Baltimore Fidelity Warehouse Co. v. Canton Lumber Co.
| Decision Date | 10 May 1912 |
| Parties | BALTIMORE FIDELITY WAREHOUSE CO. v. CANTON LUMBER CO. |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Baltimore County, in Equity; Wm. H Harlan, Judge.
Bill by the Canton Lumber Company against the Baltimore Fidelity Warehouse Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.
Washington Bowie, Jr., for appellant.
Charles E. Siegmund and Thomas G. Hayes, for appellee.
In this case the appellee filed its bill in the circuit court for Baltimore county, in equity, against the appellants, the Baltimore Fidelity Warehouse Company and Edward M. Hammond and E. Lynne Painter, receivers for the Saratoga Improvement Company, to enforce a lien upon the building and property of the Baltimore Fidelity Warehouse Company, located in Baltimore county, for materials furnished by the appellee company to the Saratoga Improvement Company, contractor for said building, and used in the erection of the same. The amount of the appellee's claim, as shown by the lien filed with the bill as an exhibit, is $3,286.34.
The appellee bases its right to its lien upon chapter 52 of the Acts of 1910. This statute provides that See Dunn v. Brager, 116 Md. 242, 81 A. 516.
As the law stood prior to the passage of this act, no person, firm or corporation was entitled to the benefit of a mechanics' lien upon any building in Baltimore county for materials furnished for or about the same (except as provided in section 20 of article 63 of the Public General Laws entitled "Mechanics' Liens"), unless the contract for furnishing such material was made directly with the owner of such building or his agent. In this case the material was not furnished under a contract with the owner or his agent, but was furnished to the contractor, under a contract with him.
The appellants, defendants below, contend that chapter 52 of the Acts of 1910, under and by virtue of which, as we have said, this lien is claimed, "was not constitutionally passed, and is not a valid and subsisting law." The only question before us on this appeal is: Was chapter 52 of the Acts of 1910 constitutionally passed, and is it a valid and subsisting law?
The act here involved is a public statute, and appears in the statute book with all the prescribed forms of authentication. This court has said: "Where an act has been duly authenticated and published as law by authority, the presumption is that all the constitutional solemnities and prerequisites necessary to its valid enactment have been complied with; and this presumption exists until the contrary is clearly made to appear." Berry v. Baltimore & Drum Point R. R. Co., 41 Md. 462, 20 Am. Rep. 69.
"In several of the state courts of the highest authority, and in all cases, with but few exceptions, it has been held *** that it is the right and duty of the court to go behind the authentication of the statute, and to receive evidence, such as that furnished by the engrossed bills, with indorsements thereon, and the journal of proceedings of the two houses of the Legislature, upon the question of the constitutional enactment of what purports to be a statute." Berry v. Baltimore & Drum Point R. R. Co., supra; Legg v. Mayor, etc., of Annapolis, 42 Md. 203. The court, however, in the case of Berry v. Baltimore & Drum Point R. R. Co., supra, cautiously observed that they did not decide therein that the journals of the two houses, though required by the Constitution to be kept as records of the proceedings, would be evidence per se upon which the validity of a statute having the required authentication could be successfully questioned as to the manner of its enactment, but held that the journals, in connection with other competent evidence upon the subject, could be examined as a means of information to aid in arriving at a correct conclusion as to what was the action of the Legislature on any particular bill before it.
In this case the engrossed and enrolled bills, as well as the journals of the House and Senate, were offered in evidence by the plaintiff in support of the objections urged against the act that it was not constitutionally passed, and therefore not a valid and subsisting law. Upon the authorities cited, and from the information to be gathered from such engrossed and enrolled bills and the said journals of the House and Senate, we think they are a proper source from which the court may acquire information as to whether the statute was constitutionally passed, and is a valid and subsisting law. By them it is shown that the bill originated in the House as bill No. 129, and was introduced on February 2, 1910, and referred to the committee on judiciary. On February 10th the bill was favorably reported by the committee and read a second time in the House and ordered engrossed for third reading. On February 15th it was read a third time and passed by yeas and nays. The bill was then sent to the Senate and read the first time in the Senate on February 16th, and referred to the committee on judicial proceedings. On March 17th it was reported favorably to the Senate and read the second time. On March 24th it was read the third time in the Senate and passed by yeas and nays, and on March 25th the bill was returned to the House, where it was enrolled and "sealed with the great seal, and on March 26th was presented to the Governor for his approval." On March 28th the following message of the Senate was read and assented to and sent to the House of Delegates:
Upon the same day the following message of the House was read and assented to and sent to the Governor:
On March 28th, as shown by the indorsement upon the enrolled bill sent to the Governor, the bill was returned by him to the House, in compliance with its message, and on the same day (March 28th) the House sent to the Senate a message, acknowledging the receipt of its message of that day, asking for the return of the bill, and with such message it returned the bill. On March 29th the President laid before the Senate the bill returned by the House; whereupon the vote by which the bill was passed was reconsidered, and certain amendments thereto were adopted, and the bill passed by yeas and nays, as amended. On March 30th the bill was received in the House from the Senate, and the Senate's amendments concurred in, and the bill passed by yeas and nays, as amended. The bill was again enrolled and sent to the Governor, and was by him approved on April 1, 1910.
It is urged by the appellants that the act was not constitutionally passed, and is not a valid and subsisting law for the following reasons: (1) The bill, having been duly passed and presented to the Governor for signature, was beyond the power of the Legislature to recall. (2) Under the Constitution, the Governor cannot return a bill, except with his veto and objections. (3) The rules of each House of the Legislature are the law of that body, and cannot be abrogated, except by express legislative enactment. (4) There is no provision in the Constitution nor rule of either house of the Legislature permitting further action regarding a bill after it has been sent to the Governor, except after his veto. (5) The enrolled copy cannot be considered as other than a new bill, and the indorsements and journals show conclusively that it did not pass the Legislature in the manner pointed out by the Constitution.
We will first consider and discuss the first, second, and fourth reasons urged against the validity of the statute.
The appellants contend that when the bill is presented to the Governor the jurisdiction and control of the legislative branch of the government ends, and that of the executive commences, and that the latter then continues until (1) the bill is signed, or (2) it is vetoed and returned to the Legislature, with the objections of the executive stated, so as to be spread upon the record, or (3) the bill becomes a law by virtue of the provisions of section 17 of article 2, if not either signed or vetoed by the Governor within six days from the time it is presented to him, unless within that time its return is prevented by the adjournment of the Legislature.
In support of its contention, the appellants cite the cases of Wolfe v. McCaull, 76 Va. 876, and People v Devlin, 33 N.Y. 269, 88 Am. Dec. 377. In the first of these cases, after the bill had been passed by both branches of the General Assembly and presented to the Governor, a joint resolution was introduced in the Senate, requesting the Governor to return said bill to the General Assembly, which joint resolution was passed by both branches of the Legislature. In response to this resolution, the Governor sent the enrolled bill to...
To continue reading
Request your trial