Barber v. Miller

• Decision Date: 02 December 2015
• Docket Number: No. 15–1404.,15–1404.
• Citation: 809 F.3d 840
• Parties: James BARBER, Individually and as next friend of J.B., a minor, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. James MILLER, Defendant–Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

809 F.3d 840

James BARBER, Individually and as next friend of J.B., a minor, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.James MILLER, Defendant–Appellee.

No. 15–1404.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Dec. 2, 2015.^*

ON BRIEF:J. Nicholas Bostic, Lansing, Michigan, for Appellant. Lisa C. Geminick, Office of the Michigan Attorney General, Lansing, Michigan, for Appellee.

Before: NORRIS, CLAY, and COOK, Circuit Judges.

COOK, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff James Barber, the biological father and legal guardian of J.B., a minor, sued Defendant James Miller, a social worker, alleging § 1983 claims related to Miller's in-school interviews of J.B. on suspicion of child neglect. These interviews led to a court order placing J.B. in protective custody. Barber also challenged the constitutionality of a Michigan statute authorizing such in-school interviews. The district court dismissed the claims against Miller on grounds of absolute and qualified immunity and dismissed Barber's constitutional challenge for lack of standing. We AFFIRM.

I. Facts

In January 2011, a member of Barber's family reported to the Children's Protective Services unit of the Michigan Department of Human Services (CPS) that Barber was neglecting J.B. Soon after, Miller, a CPS social worker, interviewed J.B. at his public elementary school without first obtaining a court order or Barber's consent. That same day, Miller interviewed Barber and inquired about his use of controlled substances. Barber defended his marijuana and prescription-drug use as medically authorized. Six days later, Miller again interviewed J.B. at school without a court order or parental consent. He also spoke with J.B.'s paternal grandmother, Mary Lou Buttis.

These various interviews prompted Miller to petition the family court to place J.B. in protective custody pending a hearing. See Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 712A.14b, 722.638. The court issued a protective-custody order; Miller picked J.B. up from school pursuant to that order. After a two-day hearing held over three calendar days, the judge found probable cause to support one or more allegations in the petition. Deciding to return J.B. to Barber's custody nevertheless, the judge conditioned the return on: Barber's abstaining from marijuana until further notice of the court, submitting to drug screening, and ensuring that J.B. has constant adult supervision.

Displeased with the intervention by CPS, Barber sued Miller under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating his constitutional rights. He alleged that Miller violated J.B.'s Fourth Amendment rights and Barber's Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights by (1) interviewing J.B. at school without a court order or parental consent, (2) littering the protective-custody petition with falsehoods and misrepresentations, and (3) removing J.B. from school pursuant to the protective-custody order. Barber also sought a declaratory judgment striking down Mich. Comp. Laws § 722.628(8), (9) —the statute authorizing CPS to conduct in-school interviews of suspected child-abuse victims without parental consent—as facially unconstitutional under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.

Miller moved to dismiss, and the district court granted the motion as to all claims. Specifically, the court cited Pittman v. Cuyahoga County Department of Children & Family Services, 640 F.3d 716, 724 (6th Cir.2011), in holding Miller absolutely immune from suit for statements included in the protective-custody petition. The district court then dismissed—on qualified-immunity grounds—claims related to the in-school interviews because Barber failed to show that clearly established law prohibited that conduct. The court also held that qualified immunity shielded Miller from liability for removing J.B. from school because the court's protective-custody order authorized that removal. Finally, the court denied on standing grounds Barber's request for a declaratory judgment, given that Barber could not show a likelihood of future injury. Barber appeals.

II. Standard of Review

"Whether a defendant is entitled to absolute or qualified immunity from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is a legal question that this Court reviews de novo. " Moldowan v. City of Warren, 578 F.3d 351, 374 (6th Cir.2009) (citing Gregory v. City of Louisville, 444 F.3d 725, 737, 742 (6th Cir.2006) ). Likewise, we give fresh review to the district court's legal determination of Article III standing. Johnson v. Econ. Dev. Corp., 241 F.3d 501, 507 (6th Cir.2001) (citing Coyne ex rel. Ohio v. Am. Tobacco Co., 183 F.3d 488, 492 (6th Cir.1999) ). At this stage, we construe Barber's complaint in the light most favorable to him, accepting all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Thompson v. Bank of Am., N.A., 773 F.3d 741, 750 (6th Cir.2014) (citing LULAC v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, 527 (6th Cir.2007) ).

