Barbanti v. Metro–N. Commuter R.R.
| Decision Date | 09 October 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 3172/2004.,3172/2004. |
| Parties | Robert BARBANTI, Plaintiff, v. METRO–NORTH COMMUTER RAILROAD, Defendant. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Robert J. Anderson, Esq., Landman Corsi Ballaine & Ford P.C., New York, Attorney for Defendant.
Mark T. Startman, Esq., Jacobowitz and Gubits, LLP, Walden, Attorney for Plaintiff.
Upon the foregoing papers, it is ORDERED that the branch of Defendant's motion for summary judgment based upon preemption is denied. The branch of Defendant's motion for summary judgment on the merits of Plaintiff's claims is granted.
Plaintiff Robert Barbanti filed an action against Defendant Metro–North Commuter Railroad alleging fraudulent inducement, breach of contract, and negligent/reckless misrepresentation. His claims arise from Metro–North's acquisition of a long-term lease of the Port Jervis Line (the “Line”) from Plaintiff's former employer, Norfolk Southern Railway. As part of the acquisition, Metro North allegedly determined to offer employment to Norfolk Southern's workers on the Line, so that Metro North would have experienced workers. Plaintiff, who was then employed as an Electronic Specialist with Norfolk Southern, was offered a position with Metro–North as a Signal Inspector. Plaintiff accepted Metro–North's offer of employment and began working for them on April 1, 2003 as a Signal Inspector on the Line. Metro–North's signal workers were subject to an existing collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) between Metro–North and the Association of Commuter Rail Employees Local 166 (“Local 166”).
Plaintiff subsequently learned that Local 166 objected to Metro–North's decision to give him the Signal Inspector position without it first having been made available to the union's existing members. Local 166 and Metro–North negotiated this and other issues related to the employees acquired with the Port Jervis Line and they entered into a Letter Agreement, dated April 15, 2003. The Letter Agreement provided, inter alia, for Plaintiff's removal from the Signal Inspector position and his placement in a new position as an Electronic Technician at a rate of pay that was lower by $0.58 per hour. The Signal Inspector position was then offered to Metro–North employees.
Plaintiff contends that Metro–North induced him to leave his position as an Electronic Specialist with Norfolk Southern and forego his seniority and other rights by representing to him that he would obtain a protected supervisory position with Metro–North as a Signal Inspector. Plaintiff specifically alleges that these representations were not made in good faith because at the time they were made Metro–North had not concluded its negotiations with Local 166 regarding the integration of the Port Jervis Line. Plaintiff complains that “[w]hen the offer was made to [him], it was simply made without conditions and without advice that it may change depending on the position taken by the Union in future negotiations.” Opposition at p. 4.
Metro–North removed Plaintiff's case to federal court on the ground that his claims were preempted by the Railway Labor Act, 45 U .S.C. §§ 151, et seq. (“RLA”), an argument it continues to make here. Plaintiff moved to remand, arguing that there was no preemption, and Metro–North moved for judgment on the pleadings on the basis of preemption. The federal court found that Plaintiff's claims were not preempted by the RLA, because they do not “require [ ] interpretation of the CBA; instead, they are grounded in rights and obligations that exist independent of the collective-bargaining agreement.” Barbanti v. MTA Metro North Commuter Railroad, 387 F.Supp.2d 333, 337 [SDNY 2005]. More specifically, the court found that “the terms of both the Letter Agreement and the CBA are irrelevant to whether Defendant's prior promises to the Plaintiff were knowingly false statements of material fact on which Plaintiff relied in changing his employer.” Id. at 337 (citing Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 124 [1994] ). Thus, the court found that Plaintiff's claims were not preempted. The court granted remand and denied Metro North's cross-motion for judgment on the pleadings. The federal court sent the case back to this Court where it was filed initially. Following remand, the parties conducted discovery, including depositions of Plaintiff and Metro North representatives involved in Plaintiff's hiring.
Metro North now moves for summary judgment, again arguing that Plaintiff's claims are preempted by the RLA and that this Court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate Plaintiff's claims because they constitute “minor disputes” under the RLA over which Boards of Adjustment have exclusive jurisdiction.1 Metro North also contends that even if Plaintiff's claims are not preempted, summary judgment is warranted on the breach of contract claim because there was no employment contract that existed independent of the CBA. With regard to Plaintiff's claims of fraudulent inducement and negligent misrepresentation, Metro North asserts that there are no triable issues of fact because Metro North did not knowingly or negligently make a false representation to Plaintiff.
