Bar Ass'n of City of Boston v. Sleeper

• Decision Date: 30 January 1925
• Citation: 146 N.E. 269,251 Mass. 6
• Parties: BAR ASS'N OF CITY OF BOSTON v. SLEEPER.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

251 Mass. 6

146 N.E. 269

BAR ASS'N OF CITY OF BOSTON

v.SLEEPER.^*

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Jan. 30, 1925.

Exceptions from Supreme Judicial Court, Suffolk County.

Petition by the Bar Association of the City of Boston against Alvah G. Sleeper. Respondent was disbarred for perjury in disbarment trial, and he excepts. Exceptions sustained, and petition referred to single justice.

Respondent requested the following rules:

Upon all the evidence in the case there is nothing to show deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct upon the part of the respondent; that there is no evidence to support any finding other than that the respondent has been faithful to all his duties to his client and as an attorney and counselor of this court; that the petition for disbarment was not a proper method to obtain the information sought, the respondent should have been informed by legal process of the information sought, and, in case of dispute as to the duty of disclosure, the court should have determined that issue, and the information, if proper, should have been imparted under the protection of the court.F. W. Mansfield, of Boston, for petitioner.

W. B. Grant, W. P. Dyer, and F. M. Ryder, all of Boston, for respondent.

RUGG, C. J.

This is a petition for the disbarment of the respondent, an attorney at law. One of the charges set forth in the petition for disbarment was that the respondent had told separately to Arthur E. Keating and to William H. Proctor, both members of the state police, that one of the respondent's clients, Hollis H. Hunnewell by name, had represented that he already had paid on three different occasions a large sum of money by way of blackmail to certain lawyers; that an appointment had been made for him to go to a designated room in a Boston hotel, where he feared that a further demand would be made on account of the same matter; that the respondent advised Hunnewell to go pursuant to the appointment; taht the respondent followed shortly after and found in the room three lawyers, who were named to Keating and to Proctor, and that after a brief conversation all left the room and no money was paid, and that the respondent voluntarily appeared before a committee of the Boston Bar Association to make a statement concerning this affair, and deliberately lied about it by denying that he had told to Keating and Proctor the matters and things repeated by them. There were other charges connected with the same transaction, but it is not necessary to state them because the findings center about this one.

The case was heard at length before a single justice. He filed ‘findings of fact, rulings, and order’ as follows:

‘I find as follows:

‘(1) Alvah G. Sleeper made to Arthur E. Keating and William H. Proctor, in substance, the statements set forth in the petition for his disbarment. This finding is based not only on the testimony of Keating and Proctor, but upon that of other witnesses. It is supported by the conduct of Sleeper.

‘(2) Sleeper, at the hearing before the subcommittee of the grievance committee of the Boston Bar Association, finally denied that he ever made the statements.

‘(3) While upon the witness stand before me as a witness in his own behalf he denied making them.

‘(4) In giving such testimony, he knowingly failed to tell the truth, and was guilty of the crime of perjury.

‘(5) There was no evidence that the statements made by Sleeper to Keating and Proctor were true. Sleeper not only denied making them, but negatived the facts set forth therein. The parties referred to in the statements emphatically denied their truth. Hollis H. Hunnewell, named therein, although in New York, was unwilling to come to this commonwealth to give testimony, and his deposition was not taken.

‘(6) There was evidence that Hunnewell had consulted Sleeper concerning a claim which he [Hunnewell] stated to Sleeper had been made upon him.

‘(7) Hunnewell waived any privilege as to what had taken place between Sleeper and himself.

‘(8) Sleeper was guilty of gross misconduct when, before the subcommittee of the grievance committee of the Boston Bar Association he untruthfully denied that he had told Keating and Proctor the story hereinbefore referred to. No order of disbarment is made on this finding.

‘The respondent duly requested certain rulings which are hereto annexed. I refuse those numbered 1, 2, and 8. Those numbered 3 and 4 are immaterial in view of my order; those numbered 5, 6, 7, and 9 are given, although some of them are now immaterial and very likely too broad in their scope.

