Ball v. City of India

• Decision Date: 25 July 2014
• Docket Number: No. 13–1901.,13–1901.
• Citation: 760 F.3d 636
• Parties: Toni BALL, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS, et al., Defendants–Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

760 F.3d 636

Toni BALL, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS, et al., Defendants–Appellees.

No. 13–1901.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued Nov. 12, 2013.

Decided July 25, 2014.

Gregory Pierce Gadson, Attorney, Nathaniel Lee, Attorney, Lee & Fairman, LLP, Indianapolis, IN, for Plaintiff–Appellant.

Angela S. Joseph, Attorney, Office of the Corporation Counsel, Kyle Hunter, Attorney, Office of the Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, for Defendants–Appellees.

Before ROVNER and SYKES, Circuit Judges, and DURKIN, District Judge. ^*

ROVNER, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff Toni Ball sued Indianapolis police detective Clifton Jones and various state and municipal defendants after she was arrested in error based on a probable cause affidavit that Jones prepared. The district court dismissed Ball's claims against the state defendants and granted judgment on the pleadings as to all of the municipal defendants, leaving only her Fourth Amendment claim against Jones. Ball then sought leave to amend her complaint to abandon the remaining federal claim and assert only state-law claims against Jones. The court granted the motion to amend and, at Ball's request, remanded the case to state court, where it had originated. Ball now appeals the district court's adverse rulings on her other claims. We affirm.

I.

A warrant was issued for Ball's arrest in December 2010 based on an affidavit prepared and signed by Jones. Federal, state, and Indianapolis law enforcement officials had been investigating a suspected drug trafficking gang known as the Detroit Boys. Pursuant to that investigation, they had obtained authority to monitor telephone “call centers” that were used to field calls from the gang's customers and direct them to one of two drug distribution houses in Indianapolis, where customers could pick up the cocaine or heroin that they wished to purchase. According to the affidavit that Jones prepared, some thirteen of the intercepted calls either were placed by or made reference to an individual whose street name was “Mama Toni.” Based in part on Jones' and another detective's familiarity with Ball's voice, Ball was believed to be the person making and/or referenced in these calls. The affidavit also averred that Ball had been seen at the gang's drug distribution houses. On these grounds, the affidavit asserted that Ball had conspired with gang members to possess cocaine and/or heroin.

Ball was arrested by Jones on December 16, 2010, and was charged with two counts of narcotics possession. She posted bond. But local prosecutors soon concluded that the wrong person had been arrested and charged. The State dismissed all charges against Ball on January 13, 2011.

Within a matter of weeks, Ball filed suit in the Marion County, Indiana superior court against the City of Indianapolis, its police department, the Indiana State Police, the State of Indiana, and Jones. The overall thrust of the complaint was that Jones had knowingly included falsehoods in the affidavit on which the warrant for Ball's arrest was based and that others involved in the investigation had failed to verify the accuracy of the affidavit. The complaint included, inter alia, federal claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 against all defendants based on asserted violations of Ball's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process; claims under both the Fourth Amendment and Indiana law (including the Indiana constitution) against Jones for false arrest and imprisonment; a state-law claim for conspiracy to commit perjury against all defendants; state-law claims for fraud, perjury, and official misconduct against Jones; and respondeat superior claims against Indianapolis, the Indianapolis police department, the State, and the state police, premised on Jones' actions. Based on the federal claims, Jones and the municipal defendants (representing that they had the consent of the state defendants) removed the case to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 1446. The municipal defendants answered the complaint and sought judgment on the pleadings as to the claims against them pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c); and the state defendants moved to dismiss the claims against them pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

