Baltimore & O.R. Co. v. County of Jefferson
| Decision Date | 01 January 1886 |
| Citation | 29 F. 305 |
| Court | Circuit Court of Virginia |
| Parties | BALTIMORE & O.R. CO. v. COUNTY OF JEFFERSON. |
Caleb Boggess and J. A. Hutchinson, for Baltimore & O.R. Co.
C. C Watts and Forrest Brown, for the County of Jefferson.
The Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company, a corporation of the state of Maryland, files its bill against the county of Jefferson as a corporation of the state of West Virginia, and Eugene Baker, late sheriff, and A. G. Hurst, acting sheriff, of the county, and citizens of this state, to enjoin and restrain the defendant from collecting taxes, which, as the bill alleges, were levied for the purpose of aiding the construction of the Shenandoah Valley Railroad, passing through the county of Jefferson, a rival corporation to that of the plaintiff. To this bill the defendant demurs, and the case is now heard upon the issue presented by the demurrer. It appears from the bill that the legislature of West Virginia, on the twenty-fifth of February, 1870, passed 'An act to authorize the Shenandoah Valley Railroad Company to construct their road through the state of West Virginia, to the Potomac river, and also to authorize the board of supervisors of Jefferson county to submit to a vote of the people, at a special election, the question of the subscription to the capital stock of the company. ' The power of the court is invoked to protect the plaintiff from what it alleges to be 'the unjust and illegal claim of the county of Jefferson to charge it with the payment of taxes to discharge the principal and interest of bonds amounting to $250,000 issued by said county to pay for its subscription to the capital stock of the defendant corporation.'
An examination of the act justifies the conclusion that it was the intention of the legislature to confer power upon an existing corporation, created by the laws of a sister state, to extend her road through the county of Jefferson, in this state. It was not the creation of an original corporation, but was a grant, in the nature of a license, to an existing one, to construct its road, which appears to be the main purpose of the act.
The first question presented for the consideration of the court is the validity of the act under which the subscription was made. It is claimed that this act embraces more than one object, and more than one object is expressed in the title, and is for that reason void, because it is in conflict with the thirty-sixth section of the fourth article of the constitution of West Virginia, adopted in 1863, which provides 'that no law shall embrace more than one object, which shall be expressed in the title. ' In this connection we are informed that the fifth and sixth sections of the act provide for a subscription to the capital stock of the road by Jefferson county, which is an object different from the main purpose of the law, and is for this reason obnoxious to the constitution. To support this position the court is referred to Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, 78, 79, 150, 151, and Cutlip v. Sheriff, 3 W.Va. 589.
We cannot concur with counsel that either of the authorities cited sustains their view of the law. Mr. Cooley, in discussing this question, under the head of 'The Title to a Statute,' remarks that the general purpose of constitutional provisions of this character are accomplished when a law has but one general object, which is fairly indicated by the title. This view of the text writer is well supported by judicial decisions. The case in 3 W.Va. strongly relied on to support the position that the act of 1870 is unconstitutional, we think, does not sustain it. The title of the act in that case was 'An act locating the county-seat of Calhoun. ' But the law, as passed, contained a section which authorized the board of supervisors of said county to sell any property at Arnoldsburg, in the county. The court held this act void, for the reason that the third section contained an object other than the one expressed in the title. It authorized the board of supervisors to sell any county property at Arnoldsburg, at that time the county-seat, without describing it, or restricting their action to the sale of the property which was properly connected with the proposed change in the county-seat. This purpose was not expressed in the title, and for this reason it was held to be repugnant to the constitution.
Conceding that decision to be right, does it apply to the case under consideration? We think not. In this case, the act had but one main object; that was to authorize the construction of a railroad through the territory of West Virginia. All other provisions of the bill are auxiliary to that object, and have a necessary or natural connection. The power conferred by the act upon the board of supervisors of Jefferson county to submit to a vote of the people the question of a subscription to the capital stock of the company, although it was not expressed in the title, yet was an incident to the main object, and in no sense that we can perceive was it a different and distinct object from the main purpose of the law.
The object of this constitutional provisions is to prevent the union of incongruous matters, having no relation to each other. It is to be found in the constitution of a number of the states, and has received judicial construction. We think, upon a close examination of the cases decided in Indiana, Michigan, New York, and Illinois, upon similar constitutional provisions, that it will be found that the courts hold that, where the law embraces several objects, all of which are matters properly connected with its chief object, that it is unnecessary that the title of the act should contain every purpose of the law.
The constitution of Texas contains a provision similar to the one under consideration. It declares that 'every law enacted by the legislature shall embrace but one object, and that shall be expressed in the title. ' This provision has received judicial interpretation in the case of City of San Antonio v. Mehaffy, 96 U.S. 312. The legislature of that state passed 'An act to incorporate the San Antonio Railroad Company. ' Like the law we have under consideration, it had other provisions, one of which was 'to authorize the city of San Antonio to take stock in the company, and issue bonds to pay for the same. ' The supreme court of the United States in that case held the law to be constitutional, and that it had but one object, and that was expressed in the title. In the case of Unity v Burrage, 103 U.S. 458, the supreme court was again called upon to pass upon a clause of the constitution of Illinois similar, if not almost identical, in phraseology to the one we have under consideration; and the court again affirmed its ruling in the case of San Antonio v. Mehaffy, citing with approbation the case of Belleville, etc., R. Co. v. Gregory, 15 Ill. 20. Still later, the supreme court of Illinois maintained this doctrine in Ross v. Chicago R. R., 77 Ill. 127. This long line of decisions was recently reviewed by the supreme court of the United States in the case of Mahomet v. Quackenbush, 117 U.S. 508, S.C. 6 S.Ct. 858, and the chief justice, speaking for the court, again sustained their previous rulings upon this question. The decisions of the highest tribunals in the states of Indiana, Michigan, and Wisconsin are to the same effect,...
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