Bannon v. Port of Palm Beach Dist., 39374

• Decision Date: 31 March 1971
• Docket Number: No. 39374,39374
• Citation: 246 So.2d 737
• Parties: Marvin I. BANNON and Lillian M. Bannon, his wife, Appellants, v. PORT OF PALM BEACH DISTRICT, and Peanut Island Properties, Inc., Appellees.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 737

246 So.2d 737

Marvin I. BANNON and Lillian M. Bannon, his wife, Appellants, v. PORT OF PALM BEACH DISTRICT, and Peanut Island Properties, Inc., Appellees.

No. 39374.

Supreme Court of Florida.

March 31, 1971.

James S. Robinson, of Sullivan & Robinson, West Palm Beach, for appellants.

Douglas C. Fulton, of Burns & Weber, West Palm Beach, for Port of Palm Beach District.

Peter Van Andel, of Gunster, Yoakley, Criser, Stewart & Hersey, Palm Beach, for Peanut Island Properties, Inc. Joseph C. Jacobs and Ben H. Wilkinson, of Ervin, Pennington, Varn & Jacobs, Tallahassee, for Save Peanut Island, Inc., amicus curiae.

ROBERTS, Chief Justice.

We have for review on direct appeal a judgment of the trial court validating a long term lease between the Port of Palm Beach District and Peanut Island Properties, Inc. in which, inter alia, that court construed a controlling provision of the Constitution and held specifically that the lease and the development plan do not violate Sections 5, 7 and 10 of Article IX, Florida Constitution of 1885 as amended, and do not violate Sections 9 and 10 of Article VII, 1968 revision of the Florida Constitution, F.S.A.

Appellants appearing below as individuals and on behalf of the taxpayers of the Port of Palm Beach District instituted the litigation contending that the Port had violated its statutory grant of powers as set forth in § 315.03, Florida Statutes, F.S.A. as well as the sections of the Constitution above mentioned. They alleged that the Port leased property it owned but which did not constitute a 'port facility' as defined by the statutes to a private corporation which they contend was for a private rather than a public purpose. Peanut Island Properties, Inc., the lessee and appellee here, denied the allegations and counterclaimed for a declaration that the land in question did constitute a 'port facility' and that the Port had statutory and organic authority to make the lease.

The trial court found that the Port District had the authority by statute to lease the land in question to the tenant, that the land involved as the subject matter of the lease was a 'port facility' as defined in § 315.02(6), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., that the Port District by entering the lease did not appropriate money for or lend its credit to or become a joint owner with or levy taxes for the benefit of the lessee, and that the lease is valid and binding between the parties.

Being aggrieved by the judgment, the appellants bring this appeal and pose questions:

1. Is Peanut Island a 'port facility' as defined in the applicable statutes or acts?

2. Does the Port have the authority under the applicable special and general acts of the State of Florida to lease the land for the purposes contained in the lease?

3. Does the proposed implementation of the lease violate the constitutional and statutory prohibitions against lending the credit of the State of Florida for a private purpose?

We shall deal with them in the order in which they are presented.

Appellants contend that although the Port District has owned a portion of the island for a long time, the property has never been utilized for any port purposes and cannot quality as a 'port facility.' We do not agree. Section 315.02(6), Florida Statutes, F.S.A. defines a port facility as follows:

'The term 'port facilities' shall mean and shall include harbor, shipping and port facilities and improvements of every kind, nature and description, including (but without limitation) channels, turning basins, jetties, breakwaters, public landings, wharves, docks, markets, parks, recreational facilities, structures, buildings, piers, storage facilities, public buildings and plazas, anchorages, utilities, bridges, tunnels, roads, causeways and any and all property and facilities necessary or useful in connection with the foregoing, and any one or more or any combination thereof and any extension, addition, betterment or improvement of any thereof.'

Peanut Island is an artificial island that was created by dumping the spoil occasioned by dredging the Palm Beach Inlet. The Port District's acquisition began subsequent to a resolution of the Port Commissioners in 1921 and was completed in 1950. The purpose of the Port District is indicated in the initial purchase resolution which, inter alia, said:

'Whereas, the said Island is capable of being improved by the erection of docks and wharves and the construction of buildings on said island for stores, warehouses, quarantine or other purposes; and

'Whereas, the Lake Worth Inlet District can better maintain an inlet between the waters of the Atlantic Ocean, better attain the objects of the creation of the said Inlet District and contribute more to the maintenance of the health of the inhabitants of the Territory embraced in the said District and the welfare of said District if control and ownership of land not owned by the State of Florida and created through the dredging operations of the said District be vested in the said Lake Worth Inlet District.'

It appears from the record here that since the time of purchase, the portion of Peanut Island owned by the Port District has been used primarily as an undeveloped recreation facility, a public landing, and anchorage. It also serves as a windscreen to protect the port terminals from adverse weather. The evidence clearly indicates that the portion of the island owned by the District is a 'port facility' as defined by the statutes, and being so, it is properly subject to being leased for public or private purposes as the governing body of the District determines is in the best interest of the Port.

We next consider the question of whether or not the Authority had the power to lease the land for a private development at no public expense. Section 315.03(9) of the Florida Statutes, F.S.A., which in enumerating the powers of ports, states the following:

'To sell at public or private sale or Lease for public or private purposes all or any portion of any port facilities now or hereafter owned by the unit, including any such facilities as extended, enlarged or improved, and all or any portion of any property of the unit improved, created, extended or enlarged under the authority of this law, on such terms and subject to such conditions as the governing body shall determine to be in the best interests of the unit.' (Emphasis supplied)

Further, Section 315.03(14) states the following:

'To lease or rent, or contract with others for the operation of all or any part of any port facilities now or hereafter acquired, owned or constructed by the unit, on such terms and for such period or periods and subject to such conditions, as the governing body shall determine to be in the best interests of the unit.' (Emphasis supplied)

Section 315.14 defines 'public purposes' as used in Chapter 315 of...