Baratta v. Baratta
| Citation | 122 A.D.2d 3,504 N.Y.S.2d 175 |
| Parties | Caroline BARATTA, Respondent, v. Ronald R. BARATTA, Appellant. |
| Decision Date | 07 July 1986 |
| Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
Goldstein & Rubinton, P.C., Huntington (Peter D. Rubinton, of counsel), for appellant.
Michael F. Erdheim, New York City, for respondent.
Before LAZER, J.P., and GIBBONS, BRACKEN and LAWRENCE, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.
In a matrimonial action, the defendant husband appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an amended order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Murphy, J.), entered April 12, 1983, as directed the entry of money judgmen in favor of the plaintiff wife in the amounts of (1) $16,095.26, and (2) $19,656.61, respectively. By order dated June 11, 1984 (Baratta v. Baratta, 102 A.D.2d 838, 476 N.Y.S.2d 637) this court remitted the matter to Special Term in order that it might state the facts it deemed essential to its decision (CPLR 4213[b] ). Special Term has now complied.
Amended order modified, on the law, by deleting the second decretal paragraph thereof directing the entry of a money judgment for $19,656.61, and that branch of the plaintiff's application which was for leave to enter a money judgment for said arrears denied. As so modified, amended order affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.
The parties to this action entered into a settlement agreement on June 18, 1981. This agreement contained a number of extremely vague provisions. To cite but one such provision as an example, the agreement stated that the defendant husband "shall pay for all of the childrens' extracurricular activities". It is the vagueness of this and similar provisions that lies at the root of this appeal.
The parties were divorced by a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Geiler, J.), dated July 14, 1981. That judgment provided that the settlement agreement would survive, and not be merged in the judgment, and that the court would retain jurisdiction "for the purposes of specifically enforcing such of the provisions of that agreement as are capable of specific enforcement". The agreement was not incorporated into the judgment.
On February 24, 1982, in order to resolve a dispute arising under the agreement, the parties entered into a stipulation upon which was based a subsequent order of the same court (Spatt, J.). That order directed, inter alia, that the defendant pay the plaintiff, on or before April 26, 1982, the sum of $16,095.26 (representing the total amount of various bills incurred by the plaintiff which, under the separation agreement, it was allegedly the defendant's obligation to pay). The directive was, however, "subject to the plaintiff providing defendant with * * * proof of payment of the items referred to". The order of Justice Spatt further provided that the plaintiff was authorized to enter judgment upon five days' notice in the event the defendant defaulted in complying with the terms of that order.
By order to show cause dated July 16, 1982, the plaintiff moved for an order, inter alia, permitting her to enter judgme in the amount of $16,095.26, which allegedly remained unpaid in violation of Justice Spatt's order. This motion also contained a request for leave to enter judgment in the additional amount of $27,753.32, representing "arrears" allegedly due under various provisions of the settlement agreement. After a hearing, the court directed, inter alia, entry of judgments in the amounts of (1) $16,095.26 pursuant to the order of Justice Spatt, and (2) $19,656.61 representing that portion of the plaintiff's claimed additional expenses which the court found to be within the scope of the defendant's duty to pay under the settlement agreement. This appeal followed.
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