Bandhan v. Laboratory Corp. of America

• Decision Date: 26 November 2002
• Docket Number: No. 99 CIV.12085.,99 CIV.12085.
• Citation: 234 F.Supp.2d 313
• Parties: Angela BANDHAN, Plaintiff, v. LABORATORY CORPORATION OF AMERICA, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

234 F.Supp.2d 313

Angela BANDHAN, Plaintiff, v. LABORATORY CORPORATION OF AMERICA, Defendants.

No. 99 CIV.12085.

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

November 26, 2002.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Lisa R. Lipman, New Rochelle, NY, for Plaintiff.

John Ridley, Drinker & Biddle, Florham Park, NJ, for Defendants.

ORDER

BERMAN, District Judge.

I. Introduction

On or about December 16, 1999, Plaintiff Angela Bandhan ("Plaintiff"), filed this action against her former employer, Laboratory Corporation of America ("Defendant" or "LabCorp."), alleging that Defendant discriminated against her because of her race and retaliated against her for complaining of discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et. seq. (1994) ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 290 et. seq., as amended ("NYSHRL").

On or about May 10, 2001, Defendant moved for summary judgment ("Defendant's Motion") under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Fed. R. Civ.P."); and on or about July 11, 2001, Plaintiff filed an opposition to Defendant's Motion. Defendant replied on August 3, 2001.

On March 26, 2002, United States Magistrate Judge George A. Yanthis, to whom this matter had been referred, issued a report and recommendation ("Report") recommending that Defendant's Motion be granted as to Plaintiff's failure to promote and unequal pay claims, Report at 7-8, and denied as to Plaintiff's wrongful termination and retaliation claims. Id. at 10-11.

The Report advised the parties that "[p]ursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), as amended, and Rule 72(b), Fed.R.Civ.P., the parties shall have ten (10) days from receipt of this Report to serve and file written objections to the Report and Recommendation." Id. at 11. On April 30, 2002, Defendant filed objections to the Report ("Defendant's Objections"); and on May 1, 2002, Plaintiff's objections were filed ("Plaintiff's Objections"). Defendant filed a reply to Plaintiff's Objections on June 4, 2002 ("Defendant's Reply"); and on June 6, 2002, Plaintiff filed an opposition to Defendant's Objections ("Plaintiff's Opposition"). For the reasons set forth below the Court adopts the Report in its entirety.¹

II. Standard of Review

A district court evaluating a Magistrate's report may adopt those portions of the report to which no "specific, written objection" is made, as long as those sections are not clearly erroneous. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985); Greene v. WCI Holdings Corp., 956 F.Supp. 509, 513 (S.D.N.Y.1997). "Where a party makes a `specific written objection' within `[ten] days after being served with a copy of the [magistrate judge's] recommended disposition,' however, the district court is required to make a de novo determination regarding those parts of the report." Cespedes v. Coughlin, 956 F.Supp. 454, 463 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (quoting United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676, 100 S.Ct. 2406, 65 L.Ed.2d 424 (1980)). A district judge may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings and recommendations of the Magistrate. See DeLuca v. Lord, 858 F.Supp. 1330, 1345 (S.D.N.Y.1994); Walker v. Hood, 679 F.Supp. 372, 374 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).

III. Analysis

The facts as set forth in the Report are incorporated herein by reference unless otherwise noted. The Court has conducted a de novo review of the Report, the record, applicable legal authorities, along with Plaintiff's and Defendant's Objections and replies.² Neither parties' submissions provides a basis for departing from the Report's recommendations.

A. Discrimination Claims

Discrimination claims under Title VII, as pointed out by Magistrate Yanthis, are often analyzed using the three step burden-shifting analysis outlined in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 804, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).³ Under McDonnell, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. The burden then shifts to the employer to articulate "a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason" for the employment action. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 142, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). "[O]nce the employer produces sufficient evidence to support a nondiscriminatory explanation for its decision, the presumption raised by the prima facie case is rebutted and drops from the case." Id. The plaintiff "must [then] be afforded the opportunity to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination." Id. at 143, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (internal quotations omitted). "The test for summary judgment is [ultimately] whether the evidence can reasonably support a verdict in plaintiff's favor." James v. N.Y. Racing Ass'n, 233 F.3d 149, 157 (2d Cir.2000).

