Barker v. Frank, 18
| Decision Date | 17 March 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 18,No. 96-305,18,96-305 |
| Parties | , 116 Ed. Law Rep. 1271 Roger BARKER, Patty MacDonald and Malcolm MacDonald, on Behalf of Themselves and all of the Citizens, Residents, Taxpayers, Inhabitants, and Owners of Real Property in Fountain Lake School District # 18 in Saline County, Arkansas, Appellants, v. Henry FRANK, in his official capacity as President and Member of the Board of Education of Fountain Lake School District; Ron Koller, in his official capacity as a Member of the Board of Education of Fountain Lake School District; Eddie Culpepper, in his official capacity as a Member of the Board of Education of Fountain Lake School District; Tim Culbreth, in his official capacity as a Member of the Board of Education of Fountain Lake School District; Phil Mariage, in his official capacity as a Member of the Board of Education of Fountain Lake School District; Charles Clark, in his official capacity as Superintendent of Fountain Lake School District ; Freddie Barton, in his official capacity as Saline County Clerk; and Nancy Elrod, in her official capacity as Saline County Collector, Appellees. |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Glenn E. Kelley, C. Tad Bohannon, Little Rock, for Appellants.
Dan F. Bufford, Mark W. Nichols, Little Rock, for Appellees.
Appellants Roger Barker, Patty MacDonald, and Malcolm MacDonald (hereinafter referred to as "taxpayers") own real property in Saline County and reside within Fountain Lake School District # 18, which includes part of Saline County and part of Garland County. The appellees are members of the Board of Fountain Lake School District # 18, the County Clerk of Saline County, and the County Collector of Saline County.
The complaint filed by the taxpayers against the appellees alleged that in July 1993 the State Assessment Coordination Division advised the Saline County Judge that the preliminary ratio of the assessed value of real property to actual value of the real property had fallen below 18 percent and that the state turnback funds to the county were in jeopardy. To cure this problem, reappraisal of land located in Saline County was suggested, and a reappraisal was done. In August 1994, the Saline County Equalization Board received the results of the reappraisal, which showed that the aggregate value of taxable real property in the school district for 1994 had increased 28.8% over that in 1993.
At the core of the taxpayers' complaint is their assertion that the collection of the 1994 school district tax constitutes an illegal exaction because of the reappraisal and the failure of the school district to roll back taxes. This is so, they allege, because the school district stands to receive revenues exceeding by more than 10% those received in 1993, which violates the specific requirements of Amendment 59 of the Arkansas Constitution. 1 The taxpayers assert that because the aggregate value of taxable real and personal property itself eclipsed 1993 by more than 10%, the school district must roll back its rate of taxation under Amendment 59. Otherwise, the tax is illegal.
The taxpayers further complain that a number of statutory tasks related to the reassessment of property have not been performed by the school district and by Saline County public officials. For example, they point out that the Saline County Clerk must certify the 1994 assessed value of land located in the school district under Ark.Code Ann. § 26-26-403 (Repl.1992), which was not done. Also, the Saline County Clerk must report to the school district's governing body and provide certification of the assessment data on land in Saline County under the same code section, which allegedly was a duty not performed. Finally, the taxpayers allege that the school district's governing body must complete certain forms and return them to the Saline County Clerk, using the data previously provided by the clerk, as required by Ark.Code Ann. § 26-26-404 (Repl.1992). This, too, was not accomplished, according to the complaint.
The complaint sought a writ of mandamus (1) to the Saline County Clerk, requiring him to perform his duties, and (2) to the school district to complete the rollback form and roll back its tax rate pursuant to the State Constitution. The taxpayers further sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the collection of 1994 real property taxes in violation of Amendment 59. Next, the taxpayers prayed for judgment declaring the collection of 1994 real property taxes in the school district to constitute an illegal exaction under Amendment 59 as revenue collected which is more than 10% above revenues collected in 1993. Finally, they sought to enjoin the appellees from further violations of Amendment 59.
