Ballentine v. State

• Decision Date: 02 August 1985
• Docket Number: No. 1083,1083
• Citation: 480 N.E.2d 957
• Parties: Stanley BALLENTINE, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below). S 374.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Page 957

480 N.E.2d 957

Stanley BALLENTINE, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).

No. 1083 S 374.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Aug. 2, 1985.

William J. Muha, Daniel G. Hoebeke, Zandstra & Muha, Highland, for appellant.

Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., John D. Shuman, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

DeBRULER, Justice.

This is a direct appeal from jury convictions of attempted murder, Ind.Code Sec. 35-42-1-1, Ind.Code Sec. 35-41-5-1, and robbery, Ind.Code Sec. 35-42-5-1. The issue raised is whether the trial court erred in its denial of his motion to dismiss based upon his claim that he was denied his right to a speedy trial.

These are the facts that are relevant to this issue. Appellant was charged by information with the offenses of attempted murder and robbery on October 28, 1980, in the Lake Superior Court. The State learned that appellant was in the custody of the Lafayette County Sheriff's Department in Oxford, Mississippi, and petitioned the court to send a certified copy of the arrest warrant and a motion for detainer to the Sheriff's Office in Mississippi. The detainer and warrant were sent on December 5, 1980. A second detainer was sent on August 25, 1981, to the Mississippi State Penitentiary, when the State learned appellant was being held in that location.

Appellant filed a pro se "Demand to be returned for trial" on January 18, 1982. When he was not returned to Indiana for trial within a one-hundred-eighty-day period, he filed a pro se motion to dismiss on July 26, 1982. The trial court held two hearings on appellant's motion to dismiss, the first on August 11, 1982, and the second on October 21, 1982. Appellant was represented by counsel at both hearings but was not returned from Mississippi for either hearing. The court denied appellant's motion to dismiss on October 21, 1982, and set the cause for trial on December 13, 1982. Appellant was returned to Indiana by December 7, 1982, and the jury trial was held on May 31 and June 1 and 2, 1983.

Appellant argues that his right to a speedy trial was violated when the State failed to return him from Mississippi within 180 days after his demand for a speedy trial. He argues that the 180-day limit is an equitable standard to apply in his case because that is the time frame used in the interstate Agreement on Detainers, Ind.Code Sec. 35-33-10-4, as well as in our Rules of Criminal Procedure, R.Crim.Pro. 4(A). However, he acknowledges that since Mississippi is not a party to the interstate Agreement on Detainers, the specific provisions of that law do not directly apply to him. Furthermore, he also acknowledges that this Court has held that the per se time limits in our criminal rules regarding speedy trial rights do not apply to persons incarcerated in other states. Smith v. State (1977), 267 Ind. 167, 368 N.E.2d 1154.

The issue of what specific time limit protects an appellant's right to a speedy trial when he is incarcerated in another state which is not a party to the interstate Agreement on Detainers is an issue of first impression for this Court. The right to a speedy trial springs from the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and is made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Klopfer v. North Carolina (1967), 386 U.S. 213, 87 S.Ct. 988, 18 L.Ed.2d 1. The United States Supreme Court has found that once an appellant, who is incarcerated in another state, has requested a speedy trial, the state must make a diligent, good-faith effort to return an appellant to its jurisdiction. Smith v. Hooey (1969), 393 U.S. 374, 89 S.Ct. 575, 21 L.Ed.2d 607. But the Court has also clearly stated that there is no constitutional basis for holding that the right to a speedy trial can be quantified into a specified number of days or months, Barker v. Wingo (1972), 407 U.S. 514, 523, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2188, 33 L.Ed.2d 101, 113, and that the proper approach is a balancing test in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the appellant are weighed. Four of the factors which should be assessed in determining whether a particular defendant has been deprived of his right are: "Length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant." Id. 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. at 2192, 33 L.Ed.2d at 117.

This Court discussed the United States Supreme Court's decision in Smith v. Hooey and found that the fact an appellant is in jail on a prior conviction, "whether he be in jail in Indiana or another jurisdiction, does not vitiate his interest in a speedy trial on the second charge.... there is now a constitutional obligation imposed upon the states to make, upon demand of an incarcerated defendant, a diligent, good-faith effort to bring him to trial." Fossey v. State (1970), 254 Ind. 173, 180, 258 N.E.2d 616, 620. We also explained that in determining whether such an effort has been made, we will look at all the facts and circumstances in the case.

In this case, appellant has not shown that any specific statutory quantity of time applies to him, and he cannot claim that he is unfairly denied protection of his constitutional right on that basis since the United States Supreme Court has specifically stated the right to a speedy trial cannot be measured by a specific quantity of time. Therefore, we utilize the test set out in Barker, keeping in mind the admonition of the Supreme Court that none of the four factors alone is "either a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial. Rather, they are related factors and must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant." Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 533, 42 S.Ct. at 2190, 33 L.Ed.2d at 118.

In regard to the length of delay, the time elapsed between the point at which the State first learned of appellant's presence in custody in Mississippi and caused the detainers to be...