III. Absolute Immunity

Barber first argues that Miller violated both his and J.B.'s constitutional rights by including false and misleading statements in the petition for a protective-custody order. As Pittman teaches though, social workers enjoy absolute immunity when acting in their capacities as legal advocates. 640 F.3d at 724–25 (citing Holloway v. Brush, 220 F.3d 767, 775 (6th Cir.2000) ). A social worker acts as a legal advocate when initiating court proceedings, filing child-abuse complaints, and testifying under oath. Id. And this absolute immunity holds, even under allegations that the social worker intentionally misrepresented facts to the family court. Id. at 723–25 (holding that a social worker accused of making numerous misrepresentations in a child-abuse complaint and two supporting affidavits enjoyed absolute immunity because she was acting "in her capacity as a legal advocate" when she submitted those documents). Absolute immunity enables social workers to "protect the health and well-being of the children ... without the worry of intimidation and harassment from dissatisfied parents." Id. at 725 (quoting Kurzawa v. Mueller, 732 F.2d 1456, 1458 (6th Cir.1984) ).

Here, Barber complains that Miller included false and misleading statements of fact in the protective-custody petition. But Miller offered his factual assessment in his capacity as a legal advocate initiating a child-custody proceeding in family court; Pittman therefore shields. And though Barber invites this court to revisit Pittman, we may not. See United States v. Elbe, 774 F.3d 885, 891 (6th Cir.2014) ("A panel of this court may not overturn binding precedent because a published prior panel decision 'remains controlling authority unless an inconsistent decision of the United States Supreme Court requires modification of the decision or this Court sitting en banc overrules the prior decision.' " (quoting Salmi v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 774 F.2d 685, 689 (6th Cir.1985) )). Miller thus enjoys absolute immunity against allegations of false and misleading statements to the family court.

IV. Qualified Immunity

Barber also claims that Miller violated J.B.'s Fourth Amendment rights and Barber's Fourteenth Amendment rights by interviewing J.B. at school and later taking J.B. into protective custody. There being no grounds for Miller to invoke absolute immunity as to these actions, see Pittman, 640 F.3d at 724, we examine his right to qualified immunity.

As it is well-understood, we only briefly review the governing law. Once a defendant invokes qualified immunity, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that (1) the defendant's acts violated a constitutional right and (2) the right at issue was clearly established at the time of the defendant's alleged misconduct. Barker v. Goodrich, 649 F.3d 428, 433 (6th Cir.2011) (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) ). Reviewing courts may "exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case." Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236, 129 S.Ct. 808.

In Pearson, the Supreme Court detailed a range of circumstances in which courts should address only the clearly established prong. Id. at 236–42, 129 S.Ct. 808. Several of those circumstances apply here. First, "it is plain" that the constitutional right that Barber seeks to enforce is not clearly established but it is "far from obvious whether in fact there is such a right." Id. at 237, 129 S.Ct. 808. Second, because the question of qualified immunity arose at the pleading stage, "the parties have provided very few facts to define and limit any [constitutional] holding." Id. at 238–39, 129 S.Ct. 808 (quoting Robinette v. Jones, 476 F.3d 585, 592 n. 8 (8th Cir.2007) ).

Third, Barber's briefing on the constitutional question lacks clarity and detail, posing a risk that we will decide the issue incorrectly. Id. at 239, 129 S.Ct. 808. We therefore confine our inquiry to the clearly established prong of the qualified-immunity analysis.

"For a right to be clearly established, the contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right." Leonard v. Robinson, 477 F.3d 347, 355 (6th Cir.2007) (quoting Greene v. Barber, 310 F.3d 889, 893 (6th Cir.2002) ) (internal quotation marks omitted). We examine the asserted right "in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general supposition." Lyons v. City of Xenia, 417 F.3d 565, 571 (6th Cir.2005) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) ). When determining whether the right is clearly established, "we look first to decisions of the Supreme Court, then to our own decisions and those of other courts within the circuit, and then to decisions of other Courts of Appeal." Andrews v. Hickman Cnty., 700 F.3d 845, 853 (6th Cir.2012).

A. The In–School Interviews

Barber contends that Miller violated J.B.'s Fourth Amendment rights and Barber's Fourteenth Amendment rights by interviewing J.B. at school on...