Baker v. Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr. Houston

• Decision Date: 21 April 2011
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. H-08-1908
• Parties: ANN MARIE ROSE BAKER, Plaintiff, v. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS HEALTH SCIENCE CENTER HOUSTON, et al,Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas

ANN MARIE ROSE BAKER, Plaintiff,

v.UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS HEALTH SCIENCE CENTER HOUSTON, et al, Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. H-08-1908

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS HOUSTON DIVISION

Dated: April 21, 2011

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

I. Introduction

Pending before the Court is the defendants', University of Texas Health Science Center at Houston ("UTHSCH") and the University of Texas System Medical Foundation ("UTSMF"), motion for summary judgment (Docket Entry No. 50). The plaintiff, Ann Marie Rose Baker, M.D., filed a response (Docket Entry No. 61), to which the defendants filed a reply (Docket Entry No. 68). After having carefully reviewed the motion, the responses, the record and the applicable law, the Court grants the defendants' motion.

II. Factual Background

This case concerns the plaintiff's disability discrimination allegations arising during her time in the defendants' Pediatrics Residency Program (the "Program"). After graduating from medical school, the plaintiff began as a pediatrics resident for the defendants in September 2003. In May 2004, she contracted viral meningitis and was then diagnosed with Guillain-Barre Syndrome ("GBS") in June 2004.¹ After being diagnosed with GBS, the plaintiff took multiple medical leaves of absence. Upon her return to the Program, the plaintiff continued her residencywith certain work restrictions and limitations, including, inter alia, no standing or walking for more than ten continuous minutes, use of a wheelchair, and fifteen-minute rest and food breaks every two hours.

Multiple of the plaintiff's supervising physicians gave her poor performance reviews for her rotations. The Pediatric Education Committee determined that the plaintiff must complete a remediation plan to complete the Program in order to ensure that she was qualified to practice pediatrics completely and independently. On May 24, 2007, Dr. Sharon Crandell, the Program Director, sent the plaintiff this remediation plan reflecting an additional three months of training. Dr. Crandell reminded the plaintiff of her right to appeal the committee's decision under the terms of the Graduate Medical Education Resident Handbook, but she chose not to exercise that right.

On September 30, 2007, the plaintiff received her certificate of completion of the Program. Shortly thereafter, she filed her charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), alleging that she had been subject to derogatory comments and harassment, and that she had endured extended rotation times and adverse treatment because of her medical condition. On February 29, 2008, the EEOC notified the plaintiff that it was closing its file on her charge and was unable to conclude that the defendants had violated any statute. On June 16, 2008, the plaintiff filed this suit.

III. Contentions of the Parties

A. The Defendants' Contentions

The defendants contend that the plaintiff's ADA Title II claim is barred by the doctrine of state sovereign immunity. They aver that the plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination, and that the plaintiff cannot recover damages in the absence ofintentional discrimination or proximate causation. The defendants also move to strike the plaintiff's response in its entirety.²

B. The Plaintiff's Contentions

The plaintiff contends that genuine issues of material fact exist to preclude summary judgment. She maintains that the defendants were her joint employers, and that they receive federal funds. She has asserted claims for disability discrimination under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165, ³ and the Rehabilitation Act ("RA") of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794.

IV. Standard of Review

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 authorizes summary judgment against a party who fails to make a sufficient showing of the existence of an element essential to that party's case and on which that party bears the burden at trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc). The movant bears the initial burden of "informing the Court of the basis of its motion" and identifying those portions of the record "which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323; see also, Martinez v. Schlumber, Ltd., 338 F.3d 407, 411 (5th Cir. 2003). Summary judgment is appropriate if "the pleadings, the discovery and disclosurematerials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

