Meek v. County of Riverside

• Decision Date: 05 March 1999
• Docket Number: No. 97-56531,PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS,97-56531
• Citation: 183 F.3d 962
• Parties: (9th Cir. 1999) DONALD L. MEEK,, v. COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE, DEFENDANT, AND ALBERT J. WOJCIK, JUDGE, RIVERSIDE MUNICIPAL COURT; RODNEY WALKER, JUDGE, RIVERSIDE MUNICIPAL COURT,
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Page 962

183 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 1999)

DONALD L. MEEK, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE, DEFENDANT, AND ALBERT J. WOJCIK, JUDGE, RIVERSIDE MUNICIPAL COURT; RODNEY WALKER, JUDGE, RIVERSIDE MUNICIPAL COURT, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.

No. 97-56531

U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit

Argued and Submitted March 5, 1999--Pasadena, California

June 24, 1999

Counsel Marc J. Poster, Greines, Martin, Stein & Richland, Beverly Hills, California, for the defendants-appellants.

George W. Shaeffer, Jr., Irvine, California, for the plaintiffappellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California; Richard A. Paez, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-97-01179-RAP

Before: Warren J. Ferguson, Melvin Brunetti, and Thomas G. Nelson, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge BRUNETTI; Dissent by Judge FERGUSON.

BRUNEETTI, Circuit Judge.

Donald L. Meek brought a section 1983 action against the County of Riverside and two municipal court Judges alleging that his First Amendment right to campaign for public office had been violated when he was constructively fired in retaliation for his seeking election to a municipal court Judgeship. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state grounds upon which relief can be granted. The district court denied the individually named defendants' motion to dismiss finding that they were not entitled to judicial immunity and that the determination of whether a court commissioner has a First Amendment right not to be fired for political reasons could not be made on the record before it. This appeal followed. We have jurisdiction over the district court's denial of judicial immunity pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291, and we affirm. Because the denial of the claim that Meek does not have a First Amendment right not to be terminated for political reasons is not a final order, we lack jurisdiction to review the district court's resolution of the issue at this stage of the litigation and therefore dismiss, in part, the appeal.

I.

Meek was appointed a Commissioner of Municipal Court of the County of Riverside, California, in 1989 and, during his tenure, was assigned primarily to the Mt. San Jacinto Judicial District. In September of 1995, Meek learned that two vacancies on the Riverside Municipal Court would occur in March and April of 1996. One of the seats was to be filled by a nonpartisan election and the other by a gubernatorial appointment. Meek approached then-Commissioner Albert J. Wojcik about an arrangement whereby Meek would support Wojcik in the March, 1996, non-partisan election for the first vacant seat and Wojcik would support Meek in his efforts to obtain a gubernatorial appointment to the second seat.

Shortly after his meeting with Wojcik, Meek concluded that Wojcik would not support him in his effort to obtain the gubernatorial appointment. He also learned that Municipal Judge Curtis R. Hinman had written a letter to Governor Wilson supporting Sherill Nielsen, a close friend and associate of Municipal Judge Rodney Walker, for appointment to the municipal court. Deciding that he had little chance of obtaining the appointment, Meek chose to run against Wojcik in the March election. During the campaign, Judge Walker allegedly stated that he would fire Meek from his position of court commissioner if Meek lost the election and that he considered Meek his political enemy.

On March 26, 1996, Wojcik was elected Judge of the Mt. San Jacinto Municipal Court and he took office on April 23, 1996. On April 4, 1996, then-Commissioner Wojcik, Judge Walker, and Judge Hinman met and held a vote on whether Meek should be terminated. Wojcik and Walker voted to fire Meek and Judge Hinman abstained.

On April 8, 1996, Judge Hinman informed Meek of the vote to dismiss and told him that he would be fired if he did not resign by April 12, 1996. Judge Hinman informed Meek that he had a right to a hearing before Wojcik and Walker but that "it would do no good, because the outcome would be the same." In lieu of termination or resignation, Meek elected to retire on April 8, 1996.

