Fidelity Trust Co. v. Palmer

• Decision Date: 17 May 1900
• Citation: 22 Wash. 473,61 P. 158
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: FIDELITY TRUST CO. v. PALMER.

61 P. 158

22 Wash. 473

FIDELITY TRUST CO. v. PALMER.

Supreme Court of Washington

May 17, 1900

Appeal from superior court, Pierce county; Thomas Carroll, Judge.

Action by the Fidelity Trust Company, administrator of the estate of Samuel W. Perkins, deceased, against John R. Palmer. From a judgment in favor of defendant, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Campbell & Powell, for appellant.

Bates &amp Murray and John H. McDaniels, for respondent.

GORDON C.J.

Plaintiff sued to recover the value of a city warrant of the city of Tacoma. It appears that the warrant was originally issued to the Fox Island Clay Works, and thereafter indorsed to the Washington Fire-Clay Company, and that company indorsed it in blank. Plaintiff's intestate, S. N. Perkins, became the owner thereof, and subsequently intrusted it to his attorney D. K. Stevens, at the latter's request, to enable him to use the same in evidence in a case then pending in the superior court. Stevens, instead of returning the same to his principal, sold it to the defendant, who paid par value therefor. At the conclusion of the evidence for plaintiff the trial court, upon defendant's motion, discharged the jury, and entered judgment in defendant's favor dismissing the action, and for costs, pursuant to section 4994, 2 Ballinger's Ann. Codes & St. At the trial the defendant was examined as a witness for plaintiff. The purpose of his examination was to show that he knew at the time of his purchase of the warrant that plaintiff's intestate was the owner of it. We have examined his testimony very carefully, and it seems perfectly clear that he was not acquainted with Mr. Perkins, or knew of his existence, until after he purchased the warrant that he believed and understood that Stevens owned it; and a reading of his testimony we think admits of no other conclusion than that he purchased it in good faith, without any actual knowledge of Perkins' ownership, or of any fact or circumstance which would be sufficient to put a prudent person upon inquiry. As already observed, the warrant itself afforded no notice or intimation of Perkins' ownership, and, if the rule that is applicable to negotiable paper can be invoked in respondent's favor, the judgment of the trial court was unquestionably correct. Appellant contends that such a warrant is not a negotiable instrument, but is intended as a mere voucher of the city treasurer when paid. The great weight of authority is that a county or city warrant possesses all of the qualities of negotiable paper but one, viz. that it is open to any defense which might have been made to the claim upon which it is founded. For all purposes involving its title, it must be treated as negotiable. Bank v. Gelbach, 8 Wash. 497, 36 P. 467; District of...