BANK v. SESSLEY

• Decision Date: 24 June 2010
• Docket Number: No. 09AP-178.,09AP-178.
• Citation: 2010 Ohio 2902,188 Ohio App.3d 213,935 N.E.2d 70
• Parties: WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., et al., Appellees, v. SESSLEY et al., Appellants; Sand Canyon Corporation, Appellee.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

188 Ohio App.3d 213

935 N.E.2d 70

2010 Ohio 2902

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., et al., Appellees,

v.SESSLEY et al., Appellants; Sand Canyon Corporation, Appellee.

No. 09AP-178.

Court of Appeals of Ohio,Tenth District, Franklin County.

Decided June 24, 2010.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED.

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Thompson Hine L.L.P. and Scott A. Campbell, Columbus, for appellees.

Philip Sessley and Leonadra Hutchins-Sessley, pro se.

CONNOR, Judge.

{¶ 1} Appearing pro se, defendants-appellants Philip Sessley and Leonadra Sessley appeal the decision of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas granting summary judgment to plaintiff-appellee, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., as Trustee for Option One Mortgage Loan Trust 2001-C, Asset-Backed Certificates, Series 2001-C (“Wells Fargo” or “appellees”), and “cross-complaint” defendant-appellee, Sand Canyon Corporation, f.k.a. Option One Mortgage Corporation (“Option One” or “appellees”). For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

{¶ 2} On May 15, 2001, Mr. Sessley obtained a mortgage loan from Option One in the amount of $85,500 to purchase real estate located at 963 North Nelson Road, Columbus, Ohio 43219. As a result, Mr. Sessley executed a note evidencing the debt and granted a mortgage securing the debt. These documents named Option One as the lender and mortgagee. The last payment that was made on the debt occurred in February 2006. Therefore, on February 7, 2007, Wells Fargo filed a complaint in foreclosure, in which it alleged that it was the owner and holder of the promissory note and corresponding mortgage.

{¶ 3} Before appellants filed an answer or other responsive pleading, Wells Fargo filed an amended complaint on February 26, 2007. The mortgage documents attached to each of Wells Fargo's first two complaints named Option One as the lender and mortgagee. After appellants had filed an answer and counterclaim, Wells Fargo filed a motion for leave to file a second amended complaint, which the trial court granted. Accordingly, Wells Fargo filed its second amended complaint on April 24, 2007. Attached to the second amended complaint was the assignment of mortgage and note, which indicated that Option One had assigned the mortgage together with the note to Wells Fargo on February 28, 2007, three weeks after Wells Fargo had filed its initial complaint. The assignment was recorded on March 9, 2007. Appellants filed their answer and counterclaim to Wells Fargo's second amended complaint on May 29, 2007.

{¶ 4} On December 3, 2007, appellants sought leave to file a third amended answer and counterclaims. At this time, appellants also sought to join Option One as a “cross-complaint defendant.” The trial court granted appellants' motion on March 11, 2008, and Option One filed its answer on June 30, 2008. Given the substantive allegations in appellants' “cross-complaint,” we will hereinafter refer to the claims as third-party claims.

{¶ 5} On September 5, 2008, appellees filed a joint motion for summary judgment, which sought judgment in their favor on Wells Fargo's claims in addition to appellants' counterclaims and third-party claims. Appellants filed a memorandum contra, and appellees filed a reply. On October 28, 2008, the trial court granted appellees' motion.

{¶ 6} Thereafter, appellants filed various procedural motions, including two motions requesting an emergency stay of the foreclosure proceedings. During the pendency of this appeal, this court granted appellants' motion but conditioned such a stay upon the posting of a bond. After appellants failed to post a bond, the foreclosure proceedings continued forward.

{¶ 7} Appellants have appealed the trial court's judgment and raise 28 assignments of error. As best we can discern, appellants' 28 assignments of error present three general arguments. First, appellants argue that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment to appellees. Second, appellants argue that the trial court erred by denying their motion to add claims. Finally, appellants argue that the trial court erred by denying their motion for relief from judgment.

{¶ 8} With regard to the trial court's decision granting summary judgment, appellate review of summary-judgment decisions is de novo.

Helton v. Scioto Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (1997), 123 Ohio App.3d 158, 162, 703 N.E.2d 841. “When reviewing a trial court's ruling on summary judgment, the court of appeals conducts an independent review of the record and stands in the shoes of the trial court.” Mergenthal v. Star Banc Corp. (1997), 122 Ohio App.3d 100, 103, 701 N.E.2d 383. We must affirm the trial court's judgment if any of the grounds raised by the movant at the trial court are found to support it, even if the trial court failed to consider those grounds. Coventry Twp. v. Ecker (1995), 101 Ohio App.3d 38, 41-42, 654 N.E.2d 1327.

