Bar Ass'n of City of Boston v. Casey

• Decision Date: 25 May 1917
• Citation: 227 Mass. 46,116 N.E. 541
• Parties: BAR ASS'N OF CITY OF BOSTON v. CASEY.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

227 Mass. 46

116 N.E. 541

BAR ASS'N OF CITY OF BOSTON

v.CASEY.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

May 25, 1917.

Appeal from Superior Court, Suffolk County; Marcus Morton, Judge.

Petition by the Bar Association of the City of Boston against Peter J. Casey. Respondent appeals, and excepts from order denying motion to vacate judgment of disbarment after entry of rescript following former appeal. Exceptions and appeal dismissed.Arthur D. Hill, of Boston, for petitioner.

Peter J. Casey, of Boston, pro se.

RUGG, C. J.

This case had been before the court on four different occasions: 196 Mass. 100, 81 N. E. 892;Id., 204 Mass. 331, 90 N. E. 584;Id., 211 Mass. 187, 97 N. E. 751,39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 116, Ann. Cas. 1913A, 1226;Id., 213 Mass. 549, 100 N. E. 658. Its history was narrated fully in the last decision and need not be here repeated. In the second decision, among other matters, the merits of ‘a motion to vacate and arrest judgment’ were decided, in which nine different causes were set forth. In the last decision there were considered two separate motions in arrest of judgment, each setting forth several grounds, and a motion to set aside findings. All these matters were examined in detail. The last ground alleged in one of these last two motions in arrest of judgment was, ‘and for every other ground, reason or cause at law for which said judgment may be arrested.’

The effort now is to bring the case here a fifth time by exceptions to an appeal from the denial of the requests contained in another paper entitled. ‘Motion in arrest of judgment affecting the jurisdiction of the court.’ The last six words add nothing because no motion in arrest of judgment can be made for cause existing before verdict or the entry of an order for the final disposition of the case ‘unless such cause affects the jurisdiction of the court.’ R. L. c. 173, § 118; Dean v. Ross, 178 Mass. 397, 400, 60 N. E. 119. All the matters now referred to existed before the entry of the last rescript accompanying the opinion in 213 Mass. 549, 100 N. E. 658. It thus appears that already this court has considered the merits of this case fully, and three distinct motions in arrest of judgment, and the decision in every instance has been against the contentions of the respondent.

It is a fundamental principle in the administration of justice according to law in this commonwealth that it is in the interest of the state and the parties taht there should be one full and fair trial of the issues in every case according to law, in order to ascertain the truth by rational means, and a decision as to all errors of law seasonably alleged to have arisen therein, and that then there should be an end to the litigation. In the nature of things, if successive motions in arrest of judgment can be filed, and each brought to this court one after another, as of right, then it follows that by the exercise of enough ingenuity and perversity, every suit, action or proceeding may be protracted indefinitely and the courts may be rendered powerless to bring causes to a conclusion by final judgment. Parties rightly entitled to prevail after the establishment of the facts by an impartial and adequate trial would be at the mercy of a sufficiently unscrupulous and acute-minded opponent. The justice which the law of the land had awarded to parties thus constantly might recede from their grasp and ultimately be denied to them. The courts would become inextricably entangled in the meshes of motions and other alleged pleadings and be unable to reach a result. The trial of causes in the courts, instead of enabling everybody, as required by article 11 of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution, ‘to find a certain remedy, by having recourse to the laws for all injuries or wrongs which he may receive in his person, property, or character * * * promptly and without delay; conformably to the laws,’ would become an object of derision and contempt. The state itself would be a helpless spectator to a mere game in which sharpness of wit would prevail over a righteous cause. Such a practice would be an utter refutation of the conception that courts exist for the establishment of justice. Courts are not thus impotent. They are clothed with power to accomplish the end for which they are constituted. The statement of the inevitable consequences of supporting the validity of the practice of successive motions in arrest of judgment is a complete demonstration of the utter fallacy of the idea that there can be such motions filed one after another as of right. It is the function of courts to accomplish justice by the regular and orderly administration of law. It is their duty to move, with due regard to all interests, irresistibly to a correct conclusion according to law. It is not the right of anybody to delay unreasonably the processes of the courts. It hardly need be said that courts are sedulous to protect all rights secured by law and that this court is most solicitous to examine every error properly alleged in each case brought before it. But it is equally its duty to see that proceedings in the courts do not become a mockery by resort to unusual, unwarranted and unreasonable methods of practice.

A motion in arrest of judgment is in its nature a single ultimate step immediately before the final disposition of a proceeding in court. That which in its essential character is single cannot be split into multitudinous details. It is to be taken only in cases to which it fairly is applicable and at the conclusion of all other methods employed for ascertaining and settling the rights of the parties. The nature of such a motion is to refer to all of error that remains before the case comes to an end.

It is the settled rule that a motion in arrest of judgment can be sustained only for errors apparent on the record. Commonwealth v. Brown, 150 Mass. 334, and cases collected at 341, 23 N. E. 98.

It is a necessary conclusion that as of right there can be but one such motion, unless possibly one has been sustained and thereafter further proceedings on the merits are had. A court may consider a second motion of this sort if it chooses, but it is under no obligation to do so, because a second such motion cannot be presented in the exercise of a right. Through excess of caution that no wrong might be done, already two groups of such motions here have been considered in the case at bar. It was said in Baker v. Warner, 231 U. S. 588 at 592,34 Sup. Ct. 175,58 L. Ed. 384, that motions in arrest of judgment ‘are not favored.’ For vastly stronger reasons successive motions of that kind are not entitled to be regarded with indulgence.

A second motion in arrest of judgment, in an analogy to a second writ of error in the federal courts, at most can bring up for correction only matters which could not have been called to the attention of the court by the earlier motion. United States v. New York Indians, 173 U. S. 464, 472, 19 Sup. Ct. 487, 43 L. Ed. 769;Illinois v. Illinois Central Railroad, 184 U. S. 77, 92, 22 Sup. Ct. 300, 46 L. Ed. 440. It stands on no higher or firmer ground than an appeal from a decree or judgment entered substantially in accordance with a rescript or mandate of an appellate court. In such case the utmost that the court will do, if that course seems proper, is to examine the record to see whether it is in conformity with its decision and, if found to be so, the final order, judgment or decree will stand as if there had been no appeal. Boston, Petitioner, 223 Mass. 36, 111 N. E. 412, where the...