Harford Cnty. v. Mitchell
| Citation | 245 Md.App. 278,226 A.3d 436 |
| Decision Date | 02 April 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 3456, Sept. Term, 2018,3456, Sept. Term, 2018 |
| Parties | HARFORD COUNTY, Maryland v. Gary E. MITCHELL, Sr. |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Argued by: Sean P. Carven (Bradley J. Neitzel, Harford County Law Department, on the brief), Bel Air, MD, for Appellant.
Argued by: John E. Kelly (Kelly & Higinbothom, on the brief), Bel Air, MD, for Appellee.
Panel: Nazarian, Beachley, Shaw Geter, JJ.
Beachley, J. Public safety employees suffering from a work-related occupational disease are generally entitled to receive workers' compensation indemnity benefits in addition to any retirement benefits from a retirement plan the employee participated in at the time of the claim. That entitlement to receive both workers' compensation and retirement benefits is limited by an offset delineated in Section 9-503(e)(2) of the Labor and Employment Article, which provides that the workers' compensation benefits "shall be adjusted so that the weekly total of those benefits and retirement benefits does not exceed the weekly salary that was paid to" the public safety employee. Md. Code , § 9-503(e)(2) of the Labor and Employment Article ("LE"). We are called upon to answer a straightforward question of law: For purposes of calculating the offset, does the term "weekly salary" mean the public employee's weekly salary on the date of disablement resulting from an occupational disease or the employee's weekly salary at the time of retirement? Both the Workers' Compensation Commission and the Circuit Court for Harford County concluded that LE § 9-503(e)(2)'s offset provision contemplates using the employee's weekly salary at the time of retirement. We agree and shall therefore affirm.
The parties do not dispute the relevant facts. Appellee Gary Mitchell worked as a Deputy Sheriff for appellant Harford County. After developing cardiovascular disease
during his employment, Mitchell was awarded temporary total disability benefits on October 14, 2005. His average weekly wage at that time was $1,196.69.1
Upon Mitchell's retirement on July 1, 2015, he began receiving $790.48 per week in retirement benefits from a government sponsored pension plan. On January 30, 2017, more than eighteen months after he retired, the Worker's Compensation Commission ("Commission") increased Mitchell's permanent partial disability award to $578.00 per week as a result of a worsening of his condition. In determining the LE § 9-503 offset amount, the Commission concluded:
Calculation of average weekly salary: The parties are to utilize the "weekly salary that was paid to the ... police officer" which would be based on the weeks prior to retirement as opposed to the weeks used for average weekly wage which is determined by the weeks prior to the date of disablement.
(Alteration in original). The Commission determined that Mitchell's weekly salary for the fourteen weeks prior to retirement was $1,721.00.2
The County appealed the Commission's decision to the Circuit Court for Harford County. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment in the circuit court. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Mitchell, adopting the Commission's interpretation of the § 9-503 offset. The County timely noted this appeal.
The County argues that "weekly salary" in LE § 9-503(e)(2) is identical in meaning to "average weekly wage," as defined in LE § 9-602. In the County's view, because § 9-602 directs that the employee's average weekly wage shall be determined at the time of disablement, the Commission erred in using Mitchell's average weekly wage at retirement in calculating the offset. The County argues that the Commission's interpretation of "weekly salary" conflicts with the legislative purpose of the offset provision to prevent duplicate benefits for a single wage loss. According to the County, the Commission's interpretation does not serve to replace Mitchell's lost wages at the time of disablement in 2005, "but rather [his] higher salary at retirement."
Mitchell responds that the Commission's interpretation of the term "weekly salary" is consistent with the statute's legislative purpose. He contends that, because the clear legislative intent of § 9-503(e)(2) is to ensure that a public safety employee's combined workers' compensation and retirement benefits do not exceed the employee's weekly salary, the term " ‘weekly salary’ must mean a salary paid during the same time period as the payment of both workers' compensation benefits and retirement pension benefits." Mitchell finds significance in § 9-503(e)(2)'s use of "weekly salary" rather than the phrase "average weekly wage" found in § 9-602, asserting that the legislature recognized that "average weekly wage" was a term of art that permeates the Labor and Employment Article, yet chose not to use that phrase in § 9-503(e)(2).