In opposition, Plaintiff contends that Metro North may not re-litigate the preemption issue because that issue was already decided by the federal court prior to remand and that court's determination is the “law of the case.” Metro North argues that the law of the case doctrine does not bar re-examination of the issue because the federal court was limited to the pleadings and this Court now has the benefit of a full evidentiary record. That record, Metro North asserts, supports finding that the RLA preempts Plaintiff's claims and warrants raising the issue again on a motion for summary judgment.
The doctrine of “law of the case” is “in essence a doctrine of intra-action res judicata,” which “holds that once an issue is decided, it cannot again be litigated at trial level.” Siegel, N.Y. Prac § 276, at 475 [5th ed]. “Once a point is decided within a case, the doctrine of the law of the case makes it binding not only on the parties, but on the court as well: no other judge of coordinate jurisdiction may undo the decision.” Siegel, N.Y. Prac § 448, at 781 [5th ed] (citing State of New York Higher Educ. Svcs. Corp. v. Starr, 158 A.D.2d 771, 551 N.Y.S.2d 363 (3rd Dept 1990] ).
The federal district court is a court of coordinate jurisdiction in that it, like this court, is a trial court. That court made a determination in this case that Plaintiff's claims are not preempted by the RLA. Thus, the application here of the law of the case doctrine would preclude any re-examination by this Court of that issue.
However, in Matter of Seltzer v. New York State Democratic Committee, 293 A.D.2d 172, 174, 743 N.Y.S.2d 565 [2nd Dept 2002], a case arising in a similar procedural context, the Second Department declined to follow a federal district court's decision in the same case. Matter of Seltzer was initially brought in state court under Election Law § 2–126 and was then removed to federal court on the ground that the claim was preempted by the Federal Election Campaign Act (“FECA”). The federal court found that the claim was not preempted and remanded the case to state court. Following remand, the Federal Election Commission issued an advisory opinion finding that Election Law § 2–126 is preempted by the FECA in a primary election for federal office. The Second Department determined that it could re-examine the issue of preemption in light of the FEC's later opinion.
In reaching that decision, the Second Department found in the first instance that a federal court's “initial ruling on the preemption issue does not constitute controlling authority,” because state courts are “not necessarily bound by the decisions of intermediate and lower federal courts.” Matter of Seltzer, 293 A.D.2d at 174 (citing People v. Kin Kin, 78 N.Y.2d 54;Flanagan v. Prudential–Bache Sec., 67 N.Y.2d 500;Alvez v. American Export Lines, 46 N.Y.2d 634,aff'd446 U.S. 274). The Second Department also determined that it was “not bound by the doctrine of the law of the case.” 293 A.D.2d at 174. It stated that the doctrine “is not so inflexible as to preclude the correction of a ruling based on new evidence or a change in the law if the error sought to be corrected is so plain ... [that it] would require [the] court to grant a reargument of a cause.' “ Id. at 174 (citing Foley v. Roche, 86 A.D.2d 887, 887, quoting Eaton v. Alger, 47 N.Y. 345, 348). Finding the federal court's decision in the case to be plainly wrong in light of the FEC's opinion, the Second Department held that it was not bound to follow that court's erroneous decision. Id. at 175.
Applying that reasoning here, this Court need not adhere to the district court's initial ruling on the issue of preemption if new evidence or a change in the law supports a finding that the decision was plainly wrong.2 Here, as in Matter of Seltzer, a later decision of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals shows that the district court's decision was plainly in error. Shortly after the case was remanded to this Court in May, 2005, the Second Circuit considered the same issue that arose in this case-specifically, whether state law claims that qualify as minor disputes are preempted by the RLA and are within the exclusive jurisdiction of arbitral panels. See Sullivan v. American Airlines, Inc., 424 F .3d 267 [2nd Cir2005] (decided September 13, 2005). Sullivan held that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case because the RLA did not provide complete preemption and the case could not be removed to federal court based upon the defense of ordinary preemption.
Sullivan involved defamation claims brought by employees of American Airlines against the airline, two of the airline's managers, and three union members who had fought against the plaintiffs...
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