Bales v. Shelton, S90G0405
| Citation | 391 S.E.2d 394,260 Ga. 335 |
| Decision Date | 17 May 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. S90G0405,S90G0405 |
| Parties | BALES v. SHELTON. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Anne E. Barnes, Thomas Allan Rice, Smolar, Pelletier, Roseman & Barnes, Atlanta, for Bales.
E. Davidson Burch, Blasingame, Burch, Garrard & Bryant, David R. Montgomery, Hudson & Montgomery, Athens, Jack M. Carey, Carey & Walker, Gainesville, for Shelton.
William Bales sued David Shelton for damages arising from an auto accident. The jury awarded Bales $1,500. The trial court then gave defendant credit against the judgment for no fault insurance payments. The amount of the credit exceeded the amount of the judgment. Therefore, Bales recovered nothing. Bales filed a direct appeal to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal, holding that an application for discretionary appeal should have been filed. We granted certiorari to consider whether an application was necessary in light of City of Brunswick v. Todd, 255 Ga. 448, 339 S.E.2d 589 (1986); Barikos v. Vanderslice, 177 Ga.App. 884, 341 S.E.2d 513 (1986); and OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(6).
Bales contends that no application to appeal is necessary in his case because City of Brunswick, supra, holds that the discretionary appeal procedure provided in OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(6) applies only where the amount recovered in the final judgment is between one cent and $2,500. Further, in Barikos, supra, the Court of Appeals held that before deciding whether a judgment falls within the ambit of the discretionary appeal procedure, the court must subtract amounts credited against the judgment for no-fault insurance payments. Therefore, he reasons that for purposes of the appeal procedure, his recovery should be considered to be zero--and a zero recovery does not fall within the ambit of the discretionary appeal procedure.
Given the existing case law, Bales's reasoning is sound; but we believe it achieves the wrong result. In OCGA § 5-6-35(a)(6), the legislature made clear its intention to require an application to appeal when the judgment is between one cent 1 and $2,500. See City of Brunswick, supra. The purpose of the statute is to limit appeals in those cases where a jury has decided that the damage involved was less than $2,500. In a tort action, set-offs to the judgment that arise from some collateral source--such as prior payments, or pre-existing debts 2--do not help to ascertain the price tag for the injury involved in the action. Therefore, such set-offs should not be considered when deciding whether an application for appeal is necessary. In so holding, we overrule Barikos, supra.
In this case the jury determined that the damage to plaintiff...
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...counterclaim. If this case involved solely the appeal of a "zero" award, there would be a right of direct appeal. See Bales v. Shelton, 260 Ga. 335, 391 S.E.2d 394 (1990); City of Brunswick, supra; Rich v. McDonald Car, etc., Leasing, 180 Ga.App. 613, 349 S.E.2d 832 (1986), overruled on oth......
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...400 S.E.2d 5 (1991) ("[A] zero judgment may be appealed without following discretionary appeal procedures."); Bales v. Shelton , 260 Ga. 335, 336 & n.1, 391 S.E.2d 394 (1990) (reiterating that "[i]n OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (6), the legislature made clear its intention to require an application to......
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...we consider the amount of damages the jury awarded and not the amount left after the trial court's reduction. See Bales v. Shelton , 260 Ga. 335, 391 S.E.2d 394 (1990) ; Eberhardt v. Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. , 223 Ga. App. 478, 477 S.E.2d 907 (1996). As our Supreme Court explained, "se......
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Durham v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc.
...offs, we consider the amount of damages the jury awarded and not the amount left after the trial court's reduction. See Bales v. Shelton , 260 Ga. 335, 391 S.E.2d 394 (1990) ; Eberhardt v. Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. , 223 Ga. App. 478, 477 S.E.2d 907 (1996). As our Supreme Court explaine......
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Appellate Practice and Procedure - Roland F. L. Hall
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