Whitten v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc.

• Citation: 521 F.2d 1335
• Decision Date: 27 August 1975
• Docket Number: No. 74-1815,74-1815
• Parties: 90 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2161, 77 Lab.Cas. P 11,071 William G. WHITTEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ANCHOR MOTOR FREIGHT, INC., and Local 377, Teamsters' Union, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 1335

521 F.2d 1335

90 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2161, 77 Lab.Cas. P 11,071

William G. WHITTEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ANCHOR MOTOR FREIGHT, INC., and Local 377, Teamsters' Union,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 74-1815.

United States Court of Appeals,

Sixth Circuit.

Aug. 27, 1975.

Paul H. Tobias, Goldman, Cole & Putnick, Cincinnati, Ohio, for plaintiff-appellant.

Bernard S. Goldfarb, Alan M. Rauss, Cleveland, Ohio, Eugene Green, Youngstown, Ohio, for defendants-appellees.

Before PHILLIPS, Chief Judge, and LIVELY and ENGEL, Circuit Judges.

ENGEL, Circuit Judge.

William Whitten, a truck driver with 13 years seniority, was discharged by defendant Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., because of an accident on July 21, 1966, when the automobile-carrying truck he was driving hit a bridge which was too low for the height of his load. In consequence, two of the General Motors automobiles which Whitten was hauling were damaged. After his discharge, Whitten brought suit in the district court pursuant to Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185, ¹ against Anchor for wrongful discharge in breach of its contract and against Teamsters' Local Union 377 for breach of its duty of fair representation in refusing to process the grievance and to obtain an arbitration hearing.

This case was tried for two weeks to a jury, but at the conclusion of all proofs, District Judge Leroy Contie directed a verdict in favor of both defendants. As to Whitten's claim of wrongful discharge, Judge Contie ruled that the undisputed evidence showed that the accident was a "major chargeable" one within the unambiguous language of the contract and that it further showed there had been a "full investigation" of the accident. Therefore, Judge Contie ruled, Anchor had an absolute right under the contract to discharge Whitten and his cause of action must fail.

As to Whitten's claim of breach by the defendant Union of its duty of fair representation, Judge Contie ruled that there could possibly be a factual issue relative to the arbitrariness of the Union based upon the Union's failure to notify Whitten of the hearing on his grievance and its failure to notify him of the fact that it did not intend to pursue his grievance to arbitration. He found no evidence that the Union had acted in bad faith. Further, he concluded that in order to establish a claim for breach of the duty of fair representation against the Union, Whitten must also establish his claim of wrongful discharge against the Company. Since Judge Contie ruled that as a matter of law this claim must fail, he held the claim against the Union must also fail.

Whitten has raised a number of issues on appeal, most relating to the claim that the district court erred in ruling that Anchor had an absolute right under the labor contract in force to discharge him. An analysis of these claims requires an understanding of the contract which was in effect at the time the discharge occurred.

The terms and conditions of employment of all Anchor's drivers (including Whitten) were governed by a labor agreement known as the National Master Automobile Transporters Agreements and Central Conference Areas Supplemental Agreements Covering Truckaway, Driveaway and Local Agreements. Under Article 32 of the general contract, the employer could not discharge or suspend any employee without "just cause", and was required to give the employee at least one warning notice of the complaint against him. No warning notice had to be given to the employee, however, if the cause of discharge was "recklessness resulting in serious accident while on duty . . . ."

The general contract, however, was supplemented by a series of "Uniform Rules and Regulations". Rule 1(a) of the Uniform Rules provided:

Where Article 32 of the contract and the Uniform Rules conflicted, the contract was explicit in providing:

"Uniform Rules and Regulations" with respect to disciplinary action covering the Conference as approved by the Joint Conference Committee shall prevail in the application and interpretation of this Article regardless of any provisions of this Agreement to the contrary.

Relying upon this court's decision in Scott v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 496 F.2d 276 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 868, 95 S.Ct. 126, 42 L.Ed.2d 107 (1974), Whitten argues that the court erred in failing to submit to the jury the question of whether Anchor had "just cause" in discharging him. In Scott, supra, we held that "When a contract is ambiguous, it is for the jury to determine the meaning of its terms, subject to proper instructions and based upon 'evidence of the surrounding circumstances and the practical construction of the parties'. Tennessee Consolidated Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 416 F.2d 1192, 1198 (6th Cir. 1969) . . . ." 496 F.2d at 280.