Failure to Promote

"To state a claim for an allegedly discriminatory failure to promote, a plaintiff must allege that (1) he [or she] is a member of a protected class; (2) he [or she] is qualified for the position; (3) he [or she] applied for and was denied promotion to the position; and (4) the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants." Lee v. Overseas Shipholding Group, Inc., 2001 WL 849747, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2001) (citation omitted).⁴

Magistrate Yanthis properly concluded that Plaintiff did not state a prima facie case because Plaintiff could not demonstrate that the Phlebotomy Supervisor position she complains about was open in May of 1997. "[T]he undisputed facts establish that the [supervisor] position for which plaintiff applied was not vacant and, in fact, had been occupied by [Juliette] Morales ["Morales"] for some time. Consequently, plaintiff cannot demonstrate that the position remained open and that LabCorp continued to seek applicants."⁵ Report at 7 (emphasis in original); see Brown v. Coach Stores, Inc., 163 F.3d 706, 710 (2d Cir.1998) (a plaintiff must allege that she "applied for a specific [available] position or positions and was rejected therefrom, rather than merely asserting that on several occasions she ... generally requested promotion.").

Disparate Pay

Plaintiff argues, among other things, that because she was not promoted to Phlebotomy Supervisor earlier than she was, her pay was kept "artificially low" by Defendant since she was acting as a "de facto" supervisor for three years, Plaintiffs Objections at 20, and this failure to pay her as a supervisor "represents disparate pay between two individuals," i.e., Plaintiff and Morales. Id. at 20.

In order to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory disparate pay under Title VII, a plaintiff must show: (1) that she was a member of a protected class; (2) that she was paid less than similarly situated nonmembers of her protected class; and (3) evidence of discriminatory animus. See Belfi v. Prendergast, 191 F.3d 129, 140 (2d Cir.1999).

As Magistrate Yanthis correctly determined, "[P]laintiff fails to establish a prima facie case of unequal pay." Report at 8. For one thing, Plaintiff was unable to establish that she and Morales were "similarly situated." See Shumway v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 118 F.3d 60, 64 (2d Cir.1997). For example, during the first two years of Plaintiff's employment, Morales (as a Phlebotomy Supervisor) was responsible for supervising other phlebotomists and patient service technicians while Plaintiff (then a senior phlebotomist) performed lab tests and patient testing. Statement of Facts, ¶ 4. Also, Morales had greater work experience than Plaintiff; Morales held a Phlebotomy Supervisor position for over six years prior to Plaintiff's promotion; and Morales had been employed by Defendant at least three years longer than Plaintiff. Statement of Facts, ¶¶ 4, 6. See, e.g., Koster v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 687 F.Supp. 848, 859 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) ("[u]nequal pay for jobs which are merely similar does not subject an employer to Title VII liability"); Wright v. Milton Paper Co., 2002 WL 482536, at *8-9 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2002) (finding plaintiff not similarly situated to employees that allegedly performed the "same or similar duties" since plaintiff had less experience in the position and was with the company a shorter time).⁶

Second, although Plaintiff earned $15.866 per hour as a Phlebotomy Supervisor in 1998 while Morales earned $18.954 per hour, Statement of Facts, ¶¶ 27-28, Morales, unlike Plaintiff, had been a Supervisor for over six years and, as noted, was a former NHL employee with greater seniority. Plaintiff "does not dispute that Roche and NHL had different pay scales prior to the merger, or that NHL's pay scale was higher than Roche's." Report at 8. Moreover, "from 1995 through June 1999, plaintiff's salary increased by 32.5% while Morales's salary increased by 9.9%." Id. Plaintiff "fails to demonstrate that the pay disparity occurred under circumstances that raise an inference of discrimination." Report at 8; see, e.g., Fayson, 2002 WL 31194559, at *6 ("multiple promotions and raises during the relevant time frame" undermined allegations of discriminatory intent).

Wrongful Termination

Magistrate Yanthis properly determined that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendant's proffered reason for Plaintiff's termination in 1999, i.e., a general reduction in force at LabCorp., is a pretext for discrimination. Report at 9-10.⁷ He pointed to the deposition of Sylvester Malangone ("Malangone"), LabCorp.'s General Manager for the Metropolitan New York Region, who testified that while Malangone "recommended ... plaintiff not be rehired in any position because he disagreed with plaintiff's handling of a situation stemming from a patient complaint," Malangone, at the same time, "admitted that plaintiff addressed the situation in accordance with company policy," id. at 10, suggesting possible pretext.⁸ Defendant...