‘An order is to be entered disbarring the respondent solely on the ground of perjury committed in the trial before me.’

[1] A proceeding for the disbarment of an attorney at law is at common law and not in equity. Therefore, when in such proceeding questions are presented to this court respecting general or special findings of fact made by the trial court, such findings stand when they are warranted by direct testimony or as inferences from all the evidence. The only matter for us to decide, even upon a full report of the evidence, is whether the general or special findings made can be sustained on any reasonable view of the case as presented to the trial court. Randall, Petitioner, 11 Allen, 472;Boston Bar Association v. Greenhood, 168 Mass. 169, 182, 46 N. E. 568;Boston Bar Association v. Casey, 227 Mass. 46, 51, 116 N. E. 541;Moss v. Old Colony Trust Co., 246 Mass. 139, 143, 144, 140 N. E. 803.

[2] There was no error of law in denying the respondent's request, to the effect that there was nothing in the evidence to show deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct on his part. It appears to be conceded that in the spring or summer of 1920, a committee of the Boston Bar Association had under consideration and investigation charges against two Boston attorneys, to the effect that they had conspired to extort money from Hollis H. Hunnewell by threats of criminal prosecution. There seems also to be no dispute about the fact that Keating and Proctor, members of the state police, each appeared before that committee and made a statement respecting those charges against the two Boston attorneys. There was ample evidence before the single justice to the effect that each made a statement before that committee in substance and effect that the respondent had told the witness in categorical detail that a client had consulted the respondent about a request that he go to a room in a Boston hotel, at a specified time, and meet the two lawyers then being investigated by the committee; that, after preliminary advice, the client went to the room in the hotel as requested, where the respondent soon followed and found there these same two lawyers, together with another; that some conversation followed and the meeting broke up without any money being paid. Proctor also said that he told the respondent that the client was Hollis H. Hunnewell, and the respondent replied that that was so. There was evidence tending to show that thereafter the respondent came before the same committee. He first declined to make any statement whatever respecting what occurred in the room in the hotel, and, later, on examination by one of the attorneys whose conduct was being investigated, and who was said to have been in that room, declared unequivocally that the attorney was not in the room. He also asserted that he had never made to either Keating or Proctor a statement that he had seen the attorneys under investigation at the room in the hotel. A stenographic report of the statement made to that committee by the respondent was presented in evidence. Keating and Proctor testified before the single justice. Their testimony does not appear to differ in any material particular from their statements to the committee. The ground covered by the several statements to the committee was the subject of full inquiry at the trial before the single justice, as well as all other matters involved. The respondent also testified before the single justice, as did numerous other witnesses who had talked with him about this subject. No further review of the evidence is necessary to demonstrate that it was a pure question of fact whether the charge for disbarment already summarized was proved. The credibility of witnesses was wholly for the single justice. If the testimony of Keating and Proctor, and that of other witnesses, were believed, that charge was sustained.

It follows that there was no error of law in denying the first request for ruling. Paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of the findings of the single justice are amply supported by evidence.

[3] The first sentence of paragraph 8 of the conclusions of the single justice discloses no error of law. If it be treated as a finding of fact, it plainly is supported by the evidence. In this aspect it is but little more than a summarization of the special findings which have gone before, except that embodied in paragraph 4. If it be regarded as a ruling of law, it is free from error. An attorney at law who made, to two members of the state police, one of whom at least was engaged in an official investigation, statements concerning other members of the bar of the nature shown on this record, and who later, when charges of the same character as those described in his statements were being investigated by a committee of the Bar Association, denied that he ever made such statements, is guilty of gross misconduct. It was a flagitious falsehood. If the statements made to the state police were false, it was his clear duty to say so before the committee of the Bar Association. That committee was engaged in an important and highly estimable public service in making inquiry into the conduct of two members of the bar against whom grave charges had been made. If the charges were groundless, the two members of the bar were entitled to exoneration; if they were well founded, proceedings for their disbarment ought to be instituted to...