[1] {¶ 9} Summary judgment is proper only when the party moving for summary judgment demonstrates that (1) no genuine issue of material fact exists, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) reasonable minds could come to but one conclusion, and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that party being entitled to have the evidence most strongly construed in that party's favor. Civ.R. 56(C); State ex rel. Grady v. State Emp. Relations Bd. (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 181, 183, 677 N.E.2d 343. Additionally, a moving party cannot discharge its burden under Civ.R. 56 by simply making a conclusory allegation that the nonmoving party has no evidence to prove its case. Dresher v. Burt (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 293, 662 N.E.2d 264. Rather, the moving party must affirmatively demonstrate by affidavit or other evidence allowed by Civ.R. 56(C) that the nonmoving party has no evidence to support its claims. Id.

[2] {¶ 10} In their challenges to the trial court's decision granting summary judgment, the preliminary issue is whether Wells Fargo was a real party in interest, such that it had standing to file and maintain this lawsuit. The relevant analysis hinges upon the application of Civ.R. 17(A), which provides:

Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. * * * No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed after objection for ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder or substitution of, the real party in interest. Such ratification, joinder, or substitution shall have the same effect as if the action had been commenced in the name of the real party in interest.

Therefore, Civ.R. 17 permits a plaintiff to cure a real-party-in-interest problem by (1) showing that the real party in interest has ratified the commencement of the action or (2) joining or substituting the real party in interest. Ohio Cent. RR. Sys. v. Mason Law Firm Co., L.P.A., 182 Ohio App.3d 814, 2009-Ohio-3238, 915 N.E.2d 397, ¶ 33, citing Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Byrd, 178 Ohio App.3d 285, 2008-Ohio-4603, 897 N.E.2d 722. Further, like other procedural rules, “Civ.R. 17(A) ‘shall be construed and applied to effect just results by eliminating delay, unnecessary expense and all other impediments to the expeditious administration of justice.’ ” Ohio Cent. RR. Sys. at ¶ 33, quoting Civ.R. 1(B).

[3] [4] {¶ 11} In applying this rule to foreclosure actions, this court has provided:

A real party in interest is one who is directly benefited or injured by the outcome of the case. Shealy v. Campbell (1985), 20 Ohio St.3d 23, 24[, 20 OBR 210, 485 N.E.2d 701]. The purpose behind the real-party-in-interest requirement is “ ‘to enable the defendant to avail himself of evidence and defenses that the defendant has against the real party in interest, and to assure him finality of the judgment, and that he will be protected against another suit brought by the real party [in] interest on the same matter.’ ” Id. at 24-25[, 20 O.B.R. 210, 485 N.E.2d 701], quoting In re Highland Holiday Subdivision (1971), 27 Ohio App.2d 237, 240[, 56 O.O.2d 404, 273 N.E.2d 903].

In foreclosure actions, the real party in interest is the current holder of the note and mortgage. Chase Manhattan Mtge. Corp. v. Smith, Hamilton App. No. C-061069, 2007-Ohio-5874[, 2007 WL 3225534], at ¶ 18.

Everhome Mtge. Co. v. Rowland, 10th Dist. No. 07AP-615, 2008-Ohio-1282, 2008 WL 747698, ¶ 11-12.

[5] [6] {¶ 12} If a party is not a real party in interest, it lacks standing to prosecute the action. State ex rel. Jones v. Suster (1998), 84 Ohio St.3d 70, 77, 701 N.E.2d 1002. If a party lacks standing to prosecute an action, then that party may not invoke the jurisdiction of a court. State ex rel. Dallman v. Franklin Cty. Court of Common Pleas (1973), 35 Ohio St.2d 176, 64 O.O.2d 103, 298 N.E.2d 515, syllabus.

{¶ 13} Appellate courts are often presented with real-party-in-interest issues in foreclosure actions. See Rowland; Byrd; see also First Union Natl. Bank v. Hufford (2001), 146 Ohio App.3d 673, 767 N.E.2d 1206; Kramer v. Millott (Sept. 23, 1994), 6th Dist. No. E-94-5, 1994 WL 518173; Washington Mut. Bank, F.A. v. Green, 156 Ohio App.3d 461, 2004-Ohio-1555, 806 N.E.2d 604; Bank of New York v. Stuart, 9th Dist. No. 06CA008953, 2007-Ohio-1483, 2007 WL 936706; Washington Mut. Bank v. Novak, 8th Dist. No. 88121, 2007-Ohio-996, 2007 WL 701081; DLJ Mtge. Capital, Inc. v. Parsons, 7th Dist. No. 07-MA-17, 2008-Ohio-1177, 2008 WL 697400; Mid-State Trust IX v. Davis, 2d Dist. No. 07-CA-31, 2008-Ohio-1985, 2008 WL 1838350; Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Jordan, 8th Dist. No. 91675, 2009-Ohio-1092, 2009 WL 625560; US Bank, Natl. Assn. v. Marcino, 181 Ohio App.3d 328, 2009-Ohio-1178, 908 N.E.2d 1032; Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v. Pagani, 5th Dist. No. 09CA000013, 2009-Ohio-5665, 2009 WL 3440028; Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Stovall, 8th Dist. No. 91802, 2010-Ohio-236, 2010 WL...