Barker v. Cal. Dep't of Corr.
| Decision Date | 25 June 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 2:13-cv-1793 KJN P,2:13-cv-1793 KJN P |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
| Parties | WILLIAM BARKER, Plaintiff, v. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION, et al., Defendants. |
Plaintiff is a state prisoner, who is represented by counsel in this action. Plaintiff proceeds on his First Amended Complaint, in which he raises claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and California state law.
Presently before the court is defendants' motion to dismiss. For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends that the motion to dismiss be granted in part, and that plaintiff be denied leave to file a Second Amended Complaint.
I. Background
This case proceeds on plaintiff's First Amended Complaint ("FAC," ECF No. 9), against defendants State of California, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation("CDCR"), and Mark Green. The FAC includes claims pursuant to Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131 et seq., Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701, and state law claims under the California Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 51 et seq. ("Unruh Act"), and the California Disabled Persons Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 54.1 et seq. ("CDPA") (all alleged against defendants CDCR and the State of California), and an Eighth Amendment claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (alleged against defendant Green).
On September 11, 2014, the court, after screening the FAC pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, issued an order directing service on defendants State of California, CDCR, and Green. (ECF No. 14.)
Now pending before the court is defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint on the following grounds:
In the operative First Amended Complaint, plaintiff alleges as follows.
At all pertinent times, plaintiff was an inmate at California Medical Facility ("CMF") in Vacaville, California. (FAC, ECF No. 9-1 at 2.)
Plaintiff is confined to a wheelchair, and has been designated "DPW" under the remedial plan ordered by the court in Armstrong v. Brown, No. C 94-2307 CW (N.D. Cal.). As a result of this designation, plaintiff is prescribed a wheelchair at all times, and requires wheelchair-accessible housing and paths of travel. (Id. at 2.)
Defendant Mark Green is a Material and Stores Supervisor I at CMF, who is allegedly responsible for issuing wheelchairs to CMF inmates. (Id. at 2.)
On May 23, 2012, plaintiff purchased a new wheelchair ("Initial Wheelchair") from CMF. The Initial Wheelchair was equipped with a regular frame and a 20-inch wide seat. (Id. at 3.)
In the course of testing the Initial Wheelchair, plaintiff found that it responded as if it had a bent axle. According to plaintiff, he therefore made several informal requests for a heavy-duty wheelchair, as he suspected that he weighed too much to safely use a regular wheelchair. (Id. at 3, 4.) Plaintiff describes a heavy-duty wheelchair as having "a higher weight capacity than a regular wheelchair." He adds that the "rear wheels [of a heavy-duty wheelchair] have a dual axel whereas a regular wheelchair has a single axel." (Id. at 3.)
On June 18, 2012, plaintiff made a formal request for a heavy-duty wheelchair. Plaintiff alleges that, in support of his request, he indicated that his weight exceeded the weight capacity of the Initial Wheelchair, that the wheels of the Initial Wheelchair did not roll properly, that portions of the Initial Wheelchair had become torn after less than one month of use, and that the Initial Wheelchair's right rear wheel rolled as though its axel was bent. (Id.)
On October 12, 2012, nearly four months later, defendant Green issued plaintiff a replacement wheelchair with a 22-inch-wide seat ("Replacement Wheelchair"). Plaintiff alleges that he immediately told Green that the Replacement Wheelchair was too large and that he (plaintiff) required a wheelchair with a seat that was only 20 inches wide. Plaintiff alleges on information and belief that Green knew that a wheelchair with a 22-inch wide seat, unlike a wheelchair with a 20-inch wide seat, would be too wide to pass through all doorways at CMF. Plaintiff also alleges on information and belief that defendant Green knew that plaintiff is designated DPW and therefore requires a wheelchair that can pass through all doorways at CMF. (Id. at 4.)
According to plaintiff, as a result of being issued the Replacement Wheelchair, i.e., a wheelchair that was too large to pass through all doorways at CMF, he was unable to access the B-1 eye clinic, as well as religious services. (Id. at 4-5.)
On October 25, 2012, plaintiff filed a Reasonable Modification or Accommodation Request Form, requesting a wheelchair with a 20-inch seat. On November 5, 2012, defendant Green responded by again providing plaintiff with the Initial Wheelchair. Plaintiff alleges that,despite pointing out to Green that he was being provided with the same wheelchair he had previously received, he was not given a different wheelchair. (Id. at 5.)
According to plaintiff, on November 19, 2012, the Initial Wheelchair "failed" by veering abruptly to the left and almost rolling over. Plaintiff alleges that his hand became lodged in the wheel, causing him to sustain injuries which included, but were not limited to, "a bony avulsion of the ulnar collateral ligament of the left thumb and comminuted fracture of the proximal phalanx of the left thumb with volar displacement of the proximal phalanx . . . ." Plaintiff consequently required surgery under general anesthesia at San Joaquin General Hospital to repair the damage. (Id. at 5.)
Plaintiff seeks monetary damages, declaratory relief, attorney's fees, and costs. (Id. at 10.)
III. Standard
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure1 provides for motions to dismiss for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant Rule 12(b)(6), the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007), and construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969); Meek v. County of Riverside, 183 F.3d 962, 965 (9th Cir. 1999). Still, to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a pro se complaint must contain more than "naked assertions," "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007). In other words, "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Furthermore, a claim upon which the court can grant relief must have facial plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Attachments to a complaint are considered to be part of the complaint for purposesof a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Hal Roach Studios v. Richard Reiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n.19 (9th Cir. 1990).
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should not be granted unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claims which would entitle him to relief. Hishon v. King & Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). In general, pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). The court has an obligation to construe such pleadings liberally. Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc). However, the court's liberal interpretation of a pro se complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not pled. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).
IV. Analysis
Defendants move to dismiss plaintiff's claims against CDCR and the State of California under Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Defendants argue: "Plaintiff does not allege any facts in his complaint against the State or CDCR, and Plaintiff has alleged no nexus between his allegations against Green and his conclusory allegation that the State and CDCR discriminated against him solely based on his disability." (Motion, ECF No. 19 at 5.)
Plaintiff counters that "the court already said the Amended Complaint states a potentially cognizable claim for relief against the Defendants pursuant to the ADA, [the Rehabilitation Act], and parallel state laws."2 (Opposition, ECF No. 20 at 4.)
Plaintiff misconstrues the nature of the preliminary screening called for by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. A court's determination, upon screening, that a complaint may state cognizable claims does not preclude a defendant from subsequently bringing a motion to dismiss one or more ofthose claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Norsworthy v. Beard, ___ F.3d ___, 2015 WL 1478264 at *3 n. 4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2015) (...
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