Russell v. General Motors Corp.
Decision Date | 21 February 1992 |
Citation | 3 Cal.App.4th 1114,4 Cal.Rptr.2d 750 |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Parties | Sally RUSSELL, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Defendant and Appellant. Civ. C010412. |
David S. Baumwohl, J. Christopher Edwards, Law Offices of David S. Baumwohl, A Professional Corporation, Mammoth Lakes, for plaintiff and respondent.
In this personal injury action for compensatory and punitive damages on theories of negligence, breach of warranty, and/or strict products liability, defendant General Motors Corporation moved to compel supplemental answers to interrogatories and conditionally for costs, fees, and/or sanctions. The trial court denied the requests and imposed $1,905 in monetary sanctions on defendant pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, section 2023, subdivision (b)(1). 1
Defendant petitioned this court for an extraordinary writ vacating the order which imposed the sanctions. The petition was denied. Defendant now appeals the interlocutory order imposing sanctions which it contends is an appealable order under section 904.1, subdivision (k). We disagree and hold that a monetary discovery sanction order over $750, which is an interlocutory or interim order, is not an appealable "judgment" under subdivision (k) of section 904.1. We dismiss the appeal as having been taken from a nonappealable order; however, we point out that the order is reviewable on appeal from the final judgment in the main action.
Section 904.1, subdivision (k), provides that an appeal may be taken In Kohan v. Cohan (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 967, 280 Cal.Rptr. 474, the court of appeal (Second Dist., Div. One) held that section 904.1, subdivision (k), supersedes the established rule by providing that interlocutory orders for discovery sanctions are appealable. (Id., at pp. 970-971, 280 Cal.Rptr. 474.)
In deciding Kohan, the court of appeal acknowledged that rather than expand the category of appealable sanction orders, the intent of the Legislature in enacting section 904.1, subdivision (k) was to " (Id., at p. 970.)
The court nonetheless concluded it was bound by what it believed to be the plain meaning of the language of subdivision (k). (Id., at p. 970.)
Recently, the court of appeal (Second Dist., Div. Three) held in Rao v. Campo (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1557, 285 Cal.Rptr. 691 "that a monetary discovery sanction order over $750, which is an interlocutory or interim order is not a 'judgment' for purposes of appealability under subdivision (k) of section 904.1." (Id., at p. 1568, 285 Cal.Rptr. 691.) The Rao court acknowledged that its decision conflicts with Kohan, supra, but concluded that Kohan did not reconcile subdivisions (a) and (k) of section 904.1 and thus failed "to distinguish between interlocutory or interim orders which are not appealable, e.g., orders imposing monetary discovery sanctions (citation), and final orders on collateral matters The statutes of 1989, chapter 1416, section 25, made two amendments to section 904.1 as follows:
directing the payment of money or performance of an act, which are directly appealable, e.g., monetary sanctions under section 128.5 (citations)." (Rao, supra, 233 Cal.App.3d at p. 1566, 285 Cal.Rptr. 691.)
Subdivision (a) was amended by adding the provision that "... an appellate court may, in its discretion, review ... a judgment or order for the payment of monetary sanctions, upon petition for an extraordinary writ." (Italicized portion added by amendment of 1989.)
Subdivision (k) was added, to provide that an appeal may be taken
Both Kohan and Rao acknowledge that historically an order imposing monetary discovery sanctions, regardless of the amount, has not been appealable. (Kohan, supra, 229 Cal.App.3d at p. 969, 280 Cal.Rptr. 474; Rao, supra, 233 Cal.App.3d at p. 1561, 285 Cal.Rptr. 691.) Both also conclude the legislative history of the 1989 amendment to section 904.1 reveals that the amendment was proposed for the purpose of reducing and limiting the class of judgments and orders imposing monetary sanctions which could be immediately and independently appealed before entry of final judgment. (Kohan, supra, 229 Cal.App.3d at p. 970, 280 Cal.Rptr. 474; Rao, supra, 233 Cal.App.3d at p. 1563, 285 Cal.Rptr. 691.)
Construing subdivisions (a) and (k) together, Rao came to a different conclusion regarding the plain meaning of the language of subdivision (k). "Subdivision (k) authorizes an independent and immediate appeal, i.e., direct appeal, where a monetary sanction judgment exceeds $750; but if such judgment is $750 or less then 'review on appeal' is available only after entry of final judgment in the main action or, at the discretion of the court of appeal, upon petition for an extraordinary writ."
"Subdivision (k) contains no provision for writ review where the monetary sanction judgment exceeds $750; however, such review is available pursuant to subdivision (a), which has no monetary restrictions and provides 'an appellate court may, in its discretion, review ... a judgment or order for the payment of monetary sanctions, upon petition for an extraordinary writ.' " (Rao, supra, 233 Cal.App.3d at p. 1566, 285 Cal.Rptr. 691.)
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