Bargsley v. Authority (In re Birmingham Airport Auth.)
Decision Date | 28 September 2018 |
Docket Number | 1170592 |
Citation | 274 So.3d 964 |
Parties | EX PARTE BIRMINGHAM AIRPORT AUTHORITY (In re: Terri Bargsley v. Birmingham Airport Authority) |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
John C. Neiman, Jr., Lee E. Bains, Jr., and Brandt P. Hill of Maynard, Cooper & Gale, P.C., Birmingham; and Kem Marks Bryant, chief legal officer and gen. counsel, Birmingham Airport Authority, for petitioner.
Gayle L. Douglas and M. Blair Clinton of Heninger Garrison & Davis, LLC, Birmingham, for respondent.
Terri Bargsley filed a negligence and wantonness action in the Jefferson Circuit Court ("the circuit court") against the Birmingham Airport Authority ("the BAA") seeking to recover damages for injuries Bargsley allegedly incurred in a fall at Birmingham-Shuttlesworth International Airport ("the airport"), which the BAA manages and operates. The BAA filed a motion to dismiss Bargsley's tort action, claiming that it is entitled to immunity under various sections of the Alabama Code 1975. The circuit court granted the BAA's motion to dismiss in part and denied it in part. The circuit court determined that the BAA is entitled to immunity from Bargsley's negligence claim but that it is not entitled to immunity from Bargsley's wantonness claim. The BAA then petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the circuit court to vacate the portion of its order denying the BAA's motion to dismiss as to Bargsley's wantonness claim and to enter an order dismissing Bargsley's wantonness claim. We grant the petition and issue the writ.
The BAA is a public corporation organized under § 4-3-40 et seq., Ala. Code 1975, to manage and operate the airport, which is owned by the City of Birmingham. Bargsley alleges that, in April 2017, while traveling for business purposes, she was walking through the terminal at the airport when she slipped on a clear liquid and fell. Bargsley alleges that she suffered injuries as a result of the fall.
On October 10, 2017, Bargsley sued the BAA and several fictitiously named parties asserting claims of negligence and wantonness and seeking damages for her alleged injury. On October 23, 2017, the BAA filed a motion to dismiss Bargsley's tort action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P. The BAA argued that it is entitled to immunity from Bargsley's tort action under §§ 4-3-7, 4-3-47, and 23-1-383, Ala. Code 1975. Section 4-3-7 states:
"No action or suit shall be brought or maintained against [an airport] authority, or any director thereof, for or on account of the negligence of such authority or director or its or his agents, servants or employees, in or about the construction, maintenance, operation, superintendence or management of any airport, heliport or other facility owned or controlled by the authority."
Section 4-3-47 states, in pertinent part, that "[t]he [airport] authority shall have the ... power ... [t]o sue and be sued in its own name in civil actions, excepting actions in tort against the authority."
On November 6, 2017, Bargsley filed a response in opposition to the BAA's motion to dismiss. Bargsley did not oppose the BAA's argument that it is entitled to immunity from her negligence claim, but she argued that the BAA is not entitled to immunity from her wantonness claim.
On February 15, 2018, following a hearing, the circuit court granted the BAA's motion in part and denied it in part. The circuit court stated "that the claims against [the BAA] asserting negligence are hereby dismissed with prejudice but the claims asserting wantonness against [the BAA] are not dismissed, but shall continue, unaffected by this order." (Capitalization omitted.)
On March 29, 2018, the BAA petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the circuit court to vacate the portion of its order denying the BAA's motion to dismiss as to Bargsley's wantonness claim and to enter an order dismissing in its entirety Bargsley's tort action.
In Ex parte Rock Wool Manufacturing Co., 202 So.3d 669, 671 (Ala. 2016), this Court set forth the following applicable standard of review:
The entire basis of the BAA's argument before this Court is that it is entitled to immunity from Bargsley's wantonness claim.1
The only issue before us is whether the circuit court erred in denying the BAA's motion to dismiss Bargsley's wantonness claim.
The BAA argues that the plain language of § 4-3-47 provides it with immunity from Bargsley's wantonness claim. Section 4-3-47 states, in pertinent part:
(Emphasis added.) The BAA argues that the plain language of § 4-3-47(2), Ala. Code 1975, clearly states that tort actions cannot be brought against an authority, such as the BAA, that Bargsley's wantonness claim is an action in tort, and that, therefore, the BAA is free from liability on the wantonness claim.
In response, Bargsley argues that, rather than simply reading the plain language of § 4-3-47(2), this Court must interpret the plain language of § 4-3-47(2) in light of § 4-3-50, Ala. Code 1975, which states:
"No civil action shall be brought or maintained against the authority or any director thereof for or on account of the negligence of such authority or director or its or his agents, servants or employees in or about the construction, maintenance, operation, superintendence or management of any airport, heliport or other facility owned or controlled by the authority."
(Emphasis added.) Bargsley argues that because the plain language of § 4-3-50 entitles an authority to immunity only from a negligence action, the plain language of § 4-3-47(2) cannot be read to entitle an authority to a broader immunity from any action in tort.
This Court set forth the applicable principles of statutory interpretation in Ex parte Ankrom, 152 So.3d 397, 409-10 (Ala. 2013) :
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