The school district moved to dismiss the taxpayers' complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Saline County Clerk and Collector moved similarly and asserted that the taxpayers' claims were required to be brought in county court because they involved county taxes. The taxpayers replied that the taxes at issue were school district taxes as opposed to county taxes, and, thus, circuit court was the appropriate jurisdiction. They further referred to their prayers for mandamus and prohibition, remedies which typically lie in circuit court.
The taxpayers subsequently supplemented their response to the motions to dismiss. They contended that even assuming that the school district tax was a county tax, jurisdiction in circuit court was still proper because the case involved an illegal exaction. Citing Foster v. Jefferson County Quorum Court, 321 Ark. 105, 901 S.W.2d 809 (1995), supp. op. granting reh'g, 321 Ark. 116-A, 901 S.W.2d 815 (1995), they contended that circuit court was an appropriate jurisdiction. The school district replied that the case did not involve an illegal exaction but merely a legal tax that was illegally collected.
After a hearing on the motions to dismiss, the trial court found that the school district tax was indeed a county tax, and that under Foster v. Jefferson County Quorum Court, supra, jurisdiction was vested exclusively in county court. The trial court also concluded that the matter more appropriately lay in chancery court as opposed to circuit court because injunctive relief was sought. The trial court finally stated that it would dismiss the case without prejudice so that the taxpayers could file in either chancery or county court, or appeal the matter. An order of dismissal was entered.
The taxpayers urge as their initial point that the trial court erred in finding that a county tax was involved and that county court was the proper jurisdiction. The school district argues that the trial court did not rule that the tax was a county tax and that this issue is a "red herring." We disagree. The trial court stated: "[I]t is my understanding and my belief that this should go to county court, that I believe this is a county tax." Turning to the merits of this issue, the Arkansas Constitution does provide that county courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction in all matters relating to county taxes. Ark. Const. art. 7, § 28. We agree with the taxpayers, however, that the tax at issue here is not a county tax.
We first observe that under the constitution school taxes and county taxes are treated differently. This matter was clearly reflected in Cole v. Blackwell, 38 Ark. 271 (1881), where we stated that under Ark. Const. art. 14, § 3 the power to levy taxes for school purposes was solely that of the school districts and that such a levy was not within the jurisdiction of the county court. Although this section of the State Constitution has since been amended on two occasions, the language that school districts shall levy taxes remains intact. See Ark. Const. amends. 11 & 40.
We further observe that the General Assembly, the body to whom the State Constitution delegates the power to tax, has consistently treated school districts, counties, and municipalities as separate taxing units. See e.g., Ark.Code Ann. § 26-80-101 to -109 (1987 & Supp.1995) (school district taxes); Ark.Code Ann. § 26-74-101 to -505 (1987 & Supp.1995) (county sales and use taxes); Ark.Code Ann. § 26-75-101 to -801 (1987 & Supp.1995) (municipal sales and use taxes). In addition, there are numerous statutes that contain language which differentiates between school district and county taxes, the most relevant being Ark.Code Ann. § 26-80-104(b) (1987), which provides that school taxes are to be collected in the same manner as county taxes. See also Ark.Code Ann. § 26-26-402(a)(1) (Repl.1992) (); Ark.Code Ann. § 14-94-122(a) (Supp.1995) ().
Moreover, this court has observed that Article 14 of the State Constitution "makes it the duty of the Legislature to provide for the establishment, maintenance and support of a system of common schools in this State." LeMaire v. Henderson, 174 Ark. 936, 939, 298 S.W. 327, 329 (1927). We went on to say: "This court has recognized from the beginning that the Legislature must employ agencies to accomplish that object, and that a school district is a proper agency therefor." Id. Matters concerning public schools rest within the province of the State--not the county government. This makes good sense, especially when some school districts are situated in more than one county, as in the case at hand.
The distinction between county taxes and school district taxes is further driven home by the fact that although the General Assembly has given counties the responsibility of collecting school district taxes, Ark. Const. art. 16, § 11 states: "No tax shall be levied except in pursuance of law, and every law imposing a tax shall state distinctly the...
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