The "paramount objective" when construing a statute "is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature." Breitenbach v. N.B. Handy Co. , 366 Md. 467, 472, 784 A.2d 569 (2001) (quoting Philip Elecs. N. Am. v. Wright , 348 Md. 209, 216, 703 A.2d 150 (1997) ). When interpreting the language of a statute, we seek to determine the intent of the legislature by looking first to "the language of the statute itself." Injured Workers' Ins. Fund v. Subsequent Injury Fund , 447 Md. 211, 226, 135 A.3d 365 (2016) [hereinafter IWIF ] (quoting Schweitzer v. Brewer , 280 Md. 430, 438, 374 A.2d 347 (1977) ). "Generally, we give the words of the statute their ‘ordinary and common meaning within the context in which they are used.’ " Mayor & City Council of Balt. v. Johnson , 156 Md. App. 569, 592, 847 A.2d 1190 (2004) (quoting Polomski v. Mayor & City Council of Balt. , 344 Md. 70, 75, 684 A.2d 1338 (1996) ). "Even in instances ‘when the language is unambiguous, it is useful to review legislative history to confirm that interpretation and to eliminate another version of legislative intent alleged to be latent in the language.’ " Blackstone v. Sharma , 461 Md. 87, 113, 191 A.3d 1188 (2018) (quoting State v. Roshchin , 446 Md. 128, 140, 130 A.3d 453 (2016) ). "[I]f the plain meaning of the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, and consistent with both the broad purposes of the legislation, and the specific purpose of the provision being interpreted, our inquiry is at an end." Breitenbach , 366 Md. at 473, 784 A.2d 569.
If the language is ambiguous, we then consider the "objectives and purpose of the enactment." Johnson , 156 Md. App. at 592–93, 847 A.2d 1190 (quoting Tucker v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. , 308 Md. 69, 75, 517 A.2d 730 (1986) ). To that end, "we read a statute so ‘that no word, phrase, clause, or sentence is rendered surplusage or meaningless.’ " Id. at 593, 847 A.2d 1190 (quoting Mazor v. State Dep't of Correction , 279 Md. 355, 360, 369 A.2d 82 (1977) ). We also may not "add or delete words" to give the statute "a meaning not reflected by the words the Legislature chose to use or engage in forced or subtle interpretation in an attempt to extend or limit the statute's meaning." IWIF , 447 Md. at 226, 135 A.3d 365 (quoting Whiting-Turner Contracting Co. v. Fitzpatrick , 366 Md. 295, 302, 783 A.2d 667 (2001) ). "Moreover, when the statute is part of a general statutory scheme or system, ‘all sections must be read together ... to discern the true intent of the legislature.’ " Johnson , 156 Md. App. at 593, 847 A.2d 1190 (alteration in original) (quoting Breitenbach , 366 Md. at 472, 784 A.2d 569 ). In discerning the legislative intent, we seek to "avoid[ ] an illogical or unreasonable result, or one which is inconsistent with common sense." Id. (quoting Chesapeake Charter, Inc. v. Anne Arundel Cty. Bd. of Educ. , 358 Md. 129, 135, 747 A.2d 625 (2000) ). "Last, applying a canon of construction specific to the Act, if the intent of the legislature is ambiguous or remains unclear, we resolve any uncertainty in favor of the claimant." Breitenbach , 366 Md. at 473, 784 A.2d 569.
The relevant portion of the Workers' Compensation Act at issue here reads:
LE § 9-503 (emphasis added). The basic purpose of the statute is clear, as recognized by the Court of Appeals in Balt. Cty. v. Thiergartner :
A provision of the workers' compensation law creates a presumption favorable to certain categories of public safety employees. In particular, the law presumes that certain disabling medical conditions, such as heart disease
, hypertension, and lung disease, are occupational diseases suffered in the line of duty and are therefore compensable under the workers' compensation law. However, the statute caps those benefits: the sum of workers' compensation benefits and a retired employee's retirement benefits may not exceed the employee's average weekly salary during employment. The formula for capping workers' compensation benefits, seemingly simple in its description, inevitably raises questions in its implementation, particularly when its components take different forms paid on different timetables.
442 Md. 518, 519, 113 A.3d 627 (2015). Thus, while the essential legislative purpose is obvious, its "implementation" is not so clear. This case presents the type of implementation difficulty that the Thiergartner Court presciently foresaw.
LE § 9-503(e)(1) provides that a public safety employee shall...
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