Barnes County Ed. Ass'n v. Barnes County Special Ed. Bd.
Decision Date | 05 March 1979 |
Docket Number | No. 9550,9550 |
Citation | 276 N.W.2d 247 |
Parties | 102 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2353 BARNES COUNTY EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. BARNES COUNTY SPECIAL EDUCATION BOARD, a public corporation, Defendant andAppellant. Civ. |
Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
Chapman & Chapman, Bismarck, for plaintiff and appellee; argued by Daniel J. Chapman, Bismarck.
Vogel, Brantner, Kelly, Knutson, Weir & Bye, Fargo, and John T. Paulson, State's Atty., Valley City, for defendant and appellant; argued by David F. Knutson, Fargo.
Barnes County Special Education Board appeals from a district court judgment that ordered it, among other things, to negotiate with the appellee, Barnes County Education Association, pursuant to Chapter 15-38.1, N.D.C.C. We affirm.
The facts are undisputed. A group of teachers employed by the Barnes County Special Education Board (Special Education Board) organized the Barnes County Education Association (Association) and petitioned the Special Education Board to recognize it as a negotiating unit pursuant to Chapter 15-38.1, N.D.C.C. The teachers also requested that the Special Education Board deduct association dues from their paychecks pursuant to Section 15-38.1-11.1, N.D.C.C. The Special Education Board obtained Attorney General's opinions on these questions that stated that although the Special Education Board may negotiate with the Association and allow payroll deductions pursuant to Chapter 15-38.1, N.D.C.C., it was not required to do so. The Special Education Board subsequently rejected the Association's petition for recognition as a negotiating unit and for payroll deductions.
The Association then brought this action for declaratory relief pursuant to Chapter 32-23, N.D.C.C., seeking an interpretation of the applicable statutes. The Association also moved for a temporary injunction to prohibit the Special Education Board from issuing contracts pending the outcome of the case. The Special Education Board, relying upon the Attorney General's opinions, brought a motion to dismiss the Association's complaint. By agreement of both parties, the district court determined that there was no genuine issue of fact and consolidated the parties' motions as one for summary judgment. The court found that Chapter 15-38.1, N.D.C.C., was applicable and ordered the Special Education Board to negotiate with the Association pursuant to that chapter. The Special Education Board was also ordered to comply with the provisions of Section 15-38.1-11.1, N.D.C.C., regarding payroll deductions for representative organization dues.
The Special Education Board appeals to this court. The district court judgment has been stayed pending the outcome of this appeal.
The narrow issue to be determined by this court is whether or not a county special education board created pursuant to Chapter 15-59.1, N.D.C.C., is an entity subject to the provisions of Chapter 15-38.1, N.D.C.C., regarding teachers' representation and negotiation.
The Special Education Board argues that the provisions of Chapter 15-38.1, N.D.C.C., are inapplicable to a county board of special education because Chapter 15-38.1, N.D.C.C., applies only to school boards of public school districts. It argues that a county board of special education created pursuant to Chapter 15-59.1, N.D.C.C., is not a school board of a public school district; therefore, Chapter 15-38.1 does not apply. It also argues that the statutes in question are clear and unambiguous and do not require judicial interpretation.
The Association responds that the statutes in question are unclear and require judicial interpretation. It also argues that Chapter 15-38.1, N.D.C.C., when read in its entirety, applies to county boards of special education.
In interpreting a statute, our lodestar is legislative intent. In determining legislative intent, certain rules of statutory construction become available.
If a statute is clear and unambiguous, the letter of the statute cannot be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit. Section 1-02-05, N.D.C.C.; In Interest of D. S., 263 N.W.2d 114, 121 n.3 (N.D.1978); Hughes v. North Dakota Crime Victims Rep. Bd., 246 N.W.2d 774, 776 (N.D.1976); Richard v. Johnson, 234 N.W.2d 22, 26 (N.D.1975); In Re Dilse, 219 N.W.2d 195, 200 (N.D.1974). In such an instance, legislative intent is presumed clear from the face of the statute. Brenna v. Hjelle, 161 N.W.2d 356, 359 (N.D.1968). Thus, we cannot invade the province of the legislature when it has clearly spoken.
If the language of a statute is of doubtful meaning, or if adherence to the strict letter of the statute would lead to injustice, absurdity, or contradictory provisions, a duty descends upon the courts to ascertain the true meaning. State v. Jelliff, 251 N.W.2d 1, 7 (N.D.1977); Chicago, M., & St. P. R. Co. v. Public Service Com'n, 98 N.W.2d 101, 106-107 (N.D.1959); Rybnicek v. City of Mandan, 93 N.W.2d 650, 654 (N.D.1958); State v. E. W. Wylie Co., 79 N.D. 471, 479, 58 N.W.2d 76, 80-81 (1953). Thus, in pursuance of the general objective of giving effect to legislative intent, we are not controlled by the literal meaning of the language of the statute, but the spirit or intention of the law prevails over the letter. State ex rel. Olson v. Thompson, 248 N.W.2d 347, 352 (N.D.1976); Ficek v. International Bro. of Boilermakers, Etc., 219 N.W.2d 860, 870 (N.D.1974); In re H., 206 N.W.2d 871, 872 (N.D.1973); Perry v. Erling, 132 N.W.2d 889, 896 (N.D.1965).
In construing the provisions of Chapter 15-38.1, N.D.C.C., the whole Act must be considered. See Payne v. Board of Trustees, 76 N.D. 278, 35 N.W.2d 553 (1949), in which this court held that in construing the Teachers' Insurance and Retirement Act, the whole Act must be considered.
In applying these principles of construction to the facts of this case, we must first determine if Chapter 15-38.1, N.D.C.C., is clear and free of ambiguity so as to foreclose statutory construction.
The Special Education Board contends that Section 15-38.1-01, N.D.C.C., which defines the purpose of Chapter 15-38.1, N.D.C.C., clearly provides that it is only applicable to school boards of "public school districts". Section 15-38.1-01, N.D.C.C., reads:
(Emphasis supplied.)
The only other reference in Chapter 15-38.1 to "public school district" occurs in Section 15-38.1-10, N.D.C.C., which reads:
(Emphasis supplied.)
Although there are a number of other sections of Chapter 15-38.1 that refer simply to school boards, the Special Education Board argues that this shorthand designation "cannot override the unambiguous definition contained in the sections involving purpose and organization."
The Association replies that these provisions are not clear and unambiguous. Indeed, the Association submits that other provisions of the chapter indicate that certificated teachers employed by a county board of special education are included within the negotiation law. The Association refers us to Section 15-38.1-02, N.D.C.C., which provides the definitions to be used in Chapter 15-38.1, N.D.C.C. The pertinent definitions read:
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