Balestreri v. Western Carloading

• Decision Date: 08 February 1980
• Docket Number: No. C-78-2223 SC.,C-78-2223 SC.
• Citation: 530 F. Supp. 825
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of California
• Parties: Joseph BALESTRERI, David Ferrante, and Richard Mora, Plaintiffs, v. WESTERN CARLOADING, a corporation and subsidiary of West Cartage, a corporation and subsidiary of Transway International, a corporation and Does I through X; International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 85 and Does XI through XX; Tim Richardson, individually and as business manager of International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 85, Defendants.

530 F. Supp. 825

Joseph BALESTRERI, David Ferrante, and Richard Mora, Plaintiffs, v. WESTERN CARLOADING, a corporation and subsidiary of West Cartage, a corporation and subsidiary of Transway International, a corporation and Does I through X; International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 85 and Does XI through XX; Tim Richardson, individually and as business manager of International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 85, Defendants.

No. C-78-2223 SC.

United States District Court, N. D. California.

February 8, 1980.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Joseph Balestreri, in pro. per.

David Ferrante, in pro. per.

Richard Mora, in pro. per.

Littler, Mendelson, Fastiff & Tichy, San Jose, Cal., for Western Carloading.

Murphy, Appenroot & Woods, San Francisco, Cal., for Local 85 and Tim Richardson.

ORDER

CONTI, District Judge.

On September 19, 1978, plaintiffs, Joseph Balestreri, David Ferrante, and Richard Mora, filed a complaint pursuant to Labor-Management Relations Act § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 against (1) their former employer, Western Carloading (hereinafter WC); (2) their union, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (hereinafter union); and (3) Mr. Tim Richardson, who was a business agent for Teamsters Local 85. Plaintiffs maintain that (1) the union, more specifically Local 85, failed adequately to represent plaintiffs with respect to their discharge by WC and (2) that WC breached its collective bargaining agreement with Local 85 when it wrongfully discharged plaintiffs. The matter is before the court on defendant union's Motion for Summary Judgment.

I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The parties and the court are well aware that the standard for summary judgment is a strict one. Summary judgment shall not be rendered unless (1) the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and the accompanying affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and (2) that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. F.R. Civ. P. 56; MGM Grand Hotel, Inc. v. Imperial Glass Co., 533 F.2d 486, 488 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 887, 97 S.Ct. 239, 50 L.Ed.2d 168 (1976) (quoting Radobenko v. Automated Equip. Corp., 520 F.2d 540, 543 (9th Cir. 1975)).

The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of clearly establishing the lack of any triable issue of material fact. It is not the function of the trial court at the summary judgment hearing to resolve any genuine factual issue, including credibility; and for purposes of ruling on the motion, all factual inferences are to be taken against the moving party and in favor of the opposing party. Discretion plays no real role in the granting of summary judgment. See 6 Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 56.158, at XX-XXX-XXX.

II. BACKGROUND

This lawsuit stems from an altercation that occurred at 1:45 a.m. on September 22, 1977. Plaintiffs maintain that on that day, one of WC's supervisors, Mr. Ken Lopes, attacked them with a knife. WC, on the other hand, contends that plaintiffs attacked supervisor Lopes. WC fired the three employees the following day.

These discharges were the subject of a grievance filed under the collective bargaining agreement and were pursued through arbitration by Local 85 on plaintiffs' behalf. After conducting a hearing, an impartial arbitrator, Mr. Sam Kagel, found that plaintiffs participated in an attack upon one of WC's supervisors (Lopes) and that all of the discharges were therefore proper under the labor contract. The arbitrator's decision is ordinarily final and binding on all parties. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 80 S.Ct. 1343, 4 L.Ed.2d 1403 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424 (1960).

III. ALLEGATION OF INADEQUATE REPRESENTATION

Labor-Management Relations Act § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 provides, in pertinent part, that:

suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organization, may be brought in any district court of the United States.

Section 301 also contemplates suits by and against individual employees as well as between unions and employers. Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 562, 96 S.Ct. 1048, 1055, 47 L.Ed.2d 231 (1976).

Collective bargaining contracts generally contain procedures for the settlement of disputes through mutual discussion and arbitration. Such was the case here. "Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is declared to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement." 29 U.S.C. § 173(d).

