B.A.M. Dev., L.L.C. v. Salt Lake Cnty.

Decision Date10 July 2012
Docket NumberNo. 20100923.,20100923.
Citation2012 UT 26,282 P.3d 41,707 Utah Adv. Rep. 16
PartiesB.A.M. DEVELOPMENT, L.L.C., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SALT LAKE COUNTY, Defendant and Appellee.
CourtUtah Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Stephen G. Homer, West Jordan, for plaintiff.

Sim Gill, Donald H. Hansen, Thomas L. Christensen, Salt Lake City, for defendant.

Justice LEE, opinion of the Court:

¶ 1 This protracted litigation arises out of a real-property exaction imposed on B.A.M. Development, L.L.C., as a condition of a construction permit for a fifteen-acre residential housing development. The case has been before us twice previously and twice we have remanded for a new trial. This third appeal will be B.A.M.'s last. We bring the case to a close by affirming the trial court in all respects.

I

¶ 2 Salt Lake County's “highway dedication” ordinance applies to developers seeking construction permits for any “parcel of land [abutting a] public street which does not conform to current county [road] width standards.” Salt Lake County, Utah, Code of Ordinances § 15–28–010. Those developers must dedicate and improve the additional street width necessary for conformity with county road-width standards. Id.

¶ 3 B.A.M. Development, L.L.C., applied to Salt Lake County for a development permit in July 1997. B.A.M. proposed to develop a fifteen-acre parcel located at 7700 West 3500 South in unincorporated Salt Lake County. The property abuts State Highway 171, a road owned by the state of Utah and managed by the Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT). As directed by the County's highway-dedication ordinance, B.A.M.'s proposed plat dedicated a 40 ft. wide right of way along Highway 171—in accordance with then-existing County road-width standards. The County's engineering and development staff approved this application.

¶ 4 The County based its road-width standard for Highway 171 on recommendations from the Wasatch Front Regional Council (WFRC) and UDOT. After the County approved B.A.M.'s application, WFRC and UDOT informed a County engineer that the “currently required” highway width at that location required a dedication of 53 ft., rather than 40 ft. The County updated its road-width standards to reflect this, and the County Planning Commission informed B.A.M. that its development permit would be subject to compliance with the new 53 ft. dedication requirement.

¶ 5 B.A.M. appealed the Planning Commission's decision to the Salt Lake County Board of Commissioners, arguing that the County's grab of an additional 13 ft. amounted to an unconstitutional taking of property. The Board of Commissioners denied B.A.M.'s appeal. B.A.M. then filed suit in the district court, which held a bench trial and ruled in favor of the County. The court of appeals affirmed, but we reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that the trial court should have applied the rough-proportionality test adopted in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 114 S.Ct. 2309, 129 L.Ed.2d 304 (1994), to B.A.M.'s takings claim. See B.A.M. Dev., L.L.C. v. Salt Lake Cnty. (B.A.M. I), 2006 UT 2, 128 P.3d 1161. B.A.M. lost again in the second trial, in which the court employed Dolan's rough-proportionality test, and B.A.M. again appealed to this court. Again we reversed, this time on the ground that the trial court had misapplied Dolan's rough-proportionality test. See B.A.M. Dev., L.L.C. v. Salt Lake Cnty. (B.A.M. II), 2008 UT 74, 196 P.3d 601. We instructed the trial court on remand to compare the government's cost of alleviating the development's impact on infrastructure with the cost to B.A.M. of the exaction. Id. ¶¶ 13–14.

¶ 6 After conducting a third trial, the district court made the following findings regarding rough proportionality: (1) the County transportation engineer expects increasing traffic in the area surrounding B.A.M.'s development; (2) the WFRC anticipates alleviating this increased traffic through road-widening projects costing $6,748,700 in 1998 dollar values; (3) these projects “will likely be financed by a combination of government ... funding sources, including federal highway funds and additional State, County, and/or municipal funds”; (4) “the portion of the $6,748,700 total cost that is directly attributable to [B.A.M.'s subdivision] is 5%, or $337,500”; and (5) B.A.M.'s total cost for the additional 13 ft. dedication is $83,997.29. The court concluded that B.A.M.'s cost was significantly less than the government's cost, and that the County's exaction thus did not violate the Dolan rough-proportionality standard.

¶ 7 B.A.M. now appeals the judgment from the third trial, insisting that the trial court's rough-proportionality approach was again erroneous because the court calculated the County's costs too broadly and B.A.M.'s too narrowly. B.A.M. also suggests three additional grounds for reversal.