Meek filed a section 1983 suit against Wojcik, Walker, and the County of Riverside claiming that he had been fired in retaliation for exercising his First Amendment right to run and campaign for office. Claiming judicial and political immunity, Wojcik and Walker moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state grounds upon which relief can be granted.¹ The district court denied Wojcik and Walker's motion to dismiss. The district court found that Wojcik and Walker were not entitled to judicial immunity because the challenged action was administrative rather than judicial in nature. The district court further found that Wojcik and Walker acted in complete absence of jurisdiction when they constructively fired Meek and that therefore such action was not protected by judicial immunity. The district court also refused to dismiss the complaint on the ground of "absolute political immunity" because it found that it could not resolve on the record before it the issue of whether Meek had a First Amendment right to not be terminated from his position as court commissioner for political reasons.

II.

A. Judicial Immunity

Wojcik and Walker claim that the district court erred in its ruling on absolute judicial immunity. Although a district court's denial of a 12(b)(6) motion generally is not a reviewable final order, the denial of a claim of absolute judicial immunity is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine and we review the district court's denial de novo. Figueroa v. United States, 7 F.3d 1405, 1408 (9th Cir. 1993); Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 741-43 (1982). On review, the facts alleged in the complaint are assumed to be true and are construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jensen v. Oxnard, 145 F.3d 1078, 1082 (9th Cir. 1998). "[A] complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).

It is well settled that Judges are generally immune from civil liability under section 1983. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9-10 (1991) (citing long line of cases acknowledging that "generally, a Judge is immune from a suit for money damages."). "Although unfairness and inJustice to a litigant may result on occasion, `it is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of Justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to himself.' " Id. at 10 (citing Bradley v. Fisher, (13 Wall.) 335, 347, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1871)).

A Judge is not deprived of immunity because he takes actions which are in error, are done maliciously, or are in excess of his authority. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-56 (1978). The rationale for granting Judges immunity from liability for even intentional and malicious conduct while acting in their judicial capacity is that Judges should be free to make controversial decisions and act upon their convictions without fear of personal liability. Id. at 363-4. The concern for principled and fearless decision-making forms the basis for judicial immunity. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967). Absolute judicial immunity, however, is only granted when essential to protect the integrity of the judicial process. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224-29 (1988)(noting that courts have been hesitant to find or extend absolute official immunity).

There are two situations in which Judges are not absolutely immune from liability arising out of official conduct. "First, a Judge is not immune from liability for non-judicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in the Judge's judicial capacity. Second, a Judge is not immune for actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction." Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11-12 (citations omitted); see also, Schucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1204 (9th Cir. 1988) ("A judge loses absolute immunity only when he acts in the clear absence of all jurisdiction or performs an act that is not judicial in nature."); Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc) ("A Judge lacks immunity where he acts in the clear absence of all jurisdiction, or performs an act that is not judicial in nature.")(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

The district court found that appellants were not entitled to judicial immunity because the challenged action, their decision to constructively terminate Meek, was an administrative rather than a judicial act. "[T]he factors determining whether an act by a Judge is a `judicial' one relate to the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by a Judge, and to the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the Judge in his judicial capacity. " Stump, 435 U.S. at 362.

A state court Judge is generally not entitled to absolute immunity from liability arising out of a decision to fire a sub ordinate judicial employee because the decision is not a judicial or adjudicative act, but rather an administrative one. Forester, 484 U.S. at 229. In Forrester, a former probation officer filed a damage action against a state Judge alleging that the Judge had demoted and fired her on account of her gender in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In determining the scope of judicial immunity, the Court stressed that the focus must be on the function that the immunity protects. Id. at 227. Judges are granted absolute immunity for their judicial actions in order to safeguard independent and principled judicial decision making. Id. at 226-27. Although a Judge's employment decisions "may be essential to the very functioning of the courts," they are not...