Baker v. Young

• Decision Date: 31 March 1871
• Citation: 47 Mo. 453
• Parties: GEORGE R. BAKER, TRUSTEE, ETC., Appellant, v. JAMES P. YOUNG, Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

47 Mo. 453

GEORGE R. BAKER, TRUSTEE, ETC., Appellant,

v.JAMES P. YOUNG, Respondent.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

March Term, 1871.

Appeal from St. Louis Circuit Court.

Kinealy, for appellant.

The assignment is void because Ellen Baker and George Baker could not execute a valid assignment of Ellen Baker's interest in said policy before the court, under any circumstance, by reason of her coverture. (Eadie v. Slimmon, 26 N. Y. 9; Laws of N. Y. 1840, p. 59; Wood v. Simmons, 20 Mo. 363; Jackson v. Purdew, 1 Russell, ch. 1; Honner v. Morton, 3 Russell, ch. 65; Hill on Trust. 417, and cases cited.)

On general principles of equity, such an assignment is void as against the children of Ellen Baker. In the case at bar the trustee held the legal title to the policy. Mrs. Baker's estate and interest in the policy was purely an equitable one, and the trustee did not join in the assignment. Courts of equity will not permit a wife to assign her equitable interests, even to or with the assent of her husband, or for a valuable consideration, so as to bar her children. (Fenner v. Taylor, 1 Simons, 169; Ex parte Gardner, 2 Ves. Sr. 672.)

Rankin & Hayden, for respondent.

If it be assumed that the wife held the property as her separate estate, the plaintiffs can not recover, because the wife in such case has as full power of disposition as if she were a femme sole, and may dispose of her property so held either to her husband or any one else. (Heatley v. Thomas, 15 Ves. Jr. 596; Bullpin v. Clarke, 17 Ves. Jr. 365; N. A. Coal Co. v. Dyett, 7 Paige, 9;Jacques v. M. E. Church, 17 Johns. 485; Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wall. 119; Freeman v. Freeman, 9 Mo. 772.) The statute could have no retrospective effect. The property vested under the old constitution and laws then in existence, and could not be divested. The equity vested in the wife exclusively. But even if the statute invoked has any application, it is not susceptible of the construction the plaintiff contends for. Sections 15 and 18 of the act took effect together, and must be construed together. It was not the intent of the Legislature to create a vested legal estate in remainder in a policy of insurance. Does section 15 pretend to do any such thing? And how can the plaintiff's construction be adopted without holding that the fifteenth section has no effect on any policies taken out since the act became a law? The case in 26 N. Y. is not in point. The New York act expressly provides that the parties may so make their contract of insurance as to give the children an interest. The children are named in the policy. (Kerman v. Howard, 23 Wis. 108; see Charter Oak Life Ins. Co. v. Brant, 47 Mo. 419.)

WAGNER, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court.

Plaintiff, George R. Baker, is the husband of Ellen P. Baker, and Henry W. and Kate are their minor children. He brings this suit as the trustee of his wife and the next friend of the children. It seems that the plaintiff procured an insurance on his life for the benefit of his wife, in the Mutual Life Insurance Company of New Jersey, for the sum of $5,000, the premium being paid by himself; that subsequently, with the consent of the company, the husband and wife joined in an assignment of the policy to the defendant, Young, to secure an indebtedness of the husband. At the date of the assignment the policy was non-forfeitable.

Prior to the institution of this suit he was appointed by the Circuit Court trustee for his wife, and he now sues for the recovery of the policy in her behalf and that of her children, claiming that the assignment was void. The suit is based upon the theory that immediately upon the issuing of the policy the wife and children took a vested interest, and that the wife was incapable of impairing or parting with it by any act of hers in conjunction with her husband. The doctrine that an assignment by husband and wife of the wife's reversionary interest in a chattel will not defeat the wife's right of survivorship, has been insisted upon as governing this case. But it does not apply, for here the parties are all living. The case must be governed by the construction placed upon section 18 of the act in relation to married women (2 Wagn. Stat. 936, § 18). The fifteenth section of the act does not apply, for that relates exclusively to where the wife obtains insurance and pays the premium, and it provides expressly that in case she survives her husband the sum or net amount of the insurance shall be payable to her, and for her own use, free from the claims of the representatives of her husband or of any of his creditors. But the eighteenth section declares that any policy of insurance heretofore or hereafter made by any insurance company on the life of any person, expressed to be for the benefit of any married woman, whether the same be effected by herself or by her husband, or by any third person in her behalf, shall inure to her separate use and benefit and that of her children, if any, independently of her husband and of his creditors and representatives, and also...