In response to the defense motions, the district court disposed of all but the Fourth Amendment claim for false arrest and imprisonment against Jones (as to which he had not sought judgment on the pleadings). R. 36; see Ball v. City of Indianapolis, No. 1:12–CV–00179–SEB, 2013 WL 1221936 (S.D.Ind. Mar. 25, 2013). Based on Ball's conceded failure to file the requisite notice under the Indiana Tort Claims Act, Ind.Code § 34–13–3–8, the court dismissed the state tort claims against Indianapolis and Jones in his official capacity; and the court found the allegations of the complaint insufficient to support such claims against Jones in his individual capacity. R. 36 at 5–6. The court found that the complaint likewise had failed to state a viable claim under state law against the state defendants. Id. at 6–8. Turning to the federal claims, the court noted that section 1983 was the sole avenue of relief against the City, but that Ball had failed to articulate any basis for imposing municipal liability for Jones' alleged errors under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). R. 36 at 8–10. As for the state defendants, Ball conceded that they did not constitute “persons” who could be sued under section 1983; the claims against those defendants were therefore dismissed. R. 36 at 10–11. The court concluded its order noting that it would withhold final judgment until the remaining Fourth Amendment claim against Jones for false arrest and imprisonment was resolved. Id. at 11. The court set that claim for trial six months hence. R. 37.

Shortly thereafter, Ball filed two motions: a motion for leave to amend the complaint, and a motion to remand the case to state court. The motion for leave to amend proposed to pursue only a state-law claim against Jones for false arrest and imprisonment. R. 38. And given that Ball was no longer pursuing any federal claims, the second motion asked the court to relinquish its supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claim and return the case to state court. R. 39.

The court granted both motions in a single order. The court observed:

In sum, Plaintiff asks that we allow [her] to convert [her] sole remaining federal constitutional claim into a state law claim for false arrest and imprisonment, so that this cause can be remanded to state court and tried there. Defendant did not respond to either of Plaintiff's motions within the time permitted under our Local Rule, and Defendant's counsel has informed the Court's Courtroom Deputy that Defendant's lack of response was deliberate because Defendant takes no position on the matter.

R. 40 at 1. The court therefore directed the clerk to file Ball's amended complaint, ordered the cause remanded to state court (specifically, the Marion County Superior Court), and directed the district court clerk to mail a certified copy of the remand order to the state court clerk pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). R. 40 at 2.

Ball then timely filed her notice of appeal, seeking review of the court's prior decision disposing of most of her federal and state claims. R. 43.

II.

As in any case, our first task is to consider whether we have jurisdiction over the appeal. E.g., Anderson v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 759 F.3d 645, 648–49, 2014 WL 2959129, at *2 (7th Cir. July 2, 2014). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we have jurisdiction to review a final decision of the district court. Ball's notice of appeal reflects her intent to appeal the district court's order on the motions to dismissand for judgment on the pleadings, which she asserts became final once the court allowed the amendment of her complaint to pursue only a state-law claim against Jones and then remanded the case to state court. See, e.g., Am. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago v. Equitable Life. Assur. Soc. of U.S., 406 F.3d 867, 876 (7th Cir.2005) (“An appeal of a final decision ‘brings up’ for review all interlocutory decisions of the district court that were adverse to the appellant and that have not become moot.”) (collecting cases).

The defendants contend that we lack appellate jurisdiction in view of 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), which in relevant part provides that “[a]n order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise....” As currently understood by the Supreme Court, however, this bar to review applies only to cases which were remanded pursuant to section 1447(c) because they were improperly removed to federal court in the first instance. Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 127, 116 S.Ct. 494, 497, 133 L.Ed.2d 461 (1995) (“[O]nly remands based on grounds specified in § 1447(c) are immune from review under § 1447(d).”); see also Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 711–12, 116 S.Ct. 1712, 1718, 135 L.Ed.2d 1 (1996); Thermtron Prods., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 343–44, 96 S.Ct. 584, 589–90, 46 L.Ed.2d 542 (1976), abrogated on other grounds by Quackenbush, 517 U.S. at 714–15, 116 S.Ct. at 1720. The bar does not govern cases like this one, in which there is no dispute that the removal was proper under section 1446, and the remand resulted from the district court's later discretionary decision to relinquish its supplemental jurisdiction over Ball's remaining state-law claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) once the federal claims were disposed of. See Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639–41, 129 S.Ct. 1862, 1866–67, 173 L.Ed.2d 843 (2009); see also Massachusetts v. V & M Mgmt., Inc., 929 F.2d 830, 833 (1st Cir.1991) (per curiam) (collecting cases).

More to the point, the defendants' argument confuses the question of whether the remand order may be reviewed with...