¶ 8 We review the trial court's legal conclusions de novo and the court's subsidiary factual findings for clear error. Manzanares v. Byington (In re Adoption of Baby B), 2012 UT 8, ¶¶ 40–41, 270 P.3d 486. And as for the mixed question whether the trial court correctly applied the constitutional test, the standard of review is de novo. B.A.M. II, 2008 UT 74, ¶ 5, 196 P.3d 601. We find no error in the trial court's judgment and accordingly affirm.

II

¶ 9 Before addressing the substance of B.A.M.'s appeal, we consider a motion for summary disposition filed in this case by the County. In this motion, the County challenges the timeliness of B.A.M.'s appeal, contending that the appeal fails under the time standards in Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 4(a) and 4(b). According to the County, B.A.M. did not file within the thirty days prescribed by rule 4(a), and B.A.M.'s posttrial motions were so lacking in substance that they did not qualify for the extension of time allowed by rule 4(b). We disagree and hereby deny the County's motion.

¶ 10 Under rule 4(a), a notice of appeal must be filed “within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from.” The thirty-day filing period is subject to extension under rule 4(b), however, which tolls the filing period upon submission of any of several post-trial motions, including a motion to make additional findings of fact under rule 52(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, amend the judgment under rule 59, or grant a new trial under rule 59. Utah R.App. P. 4(b)(1), (1)(B), (1)(C), (1)(D). Under rule 4(b)(1), the thirty-day period does not begin to run until the court enters an order ruling on one of those underlying motions.

¶ 11 B.A.M.'s notice of appeal was proper under rule 4(b). After the final judgment entered on July 29, 2010, B.A.M. filed a timely postjudgment motion (on August 6, 2010) entitled, Motion For New Trial and Motion to Amend Judgment.” 1 The motion referred expressly to rule 59 and requested a new trial. On its face, then, B.A.M.'s motion seemed to satisfy the tolling requirements of rule 4(b).

¶ 12 Despite B.A.M.'s formal compliance with rule 4(b), the County asks us to disregard the motion's form and to consider its essential character. And because the motion, in the County's view, was in substance a motion to reconsider—in that it was essentially a “rehash” of arguments made during trial—the County contends that rule 4(b)'s tolling provision was not triggered.2

¶ 13 We disagree. B.A.M. filed a motion that—in both form and substance—sought a new trial under rule 59. The motion was captioned as a motion for new trial, it cited rule 59, and it expressly requested a new trial. This is sufficient. Rule 4(b) is triggered by the filing of a motion that is properly styled as one of the motions enumerated in the rule and that plausibly requests the relevant relief.3 B.A.M. easily met those requirements.

¶ 14 As the County notes, B.A.M. did not specify which subsection of rule 59 provided the grounds for its relief. But its memorandum in support of the motion explained in detail the legal errors it believed the court had made, and that suffices under our precedent.4 And although B.A.M.'s arguments were unconvincing and repetitive, neither rule 4(b) nor rule 59 require that a posttrial motion make winning arguments to be procedurally proper.

III

¶ 15 As to the merits, B.A.M. first challenges the legal standards and principles applied by the trial court in ruling in the County's favor on B.A.M.'s claim that the development exaction at issue amounted to an unconstitutional taking of its property. B.A.M.'s arguments build on general principles of property law and constitutional takings principles set forth in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825, 107 S.Ct. 3141, 97 L.Ed.2d 677 (1987), and Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 114 S.Ct. 2309, 129 L.Ed.2d 304 (1994), and elaborated in our subsequent cases. Those principles are essential to an understanding of the issues before us on appeal, so we begin with a background description of the relevant legal landscape.

¶ 16 A development exaction is a government-mandated contribution of property imposed as a condition of approving a developer's project. Salt Lake Cnty. v. Bd. of Educ., 808 P.2d 1056, 1058 (Utah 1991). One common type of development exaction is a mandatory dedication of land for roads. Id. Such a mandatory dedication implicates the Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which protects private property from governmental taking without just compensation. U.S. Const. amend. V. Takings law in this field is governed by the U.S. Supreme Court's seminal decisions in Nollan and Dolan.

¶ 17 Under Nollan, the Takings Clause requires a direct relationship—an “essential nexus”—between a condition imposed on a developer and the development's predicted impact on the community. 483 U.S. at 836–37, 107 S.Ct. 3141.Nollan began with the premise that local government may outright deny development permits for any legitimate governmental purpose. Id. at 836, 107 S.Ct. 3141. And it concluded that a dedication...

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