Charter Oak Life Ins. Co. v. Brant

• Decision Date: 31 March 1871
• Citation: 47 Mo. 419
• Parties: CHARTER OAK LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY v. MATILDA BRANT, Appellant; PETER J. HURCK, TRUSTEE, AND HENRY STAGG, Respondents.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

47 Mo. 419

CHARTER OAK LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY

v.MATILDA BRANT, Appellant; PETER J. HURCK, TRUSTEE, AND HENRY STAGG, Respondents.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

March Term, 1871.

Appeal from St. Louis Circuit Court.

W. B. Napton, with Clark & Dillon, for Mrs. Brant.

I. That the assignment of the husband was invalid against the wife's title by survivorship is well settled, by our own decisions as well as the English and other American authorities. (Wood v. Simmons, 20 Mo. 363; Craft v. Bolton, 31 Mo. 355; Purdew v. Jackson, 1 Russell, ch. 1; Honor v. Marton, 3 Russell, 65; Sto. Eq., § 1413; Hornsby v. Lee, 2 Madd. 16)

II. The only question, then, is whether the wife was capable of parting with her reversionary equitable interest in this policy. I insist that such a power would be against the policy of the statutes, which allow this kind of insurance, and that it is unknown to the common law, or to that system of equity law which has created and regulated separate estates in married women. The words “sole and separate use,” which the insurance companies have inserted in this policy, are unnecessary and superfluous; or, if designed to have the force of converting this debt into a present separate estate, and therefore liable to be parted with by the wife during marriage, utterly defeats the intent of all parties in its creation, which is to provide a fund for the wife, after the death of her husband, and not one to support her or provide for her imaginary or real wants during coverture. It is a mere pleonasm in terms to give the wife a fund to be possessed, after the death of her husband, to her sole and separate use. It can not be otherwise than to her sole and separate use if the enjoyment is fixed after the dissolution of the marriage by death. If the insertion of the words “sole and separate use” enables her to dispose of it during marriage, and thus cut off the children, as well as herself, from its enjoyment at the period named in the policy, it is a contradiction in terms and an anomaly in law to make it only available on the death of her husband. There is no precedent to be found of a separate estate in the wife, in land or chattels or choses in action, capable of being parted with by the wife alone, where it is only to come into possession on the death of the husband. Such estates are created by modern equity law to protect them against the husband, and they are present interests, or interests which, by possibility, may fall into possession during the life of the husband. (See Sto. Eq., § 1413.) Here Judge Story distinctly and clearly states the rule of courts of equity, that even a wife's separate property can not be disposed of by her unless it is also present and immediate property; and by the word “immediate,” which is used in contradistinction to reversionary, I understand such property as is in possession, or may fall into possession during the coverture. It certainly can not apply to property which, by the terms of its creation, is not to be enjoyed until the coverture ceases. (See also 2 Roper on Husb. Wife, 187.)

III. This policy, like the one in New York, was for the benefit of the wife and children, and if the wife died before the husband the interest would vest in the children. Could the wife, then, dispose of their interest as well as hers?

IV. If this policy is understood to vest such a separate estate in the wife as may be passed by her assignment, then, under our decisions (Whitesides v. Cannon, 23 Mo. 457), it is an interest subject to be taken by her creditors or her husband's creditors during his life, which is manifestly against the intent of the policy and all parties to it.

P. E. Bland, for Hurck and Stagg, respondents.

I. We do not claim that the husband alone, or the husband and wife joined, or the wife alone, are competent to assign the wife's choses in action, where there is no separate estate vested in her, so as to bar by such assignment her right of survivorship. That they are not competent, is settled by this court in Wood v. Simmons, 20 Mo. 363, and Craft v. Bolton, 31 Mo. 355.

II. We claim: 1st. That if the contract of insurance in this case perated to settle a separate estate, in the fund assured, in the appellant, then she was competent to assign the interest, and it passed to respondents, Hurck and Stagg, by her assignment. (Coates v. Robinson, 10 Mo. 757; Whitesides v. Cannon, 23 Mo. 457.) 2d. That if anything passed to her under the policy, it was a separate estate in the fund. By the express terms of the contract the interest passed (if at all) to her “for her sole and separate use.” These words create a separate estate. (1 Washb. Real Prop. 413, §§ 4, 5; Albany Fire Ins. Co. v. Bay, 4 N. Y. 11.)

The point has nothing in it that a separate estate in a wife can not be vested in a fund to be reduced into possession after the death of the husband. (1 Washb. Real Prop. 59, §§ 1, 7, 8.)

The estate is necessarily a vested interest--a present estate--though the chattel itself may not be in possession nor capable of being reduced into possession until some future time.WAGNER, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court.

This was a proceeding in the nature of a bill of interpleade brought by the plaintiff against Matilda Brant, widow of Henry B. Brant, deceased, and Hurck and Stagg, praying to be allowed to pay into court the proceeds of a certain policy of insurance on the life of Henry B. Brant, deceased, and asking that the defendants be required to interplead in order to have a determination of their respective rights. The court below adjudged that Hurck, as trustee of Stagg, was entitled to the money, and from that decision Mrs. Brant appealed. The policy was issued for $5,000, payable to the sole and separate use of Mrs. Brant after the death of her husband. The annual premium was $343.10, and the demurrer admits that the premium was paid by Brant. Brant, in his lifetime, borrowed money of Stagg and assigned the policy as collateral security, Mrs. Brant joining with him in the assignment; and he having died without making payment, the question now is whether the assignment concludes or bars Mrs. Brant from recovering the proceeds of the policy. With respect to reversionary choses in action and other...