Anderson v. O'Brien
| Decision Date | 11 July 1974 |
| Docket Number | No. 42818,42818 |
| Citation | 84 Wn.2d 64,524 P.2d 390 |
| Parties | Robert ANDERSON et al., Petitioners, v. Robert S. O'BRIEN, Treasurer of the State of Washington, Respondent. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Slade Gorton, Atty. Gen., Malachy R. Murphy, William A. Coats, Asst. Attys. Gen., Olympia, for petitioners.
Slade Gorton, Atty. Gen., Philip H. Austin, Asst. Atty. Gen., Olympia, for respondent.
Petitioners members of the Economic Assistance Authority, seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent O'Brien, as state treasurer, to sign a warrant issued by that authority to the Kalispel Indian Community. The treasurer, acting on advice of the attorney general, refused to sign the warrant because of statutory and constitutional questions raised by the proposed disbursement.
The broad question presented by this original proceeding in the Supreme Court is whether, consistent with the Economic Assistance Act of 1972 (RCW 43.31A) and the Washington State Constitution, state funds may be disbursed to a federally recognized Indian tribe for the purpose of developing and constructing an industrial site and building to be leased to private manufacturing firms in order to stimulate job opportunities and reduce enemployment for the tribe.
We hold, first, that the Kalispel tribe is a proper recipient of state funds under the Economic Assistance Act of 1972 and the state constitution, as an entity with wholly public functions; second, that the legislature authorized expenditure of state funds for the purpose of developing and constructing an industrial site and building for lease to private individuals to stimulate job opportunities and reduce unemployment; and, third, that stimulation of job opportunities and reduction of unemployment by this method is a constitutionally permissible means by which to accomplish this objective.
The Kalispel Indian Community is a federally recognized Indian tribe and chartered as a body politic incorporate under the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. § 477 (1970). In 1970, out of a labor force of 56 in the reservation community, 40 members of the tribe were unemployed and only 16 employed. Twelve of the employed were working on a part-time basis, three on a seasonal basis and one employed full time.
Of the total proposed sum of $300,064 to be disbursed by the authority, $100,064 is a loan and $200,000 is an outright grant. Expenditures within the sum approved by the authority were:
Site preparation $ 16,100
Water 23,400
Sewer 25,800
Building 202,940
10 percent contingency and
inspection fee 31,824
--------
Total $300,064
The project will involve construction of an industrial building where space will be leased to manufacturing firms. One firm is committed to lease space and the tribe is prepared to negotiate with the second firm. There will be room for expansion and lease to others. Eighteen permanent job positions will be created initially to expand to an eventual 30 permanent positions.
The first issue is whether the Kalispel tribe is a proper recipient of state funds under the Economic Assistance Act of 1972 and the state constitution. RCW 43.31A.070 explicitly provides that: 'The authority is authorized to make direct grants and/or loans to political subdivisions of the state and Indian tribes recognized as such by the federal government . . .' The Washington State Constitution does not dictate otherwise.
Article 8, section 5 of the state constitution provides that: 'The credit of the state shall not, in any manner be given or loaned to, or in aid of, any individual, association, company or corporation.' In Rands v. Clarke County, 79 Wash. 152, 157, 139 P. 1090, 1092 (1914), we recognized that this constitutional prohibition is not applicable to corporations or entities whose functions are wholly public:
Plainly . . . the framers had in mind individuals, associations, companies, and corporations engaged in purely private enterprises, or enterprises only quasi public, not to enterprises carried on by the corporations whose functions are wholly public, such as the federal or state government, or some branch thereof.
Indian tribes are inique entities which do not fit into neat pigeonholes of the law. Their sovereign characteristics are well recognized. State v. Bertrand, 61 Wash.2d 333, 339, 378 P.2d 427 (1963). The federal government recognizes the right of a tribe to organize for its common welfare. 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1970). These attributes of sovereignty qualify the tribe as an entity with wholly public functions. The selection of the Kalispel tribe as a recipient for assistance in the form of state funds is not prohibited by article 8, section 5.
The second question is whether the items approved by the Economic Assistance Authority for the proposed Kalispel industrial park are authorized under the Economic Assistance Act of 1972. The problem is one of statutory construction. The primary objective of statutory construction is to carry out the intent of the legislature. Amburn v. Daly, 81 Wash.2d 241, 501 P.2d 178 (1972). Where the manifest object of a statute can be ascertained and the statute is susceptible of two constructions, that construction should be given which will carry out the intent of the legislature. Miller v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 81 Wash.2d 302, 501 P.2d 1063 (1972).