The Supreme Court has said, however, that Congress, in conferring upon employers and unions the power to establish exclusive grievance procedures, did not intend to confer upon unions such unlimited discretion to deprive injured employees of all remedies for breach of contract. Hines, supra, at 566, 96 S.Ct. at 1057. Thus, an employee can bring an action under Section 301, and thereby require the court to reach the merits of a final and binding grievance award, only if he can show that the union breached its duty of fair representation toward that employee. Hines, supra; Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 186, 87 S.Ct. 903, 914, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1966).

Plaintiff in such a case has a heavy burden since he must prove that the union conduct was arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith. Vaca v. Sipes, supra, at 190, 87 S.Ct. at 916. The Ninth Circuit has found that:

a showing of bad faith is not required, however; and a finding of arbitrary or perfunctory handling of an employee's grievance will be sufficient to show a violation of the union's duty .... The union is accorded great latitude, however, in the handling of employee grievances, and the courts are hesitant to interfere with union decisions regarding the handling of employee grievances unless they show a reckless disregard for the rights of the individual employee.

Ness v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 598 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir. 1979). Proof of union negligence or poor judgment in handling a grievance is not legally sufficient to support a claim of unfair representation. Whitten v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 521 F.2d 1335, 1341 (6th Cir. 1975); Dente v. International Org. of Masters, Mates, & Pilots, Local 90, 492 F.2d 10, 12 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 910, 94 S.Ct. 2607, 41 L.Ed.2d 214 (1974).

Defendant union maintains that based on undisputed facts and well-established legal precedent, Local 85 did not breach its duty of fair representation so that it is entitled to summary judgment. If the court grants Local 85's motion, the arbitrator's decision that the discharges were proper may not be set aside and no liability may be imposed on WC. Upon examination of the entire record, the court holds that defendant union's motion for summary judgment is granted.

In their complaint, plaintiffs enumerate the specific acts which they claim resulted in an arbitrary and bad faith representation by Local 85. First, plaintiffs maintain that union business agent Tim Richardson wrongfully informed WC that it could not discharge plaintiffs by telegram so that WC then issued conforming registered letters to each plaintiff and thereby fulfilled its contractual obligations. Second, plaintiffs claim that Duane Beeson, the attorney who was retained by the union and who represented them during the arbitration hearing, failed to handle the matter properly and thereby breached the duty of fair representation.

A. Tim Richardson

The court does not feel that defendant Richardson's conduct even approached the state of being arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith. The issue of telegrams arose on September 23, 1977 during a meeting between Richardson; Tony August, WC's supervisor on the dock; and Jim Vasile, a member of WC's management. In the course of that meeting, Richardson protested that plaintiffs had been discharged improperly so that the terminations were invalid. (Ferrante Deposition at 26-27). He maintained that plaintiffs should have either been fired on the spot for gross insubordination or should have been sent a letter with a copy to the union. From the context, it is clear that Richardson was not attempting to sabotage plaintiffs' interests, but was instead trying to prevent their discharge.

Moreover, the telegrams sent to each of the plaintiffs indicated that a letter complying with the contract was to follow. Thus, Richardson's allegedly harmful statement had absolutely no impact on the outcome of plaintiffs' case. Accordingly, the court disagrees with plaintiffs that Mr. Richardson's conduct amounted to inadequate representation.¹

B. Duane Beeson

As noted, plaintiffs maintain in their complaint that the union, through its attorney, Duane Beeson, failed adequately to represent them at their arbitration hearing. More specifically, plaintiffs claim that:

(1) on the day the arbitration hearing was held, the attorneys were changed;

(2) the new representative, Mr. Beeson, had never spoken to plaintiffs and was unprepared to proceed, but did so anyway;

(3) Mr. Beeson refused to introduce testimony taken at an earlier arbitration hearing which would have impeached Ken Lopes, who plaintiffs alleged attacked them with a knife;

(4) Mr. Beeson failed to establish plaintiffs' record of union activity, and failed to show that plaintiffs had in fact filed, or caused to be filed, numerous grievances against WC, which were the actual cause of the firings;

(5) Mr. Beeson failed to show WC's inconsistent actions by proving that WC did not fire plaintiffs on the spot, which was a violation of policy;

(6) Mr. Beeson failed to show that plaintiffs were experienced union

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