Bank of California, N.A. v. National City Co.
| Decision Date | 10 December 1926 |
| Docket Number | 19609. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | BANK OF CALIFORNIA, N. A., v. NATIONAL CITY CO. |
Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Lindsley, Judge.
On rehearing. Department opinion (138 Wash. 517, 244 P. 690) modified, and judgment below reversed.
Bullitt & Kahin, of Seattle, for appellant.
Ken McCord & Ivey, of Seattle, for respondent.
Hugh M Caldwell, Grinstead & Laube, and R. John Lichty, all of Seattle, amici curiae.
A rehearing in this case having been had by the court en banc while the court is still of the opinion that the bonds in controversy are negotiable instruments by reason of the fact that they comply with the requirements of the Negotiable Instrument Act (Rem. Comp. Stat. § 3392 et seq.), yet it is now of the opinion that some of the language contained in the department opinion, reported in 138 Wash. 517 244 P. 690, should be modified so as to conform to the decision of this court in Manker v. American Savings Bank & Trust Co., 131 Wash. 430, 230 P. 406, 42 A. L. R. 1021. In the Manker Case it was held that, in order for an instrument to be negotiable, it must conform to the requirements of negotiability laid down in the Uniform Negotiable Instrument Act of this state, and that an instrument which does not so conform is nonnegotiable in every sense. In other words, that there are no two standards of negotiability, that an instrument is negotiable for all purposes or nonnegotiable for all purposes, dependent upon whether it measures up to the requirements of the act. Prior decisions of this court were referred to in the Manker Case, and, in effect, reversed in so far as they might indicate the adoption of the theory that there are two standards of negotiability, and, in so far as the department opinion in this case inferentially revived that theory, that language is not withdrawn from the opinion.
The fact that instruments may be payable to bearer and issued for the purpose of passing from hand to hand does not create them negotiable instruments any more than other forms of personal property which are transferable by delivery by reason only of that fact can be said to be negotiable.
Judgment reversed.
Since the majority of the court seem to be of the opinion that the bonds here in question are clearly negotiable in every possible sense, I freely yield my assent to the elimination of the observations made by me in the department opinion touching the law as I conceived it to be announced in Fidelity Trust Co. v. Palmer, 22 Wash. 473, 61 P. 158, 79 Am. St. Rep. 953, Marcus v. Ofner, 103 Wash. 478, 175 [141 Wash. 245] P. 31, and Woodworth v. School District No. 2, 103 Wash. 677, 175 P. 321. In other words, I now see that those observations were unnecessary to be made in the disposition of this case. But I am not yet ready to yield my assent to the view that the law, as I conceived it to be announced in those cases, was clearly departed from in Manker v. American Savings Bank & T. Co., 131 Wash. 430, 230 P. 406, 42 A. L. R. 1021, as is in effect stated in the foregoing en banc opinion of the majority in this case. What is said in that behalf in that opinion is now no more necessary to the correct disposition of this case that what I said in the original department opinion in this case is necessary to the correct disposition of this case. For these reasons I object to this, what I conceive to be the here unnecessary attempted interpretation of Manker v. American Savings Bank & T. Co.
It may be that, when I concurred in the opinion in the case of Manker v. American Savings Bank & T. Co., 131 Wash 430, 230 P. 406, 42 A. L. R. 1021, I did not fully grasp its purport and effect, but I certainly did not understand that it overruled the cases relating to the negotiability of municipal warrants theretofore decided by the court. I thought we were laying down the rule that a different situation was presented where the instrument was a municipal bond, negotiable in form than is presented in the instance where the instrument was an ordinary municipal warrant. This much I was willing to concede, since it was in accord with the general rule, but now it seems that this was an erroneous interpretation of the holding in that case; that it was intended there to be held that an instrument which is not negotiable in every sense is negotiable in no sense. Since that is the interpretation, I am compelled to express my dissent to the holding. In my opinion, there is a wide difference between the warrant of a municipality, which is nothing more in its effect than an order drawn by one department of the...
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...775, 137 P.2d 975 (1943). Bank of Cal. v. National City Co., 138 Wash. 517, 524, 244 P. 690, rev'd on other grounds on reh'g, 141 Wash. 243, 251 P. 561 (1926); Friedman v. Airlift Int'l, Inc., 44 A.D.2d 459, 355 N.Y.S.2d 613, 614-15 (1974) (expressly distinguishing incorporation by referenc......
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