If the movant meets its burden, the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to "go beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Stults v. Conoco, Inc., 76 F.3d 651, 656 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Tubacex, Inc. v. M/V Risan, 45 F.3d 951, 954 (5th Cir. 1995); Little, 37 F.3d at 1075). "To meet this burden, the nonmovant must 'identify specific evidence in the record and articulate the 'precise manner' in which that evidence support[s] [its] claim[s].'" Stults, 76 F.3d at 656 (quoting Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1537 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 871 (1994)). The nonmovant may not satisfy its burden "with some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, by conclusory allegations, by unsubstantiated assertions, or by only a scintilla of evidence." Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Instead, it "must set forth specific facts showing the existence of a 'genuine' issue concerning every essential component of its case." American Eagle Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l, 343 F.3d 401, 405 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting Morris v. Covan World Wide Moving, Inc., 144 F.3d 377, 380 (5th Cir. 1998)).

"A fact is material only if its resolution would affect the outcome of the action... and an issue is genuine only 'if the evidence is sufficient for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the [nonmovant].'" Wiley v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 585 F.3d 206, 210 (5th Cir. 2009) (internal citations omitted). When determining whether the nonmovant has established a genuine issue of material fact, a reviewing court must construe "all facts and inferences... in the light most favorable to the [nonmovant]." Boudreaux v. Swift Transp. Co., Inc., 402 F.3d 536, 540 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing Armstrong v. Am. Home Shield Corp., 333 F.3d 566, 568 (5th Cir. 2003)). Likewise, all "factual controversies [are to be resolved] in favor of the [nonmovant], butonly where there is an actual controversy, that is, when both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts." Boudreaux, 402 F.3d at 540 (citing Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 (emphasis omitted)). Nonetheless, a reviewing court may not "weigh the evidence or evaluate the credibility of witnesses." Boudreaux, 402 F.3d at 540 (citing Morris, 144 F.3d at 380). Thus, "[t]he appropriate inquiry [on summary judgment] is 'whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.'" Septimus v. Univ. of Houston, 399 F.3d 601, 609 (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986)).

V. Analysis and Discussion

The Court grants the defendants' motion for summary judgment because no genuine issues of material fact remain in dispute. The central factual issue concerns why the defendants extended the plaintiff's residency for a few months.⁴ However, while this is a factual issue, it is not material. Not only are the defendants protected by state sovereign immunity, but as medical educators they are entitled to a degree of discretion when determining their student's level of medical ability and knowledge-particularly when patient safety is at stake. The plaintiff seeks to curb that discretion to an impermissible degree, and the Court will not usurp the educator's role.

A. State Sovereign Immunity

The Court determines that the plaintiff's claims are barred by the doctrine of state sovereign immunity.⁵ Sovereign immunity, imposed upon federal courts by the Eleventh Amendment, is a jurisdictional issue that must be addressed before any determination of the claims on the merits. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 730 (1999); United States v. Tex. Tech. Univ., 171 F.3d 279, 285-86 (5th Cir. 1999). Congress may abrogate state sovereign immunity only where it "act[s] pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional authority." Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001) (quoting Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000)).

Under the ADA, it is sometimes true that "[a] State shall not be immune" from suit. 42 U.S.C. § 12202.⁶ That is because Congress may abrogate state sovereign immunity with respect to Title II "insofar as Title II creates a private cause of action for damages against the States for conduct that actually violates the Fourteenth Amendment." United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 159 (2006). The Supreme Court examines three elements "on a claim-by-claim basis" to determine whether Congress has appropriately abrogated a state's immunity for a Title II claim:

(1) which aspects of the State's alleged conduct violated Title II;

(2) to what extent such misconduct also violated the Fourteenth Amendment; and

(3) insofar as such misconduct violated Title II but did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, whether Congress's purported abrogation of sovereign immunity as to that class of conduct is nevertheless valid.

Georgia, 546 U.S. at 159.

Applying these three elements, the Court determines that the defendants are entitled to state sovereign immunity. As regards the first Georgia element, the contested conduct is the defendants' imposition of the remediation plan, and the resulting delay in the plaintiff's completion...