The statement of purpose in the act is the primary insight into the intent of the legislature in this case. It states the act's purpose is to foster economic development by two means--the stimulation of investment and job opportunity. In addition to fostering economic development by these means, the legislature also declared reduction of unemployment to be of major concern to the economic welfare of this state. RCW 43.31A.010. 1 One of the means authorized by the legislature to accomplish these purposes is to make direct grants or loans to government agencies to assist them in financing the cost of 'public facilities.' RCW 43.31A.070.
The act next requires that public facilities grants and/or loans be used for projects which 'will improve the opportunities for the successful maintenance, establishment, or expansion of industrial or commercial plants or will otherwise assist in the creation or retention of long-term economic opportunities.' (RCW 43.31A.080 Projects for which grants or loans may be used--Priority.)
RCW 43.31A.070 authorizes grants or loans to finance the cost of 'public facilities'. RCW 43.31A.110(2) then clarifies the use which can be made of public facilities by allowing their use 'directly Or indirectly for any facility for public purposes, including, but not limited to, sewer or other waste disposal facilities, arterials, bridges, access roads, port facilities, or water distribution and purification facilities.' (Italics ours.) A public facility is, then, 'any facility for public purposes', 2 and inasmuch as reducing unemployment is a valid public purpose 3 and the proposed building for lease will create jobs, the project is a public facility.
The Economic Assistance Authority, which was designated by the legislature to carry out the purpose of the act, has concluded that the expenditure would be appropriate. This raises a strong presumption that the project would further the public purpose specified in the act and an administrative construction of an ambiguous statute should be given great weight. Deaconess Hosp. v. State Highway Comm'n, 66 Wash.2d 378, 403 P.2d 54 (1965); Bradley v. Department of Labor & Indus., 52 Wash.2d 780, 329 P.2d 196 (1958). In addition, the legislature expressly stated in RCW 43.31A.110(2) that permissible projects were 'not limited to' the enumerated examples.
Even if the phrase 'not limited to' is ignored, the inclusion of port facilities as illustrative of the type of public purpose allowable, gives the Economic Assistance Authority broad latitude. The term 'port facility' has been given a statutory definition in other states.
Section 315.02(6), Florida Statutes, F.S.A. defines a port facility as follows:
'The term 'port facilities' shall mean and shall include harbor, shipping and port facilities and improvements of every kind, nature and description, including (but without limitation) channels, turning basins, jetties, breakwaters, public landings, wharves, docks, markets, parks, recreational facilities, structures, buildings, piers, storage facilities, public buildings and plazas, anchorages, utilities, bridges, tunnels, roads, causeways and any and all property and facilities necessary or useful in connection with the foregoing, and any one or more or any combination thereof and any extension, addition, betterment or improvement of any thereof.'
Bannon v. Port of Palm Beach Dist., 246 So.2d 737, 738 (Fla.1971).
This broad definition is within the concept of what 'port facilities' actually are. In M. Fair, Port Administration in the United States, ch. 9, Port Jurisdiction and Supporting Facilities (1954) at pages 122, 124, the author discusses warehouses, and notes that
If the use of the term 'port facilities' is to describe the type of facility, by analogy, that is allowed to be used for public facilities, the legislature could hardly have chosen a broader term. The ownership of a building by the tribe to be leased to others to manufacture goods and provide employment for the tribe, is completely consistent with a...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Johnson v. Johnson
...94 Wash.2d at 834, 621 P.2d 127, quoting 15 E. McQuillin, Municipal Corporations 39.19, at 31-32 (3d ed. 1970); Anderson v. O'Brien, 84 Wash.2d 64, 524 P.2d 390 (1974). The State argues that RCW 74.20.040 furthers several public purposes, and hence is constitutional. As evidence of these pu......
-
St. Paul Intertribal Housing Bd. v. Reynolds
...62 L.Ed.2d 95 (1979). See also Joint Tribal Council of Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370 (1st Cir.1975); Anderson v. O'Brien, 84 Wash.2d 64, 524 P.2d 390 (1974); Prince v. Board of Education, 88 N.M. 548, 543 P.2d 1176 (1976). In Washington v. Fishing Vessel Ass'n the Supreme Cour......
-
State v. Martin
...susceptible to more than one construction, it should be given that construction which will carry out its objective. Anderson v. O'Brien, 84 Wash.2d 64, 524 P.2d 390 (1974); Miller v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 81 Wash.2d 302, 501 P.2d 1063 It is evident on the face of the act under scrutiny......
-
CLEAN v. State
...as to whether or not an expenditure is for a public purpose, we will defer to the judgment of the legislature." Anderson v. O'Brien, 84 Wash.2d 64, 70, 524 P.2d 390 (1974). On the other hand, public funding for facilities for professional sports teams has been rejected in at least two juris......