Balt. Cnty. v. Thiergartner
| Decision Date | 20 April 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 44, 58 Sept. Term, 2014,44, 58 Sept. Term, 2014 |
| Citation | 113 A.3d 627,442 Md. 518 |
| Parties | BALTIMORE COUNTY, Maryland et al. v. Carroll THIERGARTNER. Jeffrey Walters v. Baltimore County, Maryland. |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Robert W. Burton, Asst. Co. Atty. (Michael E. Field, Co. Atty., Towson, MD), on brief, for Petitioners/Appellee.
P. Matthew Darby (Berman, Sobin, Gross, Feldman & Darby, LLP, Lutherville, MD), on brief, for Respondent/Appellant.
Opinion
These cases reach us in somewhat different procedural postures, but the issue is the same in both. Both cases concern a limit that the Legislature has placed on workers' compensation benefits that a retired public safety employee may receive under a special presumption in the Maryland Workers' Compensation Act—a limit based in part on the amount of retirement benefits that the individual also receives.
A provision of the workers' compensation law creates a presumption favorable to certain categories of public safety employees. In particular, the law presumes that certain disabling medical conditions, such as heart disease, hypertension, and lung disease, are occupational diseases suffered in the line of duty and are therefore compensable under the workers' compensation law. However, the statute caps those benefits: the sum of workers' compensation benefits and a retired employee's retirement benefits may not exceed the employee's average weekly salary during employment. The formula for capping workers' compensation benefits, seemingly simple in its description, inevitably raises questions in its implementation, particularly when its components take different forms paid on different timetables.
The retirement benefits involved in these cases derive in part from an optional retirement program once offered by Baltimore County. The program was designed to encourage senior employees, otherwise eligible to retire, to remain on the job in return for enhanced retirement benefits—an enhancement that can be taken in a lump sum upon retirement or in other ways that result in higher recurring retirement payments. The two retired firefighters in these cases—Carroll Thiergartner, the Respondent in No. 44, and Jeffrey Walters, the Appellant in No. 581 —participated in that program and opted to receive the enhancement as a lump sum payment upon their retirements. Both retirees also qualified for workers' compensation benefits as a result of the special presumption for public safety employees. The issue in both cases is how the lump sum retirement payment is to be included in the formula for capping their workers' compensation benefits.
We hold that the statute that imposes the cap on weekly workers' compensation benefits necessarily contemplates a comparison involving payments, such as salary and retirement benefits, that are paid on different time schedules and that must be converted to a weekly number to apply the statutory formula. There is no evident reason to exclude a lump sum paid at the outset of retirement from such a conversion when applying the statutory formula.
As to the manner of including the lump sum payment in that formula, we decline to adopt the method proposed by the retirees, which would treat the lump sum differently from other retirement benefits and count it only for the particular week in which it was paid. Nor do we adopt the method proposed by the County which, although it would convert the lump sum to a weekly figure for a period of time, would front-load that amount to offset workers' compensation benefits completely for that period.
In our view, the most reasonable and accurate way to convert this portion of retirement benefits to a weekly figure would be to compute a figure for a stream of weekly amounts over the course of retirement that equates in some reasonable way to the lump sum payment. Such an approach is consistent with prior appellate decisions concerning another offset provision in the Workers' Compensation Act. The Workers' Compensation Commission adopted such a method in the Thiergartner case.
The Maryland Workers' Compensation Act, codified at Maryland Code, Labor & Employment Article (“LE”), § 9–101 et seq., is designed to ensure that employees receive compensation for disabilities resulting from work-related injuries and occupational diseases. R.P. Gilbert, et al., Maryland Workers' Compensation Handbook (4th ed. 2013), §§ 1.03, 7.01. That law provides special consideration for public safety employees by creating a presumption that certain disabling diseases or conditions are occupational diseases suffered in the line of duty and therefore compensable under the workers' compensation law. LE § 9–503.2 Pertinent to these cases, the statute provides that a paid firefighter who suffers from heart disease, hypertension, or lung disease that results in total or partial disability or death “is presumed to have an occupational disease that was suffered in the line of duty and is compensable under [the workers' compensation law].” LE § 9–503(a).
Many firefighters who qualify for that presumption will be retired and will be receiving retirement benefits as a result of their employment as a firefighter. The statute provides for an adjustment of any workers' compensation benefits awarded to such an employee. Under that provision, the workers' compensation benefits received as a result of the presumption are to be offset in certain circumstances by retirement benefits that the individual receives.3 In particular, the statute provides as follows:
LE § 9–503(e). On its face, the statutory formula appears to be a straightforward exercise that involves (1) adding two numbers (the weekly workers' compensation benefit and weekly retirement benefit), (2) comparing the result to the weekly salary earned by the firefighter during employment, and (3) if the result exceeds the weekly salary, reducing the workers' compensation benefit by the amount of the difference. But things are never so simple as they seem.
Like a number of other jurisdictions, Baltimore County has included in its personnel law a provision known as the Deferred Retirement Option Program (“DROP”). The DROP is designed to retain certain categories of long-time County employees who might otherwise choose to retire by offering them the option of an enhanced retirement benefit if an employee defers retirement and remains an active County employee.
Under the DROP related to firefighters, a County firefighter who is eligible to retire and has the requisite years of service may elect to participate in the DROP. The employee then continues to work for the County as an active employee while deferring certain compensation related to the forgone pension payments and ongoing employee pension contributions in a special account. Baltimore County Code, § 5–1–302(b)–(e). In particular, when the employee elects to participate in the DROP, an account is created for the employee that includes (1) an amount equivalent to a year's worth of pension payments for each year that the employee continues to work for the County after the employee becomes eligible for retirement (the “DROP period”); (2) the retirement contributions made by the employee during the DROP period; and (3) interest earned on the amounts in the DROP account. Baltimore County Code, § 5–1–302(e).
When the period of deferred retirement comes to an end and the employee actually retires, the employee has a choice as to how to receive the amount in the DROP account. The employee can elect to receive the accumulated amount in the DROP account as a lump sum or roll it over into an eligible retirement plan and thereby enhance future retirement benefits. Baltimore County Code, § 5–1–302(f).
Mr. Thiergartner was employed as a sworn firefighter with Baltimore County for 33 years. He retired in September 2005. At the time of his retirement, Mr. Thiergartner elected to receive a lump sum from his DROP account. He received a payment of $189,346.90 within 30 days of that election. He also began to receive a monthly retirement allowance of $3,672.07. Converted to a weekly figure, that amount is $847.40 per week.
In February 2011, more than five years after his retirement, Mr. Thiergartner filed a workers' compensation claim for heart disease related to his employment. In his claim, he identified the date of disablement as May 19, 2010.
In June 2011, applying the presumption in LE § 9–503(a), the Workers' Compensation Commission found that Mr. Thiergartner had sustained an occupational disease—coronary artery disease—related to his employment as a firefighter and agreed that the first date of disablement was May 19, 2010. It found that he was entitled to a maximum weekly benefit for a permanent partial disability of $307 for 125 weeks. The Commission order identified his “average weekly wage” as $1,213.80.
The Commission also computed the offset under LE § 9–503(e)(2). As described above, in order to apply the offset, one must compare Mr. Thiergartner's combined retirement and workers' compensation benefits, expressed as an aggregate weekly amount, with his “weekly salary.” Setting aside the lump sum DROP payment for the moment, Mr. Thiergartner's ongoing pension payment, converted from a monthly figure to a weekly figure, is $847.40; his maximum weekly workers' compensation...
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