Ball v. City of Indianapolis
| Decision Date | 25 March 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:12-cv-00179-SEB-DKL,1:12-cv-00179-SEB-DKL |
| Parties | TONI BALL, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANAPOLIS METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT, INDIANA STATE POLICE DEPARTMENT, THE STATE OF INDIANA, CLIFTON JONES, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana |
Plaintiff Toni Ball brought this case against Defendants, the City of Indianapolis (the "City"), the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department ("IMPD"), the Indiana State Police Department ("State Police"), the State of Indiana (the "State"), and Detective Clifton Jones.. Presently before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss [Docket No. 12] filed on behalf of the State Police and the State, and a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [Docket No. 18] filed on behalf of the City, IMPD, and Jones. For the reasons detailed herein, both of these motions are GRANTED.1
Between March 2009 and October 12, 2010, Detective Jones, in concert with his employer, IMPD, the City and the State Police, investigated an organization known as the "Detroit Boys," which they suspected of being engaged in narcotics drug trafficking. Accordingto Plaintiff's Complaint, the conspiracy involved a drug distribution scheme whereby the Detroit Boys' prospective customers placed telephone calls to a particular dispatch number and when their calls were answered asked to "come by." In reality, this was a code for their request for permission to buy cocaine and/or heroin. The Detroit Boys then directed their customers to one of two distribution houses where the callers could obtain the narcotics. In September 2010, Defendants undertook visual surveillance at as well as wire interceptions of the phone lines located in the two suspected distribution houses.
In December 2010, Det. Jones represented in a sworn probable cause affidavit (the "Affidavit") that Plaintiff Toni Ball had conspired to possess cocaine and/or heroin supplied by the Detroit Boys between September 8, 2010 and October 4, 2010. The Affidavit specified that Ball herself had called the telephone line or was named by others during the intercepted conversations more than thirteen times which was evidence of her involvement in the conspiracy to purchase narcotics. Although the Affidavit identified the source of the telephone number for the originating calls as an individual named "Julia Chapman," Det. Jones testified that, based on his familiarity with Plaintiff's voice, it was his opinion that Plaintiff had made the telephone calls. The Affidavit further noted that police surveillance had identified Plaintiff Ball "arriving, entering and exiting the distribution houses, after making the pertinent calls to the dispatch telephone ... to request permission to come and purchase cocaine and/or heroine."
On December 16, 2010, Plaintiff was arrested by Detective Jones and charged with two counts of "Possession of Cocaine or Narcotic/FB." However, when Plaintiff appeared in Court on January 5, 2011 on these charges, they were dismissed when it was determined that she was not the individual who was alleged to have committed the crimes.
Plaintiff's Complaint avers that Detective Jones deliberately testified falsely in the Affidavit in support of the arrest warrant, thereby causing her to be wrongfully arrested. Further, Plaintiff alleges that no one associated with Defendants verified the accuracy or veracity of Jones's Affidavit. In a "kitchen sink" fashion, Plaintiff's Complaint contains the following claims: (Count I) 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1981; (Count II) False Arrest/Imprisonment; (Count III) Fraud; (Count IV) Perjury; (Count V) Official Misconduct in violation of Ind. Code 35-44-1-2(1); (Count VI) Respondeat Superior against IMPD and the City; (Count VII) Conspiracy to Commit Perjury; (Count VIII) Respondeat Superior against the State Police and the State. Plaintiff seeks an award of compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorney fees.
The State and the State Police have filed a joint Motion to Dismiss all of Plaintiff's claims against them. The remaining Defendants -- the City, IMPD,2 and Detective Jones seek judgment on the pleadings on all claims with the exception of the false arrest and imprisonment claim against Det. Jones.3 As more fully explicated below, the legal standards governing these kinds of motions are identical and, thus, we address them as such.4
Motions for judgment on the pleadings filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) are reviewed under the same standard as a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of CivilProcedure 12(b)(6). Cuatle v. Torres, No. 1:09-cv-0820-RYL-TAB, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59420, 2010 WL 2545627 at *1 (S.D. Ind. June 15, 2010). This approach implicates Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, Killingsworth v. HSBC Bank Nev., N.A., 507 F.3d 614, 619 (7th Cir. 2007), which requires a "short plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." "A plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of her 'entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007) (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S. Ct. 2932, 92 L. Ed. 2d 209 (1986)). A complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to "'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). And a claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. at 1949.
Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that she is entitled to damages under theories based on state law claims of false arrest and imprisonment, fraud, perjury, conspiracy to commit perjury, and official misconduct. All of these claims sound in tort and, as explicated below, are barred as a result of Plaintiff's failure to file a timely notice of tort claim. Plaintiff's Complaint also alleges violations of the Indiana Constitution. However, Indiana has never recognized a civil damages remedy for alleged violations of its Constitution. See Greater Indianapolis Chapter ofN.A.A.C.P. v. Ballard, 741 F. Supp. 2d 925, 934(S.D. Ind. 2010)(Barker, J.). Thus, these claims fail as well.
Pursuant to the Indiana Tort Claims Act ("ITCA"), Ind. Code 34-13-3-8:
a claim against a political subdivision is barred unless notice is filed with: (1) the governing body of that political subdivision; and (2) the Indiana political subdivision risk management commission created under IC 27-1-29; within one hundred eighty (180) days after the loss occurs.
Under the ITCA, a "political subdivision includes a "city." IND. CODE 34-6-2-110. Plaintiff concedes that she did not file a timely tort claim notice with regard to her claims against the City, and so has withdrawn them.5 While Plaintiff has not identified which specific claims she abandoning, since the Indiana Supreme Court has ruled that the ITCA applies to all torts against persons or property, (Cantrell v. Morris, 849 N.E.2d 488, 495 n. 4 (Ind. 2006)), we construe the withdrawal to apply to all her state law claims against the City. Unfortunately, as explained below, Plaintiff's federal claims against the City fail as well.
Plaintiff's failure to file a timely notice of tort claim bars her state tort claims against Det. Jones as well because the the ITCA's notice provision applies equally its employees as to the political subdivision, so long as the employee's allegedly tortious activity occurred while he was acting within the scope of his employment. Poole v. Clase, 476 N.E.2d 828, 831 (Ind. 1985). In such instances, the employer political subdivision is required to defend an individual employee named in a tort claim action. Id. at 830-32. "To interpret the intention of the Legislature otherwise would have this provision allow a complete circumvention of all of the other purposes and provisions of the Tort Claims Act since the political subdivision would have virtually the same responsibilities when only the employee is sued but without being accorded the benefits ofnotice." Id. As noted previously, Plaintiff concedes having failed to file a timely notice of tort claim. Thus, her state law claims against Det. Jones are barred as well.
Plaintiff's state law claims have also been asserted against Det. Jones in his individual capacity. Ind. Code § 34-13-3-5(c) provides:
The Complaint before us includes multiple references to Det. Jones having acted pursuant to his official position as a Detective in committing the alleged torts. Compl. ¶ 22, 59, 64-65. Furthermore, although the Complaint recites in conclusory fashion that Det. Jones's wrongful identification of Plaintiff occurred "intentionally," "willfully," "with malice," and "acting in bad faith," the Complaint is entirely devoid of any facts supporting those allegations. Accordingly, we hold that Plaintiff's Complaint fails to meet the requirements of Ind. Code 34-13-3-5(c) as well as the minimal pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 in stating a claim against Det. Jones personally. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)("Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.").
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