Whitten urges that the above cited rule, which led Judge Contie to submit the issue of "just cause" to the jury in Scott, compelled him to submit the same issue to the jury here. However, in Scott, where the plaintiff was discharged because of certain physical problems which led the company to believe he was unfit to drive, there was no explicit contract provision which gave the Company the right to discharge an employee because he was unfit. Finding the contract to be ambiguous, the court submitted the issue of whether there was "just cause" for Scott's discharge to the jury.

Here the language of the contract is unambiguous. As quoted above, the contract clearly states that the "Uniform Rules and Regulations" will control over any contrary provision in Article 32. Since the Uniform Rules unambiguously provide for what action the employer may take when an employee is involved in an accident, no issue of "just cause" was presented.

Whitten also contends the district judge erred in not submitting to the jury the questions of whether the accident he was involved in was a "major chargeable" one within the meaning of Rule 1(a), and whether the Company made a "full investigation" before discharging him.

While the term "major chargeable accidents" is not defined in the contract, Judge Contie found that the evidence was "unequivocal" that Whitten's accident was "major" even viewed in the light most favorable to him. Whitten himself acknowledged as much:

"Q. And by 'major chargeable', what does that phrase mean, as you understand it?

A. It means something over $100 on the cargo damage, or an accident with your truck."

Whitten's own attorney seemed to agree that while there was a difference in the dollar amount of the loss, the lowest figure was nevertheless major:

"As to whether it is major or not, I suppose that in terms of the actual damage you could rule as a matter of law it was major. I suppose it was a major amount of money."

The lowest estimate of damage was $300 to one car and $1,000 damage to the other. In view of this uncontroverted evidence, we conclude that the district judge did not err in holding that as a matter of law this was a "major accident".

Whitten also claims there was a jury question as to whether the accident was "chargeable" to him. This contention is based upon his allegation that Anchor failed to provide him with any equipment to measure the height of his load, and because Anchor should have routed him over the New York Thruway where there were no low bridges and no danger of accident.

The undisputed facts showed that Whitten's error in attempting to fit his rig under the bridge was the cause of the accident. The only testimony at trial indicated that this type of accident has always been treated as a major chargeable accident, and that it was one of the many possible types of major chargeable accidents. On this evidence, we conclude that there was no question for the jury as to whether the accident was "chargeable" within the meaning of the contract.

Finally, Whitten contends that the court erred in not submitting to the jury the question of whether the Company had conducted a "full investigation" as called for by Rule 1(a) before discharge for a major chargeable accident. The trial judge found as a matter of law that a full investigation had been made and that there was no question for the jury, as no contrary proof had been offered. It is clear that such language was inserted into the rule to protect an employee from arbitrary action where the circumstances of the accident were disputed, not to provide a jury with an unfettered opportunity to override the plain provisions of the contract. Whitten urges that more investigation could have been made, and that therefore it was up to the jury to determine whether what was actually done was "full".

Anchor's Safety Director Robert DeLeo met with Whitten and discussed the accident with him. DeLeo drove to the site of the accident, measured the bridge, checked the pavement, and took photographs of the bridge and approach area. Undoubtedly further investigation is always possible. We fail to see, however, in what way it would have altered the facts as they first appeared by Whitten's own filed report. We thus conclude the district judge did not err in holding that as a matter of law Anchor was not liable to Whitten for wrongful discharge.

Whitten next claims that the district judge erred in directing a verdict in favor of defendant Local No. 377, especially since the court, as noted earlier, found "there is an issue which could be submitted to the Court (sic jury) relative to whether or not the Union acted in an arbitrary manner, but the Court finds no evidence of bad faith." Judge Contie ruled that plaintiff must establish two elements before an award of damages against the Union could be made. First, plaintiff needed to establish that the Union failed to comply with its duty to fairly represent the plaintiff, and second, that the Company breached its contract by improperly discharging Whitten. Since he held as a matter of law that plaintiff failed to prove the second element, he directed a verdict...