Banning v. Bradford

• Decision Date: 11 January 1875
• Citation: 21 Minn. 308
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court
• Parties: WILLIAM L. BANNING <I>vs.</I> JOHN F. BRADFORD and others.

21 Minn. 308

WILLIAM L. BANNINGvs.

JOHN F. BRADFORD and others.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

January 11, 1875.

Action to foreclose a mortgage upon Lot 7, in Block 128, and Lot 8, in Block 129, in Minneapolis, made by the defendant Bradford, the complaint alleging as to the other defendants that they "claim some estate or interest in said mortgaged premises, accruing subsequent to the lien of said mortgage." Bradford did not answer the complaint. Goodrich, one of the defendants, in his separate answer, alleges "that at the time of the execution of the mortgage, * * * said Bradford had no right, title or interest in or to Lot 7, * * * and that said Bradford has not now nor ever has had any right, title or interest in or to said lot. And defendant further alleges that he is the owner of said Lot 7 in fee simple, and that he is now in lawful possession of the same; and further alleges that in the year 1855, and before the execution of said mortgage, the immediate grantor of this said defendant Goodrich, and this said defendant Goodrich, were, are now, and ever since have been lawfully possessed of said lot. Wherefore this said defendant demands that said mortgage be discharged of record, and declared void, as to said Lot 7, and judgment for costs." The other defendants joined in a like answer as to Lot 8. The plaintiff replied to the counterclaims contained in the answers.

At the trial in the district court for Hennepin county, before Vanderburgh, J., the only matter litigated was the title to the mortgaged premises, the title asserted by defendants being wholly adverse to that of Bradford, the mortgagor, asserted by plaintiff. The judge found as facts the various conveyances, etc., by which the parties respectively claimed to derive title from one Hanson, as a common source, and, among other conclusions of law, found as follows: "The evidence of the plaintiff, (and it is not contradicted,) * * * is insufficient to establish the title of Bradford, the mortgagor, to the mortgaged premises when said mortgage was executed; and upon the facts found touching this point, and the title disclosed by the defendants Goodrich and White, the plaintiff is not entitled to the relief sought, as against said defendants; but that the defendants (except said Bradford) are entitled to judgment." A new trial was refused, and plaintiff appealed.

H. J. Horn, for appellant.

Cooley & Lowry, for respondents.

YOUNG, J.

It is unnecessary to consider the grounds upon which this application for a new trial is based, or those on which it is opposed; for we are of opinion that upon the admitted facts of this case, neither party to this appeal has any cause of action against the other.

The appellant's mortgage, upon which this action is founded, was not a conveyance of any estate or interest in the land in question. It was merely an executed contract between the appellant and Bradford, the mortgagor, whereby the former obtained a lien upon the estate of the latter, but no estate or interest in the land itself. By the mortgage, the appellant could acquire no rights as against any one except the mortgagor, and those claiming, through him, rights and interests in his estate. As against the respondents, who were not parties to the contract, and claim no rights under it, and no rights or interests in the estate mortgaged, but who claim a legal estate in fee in the land, by a title adverse and, if valid, paramount to that of Bradford, the appellant could acquire by his mortgage no rights whatever. They are strangers to him and his mortgage, as much so as if they claimed no estate of any kind in the land; and their estate and title, whether valid or invalid, can be in no way affected by a transaction which, as to them, is wholly res inter alios acta.

As the appellant's mortgage affected only the estate of Bradford, the respondents can have no interest in the suit brought to foreclose it. The proper object of such an action is to subject the mortgaged estate to the payment of the mortgage debt. The only proper parties are the mortgagor and the mortgagee, and those who have acquired rights or interest under them in the mortgagor's estate; for these are the only persons having any rights or obligations growing out of the mortgage, or interested in any manner in the subject-matter of the action. A stranger claiming adversely to the title of the mortgagor, as he is not affected by the mortgage, is in no way interested in the foreclosure suit. It can make no difference to him whether the mortgage is valid or invalid, whether it be discharged or foreclosed, whether the estate mortgaged, the only estate which can be affected by the decree, remains in the mortgagor, or is transferred to another. As such adverse claimant is a stranger to the mortgage and to the mortgaged estate, he has no interest in the subject-matter of the action, there is no privity between him and the plaintiff, and the plaintiff has no right to make him a party defendant, for the purpose of trying his adverse title in the foreclosure suit. Story Eq. Pl. §§ 226, 227, 230, 231, 262, 513, 517, 519. 1 Dan. Ch. Pr. (3d Am. Ed.) 239, 330, 331, 582, 605. Eagle Ins. Co. v. Lent, 6 Paige, 635; Holcomb v. Holcomb, 2 Barb. 20; Corning v. Smith, 6 N. Y. 82; Lewis v. Smith, 9 N. Y. 502; Frost v. Koon, 30 N. Y. 428, 444; San Francisco v. Lawton, 18 Cal. 465; Pelton v. Farmin, 18 Wis. 222; Chamberlain v. Lyell, 3 Mich. 448; Wright v. Dudley, 8 Mich. 115; and see Newman v. Home Ins. Co., 20 Minn. 422.

There is even less ground for allowing the plaintiff to make a person claiming an adverse title a party defendant, in a suit by mortgagee against mortgagor for the foreclosure of a mortgage, than in a suit by purchaser against vendor for specific performance, or by grantee against grantor for the reformation of a deed. In each of these cases, the plaintiff has an estate in the land, legal or equitable, while a mortgagee has no estate or interest, but only a lien upon the land. But it is perfectly well settled that in neither of these can a stranger, claiming adversely to the vendor or grantor, be made a party, for the plaintiff has no cause of action against him growing out of the contract or conveyance sought to be enforced or reformed. Lange v. Jones, 5 Leigh, 192; Stuart's Heirs v....