Ballard v. Taylor
Decision Date | 16 December 1993 |
Docket Number | No. A061786,A061786 |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Parties | Thomas O. BALLARD, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Edwin TAYLOR, Defendant and Respondent. |
Thomas P. Bucy, San Pedro, for plaintiff and appellant.
Stephen M. Mackouse, San Francisco, for defendant and respondent.
In this case we hold that: (1) orders imposing monetary discovery sanctions are not made appealable by subdivision (k) of Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1, and (2) even if they were, the order challenged in this case could not be appealed because the amount of the sanction did not exceed the statutory appealability threshold of $750. Thomas O. Ballard purports to appeal from an order imposing discovery sanctions of $714. We dismiss the appeal.
This purported appeal arises from discovery proceedings in a pending landlord-tenant dispute. Tenant Edwin Taylor moved to compel production of documents by landlord Thomas O. Ballard. Taylor also requested discovery sanctions in the amount of $714 ($700 for four hours of attorney time at $175 per hour plus $14 in filing fees). (Code Civ.Proc., § 2023, subd. (b)(1).) A court commissioner granted the motion and ordered Ballard and his attorney to pay $714 to Taylor's attorney. Ballard filed a notice of appeal specifying the order for payment of sanctions.
Review of order imposing monetary sanctions is governed by subdivision (k) of Code of Civil Procedure section 904.1, which permits an appeal from
There is a split of authority as to whether orders imposing monetary discovery sanctions are immediately appealable. The majority view is that such orders, which were nonappealable prior to the 1990 effective date of subdivision (k) (see, e.g., Slemaker v. Woolley (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1377, 1382, 255 Cal.Rptr. 532), are still nonappealable even if the amount of the sanction exceeds $750. (Hanna v. BankAmerica Business Credit, Inc. (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 913, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 430; Peterson v. General Motors (1993) 19 Cal.App. 4th 1330, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 768, 769; Russell v. General Motors Corp. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1114, 1119, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 750; Ghanooni v. Super Shuttle (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 380, 388-389, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 43; Rao v. Campo (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1557, 1566-1568, 285 Cal.Rptr. 691.) The minority view is that subdivision (k) makes such orders immediately appealable if the amount of the sanction exceeds $750. (Greene v. Amante (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 684, 690, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 571; Kohan v. Cohan (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 967, 969-971, 280 Cal.Rptr. 474.)
We agree with the majority and conclude that orders imposing monetary discovery sanctions are nonappealable under subdivision (k) regardless of the amount of the sanction. As explained in Hanna, the (Hanna v. BankAmerica Business Credit, Inc., supra, 16 Cal.App.4th at p. 915, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 430.) (Id. at pp. 917-918, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 430.) (Id. at p. 918, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 430.)
Although a decisive majority view against appealability has emerged, we join the Hanna court in urging our Supreme Court and Legislature "to provide guidance on this issue in order to ensure uniformity throughout the state." (Hanna v. BankAmerica Business Credit, Inc., supra, 16 Cal.App.4th at p. 918, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 430.) 1
In any event, because the amount of the present sanction does not exceed $750, the order is nonappealable even under the minority approach. Ballard argues the statutory proscription against immediate appeal applies only to an order for payment of sub-$750 sanctions by "a party or an attorney for a party" (Code Civ.Proc., § 904.1, subd. (k), emphasis added), whereas here the sanctions are to be paid by Ballard and his attorney. But the legislative history of subdivision (k) indicates that the proper focus is on the amount of the sanction imposed, not who is to pay it. (Kohan v. Cohan, supra, 229 Cal.App.3d at p. 970, 280 Cal.Rptr. 474, emphasis added.) Here, the order for payment is less than $750. It is clear the Legislature intended all such orders to be nonappealable. This narrow construction of subdivision (k) is consistent with its purpose of...
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