Hilton v. North Dakota Educ. Ass'n

• Decision Date: 20 December 2002
• Docket Number: No. 20020054.,20020054.
• Citation: 655 N.W.2d 60,2002 ND 209
• Parties: Dale HILTON, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. NORTH DAKOTA EDUCATION ASSOCIATION; Claudia Albers, Michael Barnhart, Bart Brackin, Julie Curren, Wade Curren, Tim Erhardt, Janet Fagerland, Harold Fass, Lynette Fitterer, Judy Fryslie, Fayette Harrison, Jane Jacobson, Remae Kuehn, Milissa Meckle, Chad Rolandson, Duane Schmidt, Carole Sherwin, Dave Sherwin, Walter Wolf, and Kiley Yates, individually and collectively as the Center Education Association, Defendants and Appellees. and Center Public School District No. 18, Defendant.
• Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

655 N.W.2d 60

2002 ND 209

Dale HILTON, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. NORTH DAKOTA EDUCATION ASSOCIATION; Claudia Albers, Michael Barnhart, Bart Brackin, Julie Curren, Wade Curren, Tim Erhardt, Janet Fagerland, Harold Fass, Lynette Fitterer, Judy Fryslie, Fayette Harrison, Jane Jacobson, Remae Kuehn, Milissa Meckle, Chad Rolandson, Duane Schmidt, Carole Sherwin, Dave Sherwin, Walter Wolf, and Kiley Yates, individually and collectively as the Center Education Association, Defendants and Appellees. and Center Public School District No. 18, Defendant.

No. 20020054.

Supreme Court of North Dakota.

December 20, 2002.

Steven L. Latham (argued), Wheeler Wolf, Bismarck, N.D. and Clifton Rodenburg (on brief), Johnson, Rodenburg & Lauinger, Fargo, N.D., for plaintiff and appellant.

Michael Geiermann, Rolfson Schulz Lervick & Geiermann Law Offices, Bismarck, N.D., for defendants and appellees.

NEUMANN, Justice.

[¶ 1] Dale Hilton appealed from a judgment dismissing his action against the North Dakota Education Association ("N.D.E.A."), the Center Education Association ("C.E.A."), and the twenty individual members of the C.E.A. for breach of a duty of fair representation, intentional interference with contract, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. We hold Hilton was a teacher and was bound by a negotiated agreement between the C.E.A. and the Center School District ("School District"). We affirm.

I

[¶ 2] The C.E.A. is affiliated with the N.D.E.A., and at all times relevant to this action, the School District recognized the C.E.A. as the exclusive appropriate negotiating unit under N.D.C.C. ch. 15-38.1 for "all certificated teaching personnel employed, or to be employed by the [School District] (except Superintendent, Principals and Aids)." The C.E.A. and the School District had reached a negotiated agreement for the 1998-1999 school year for all certificated teaching personnel. In 1998, the School District hired Hilton as a counselor for two days per week for the 1998-1999 school year. Hilton was certified under N.D.C.C. ch. 15-36, and he had several degrees, including a Ph.D. in counseling. Hilton separately negotiated his contract with the School District, and his salary was higher than the negotiated agreement for the School District's certificated teaching personnel.

[¶ 3] In 1999, the C.E.A. petitioned to be recognized as the appropriate negotiating unit for all certificated teaching personnel employed, or to be employed by the School District. Hilton did not sign the C.E.A. petition. The School District recognized the C.E.A. as the exclusive appropriate negotiating unit for all certificated teaching personnel, and the C.E.A. and the School District ultimately reached a negotiated agreement for the 1999-2000 school year. The School District tendered Hilton a contract for three days per week with a per day salary less than his salary for the previous year. Hilton submitted a counteroffer with the same per day salary as the previous year. During this process, the School District learned its tendered salary and Hilton's counteroffer did not comply with the negotiated agreement. The School District asked the C.E.A. to reopen negotiations for Hilton, but the C.E.A. declined. In September 1999, Hilton accepted the School District's contract for the 1999-2000 school year for three days per week at a per day salary equal to his salary for the previous year. As a result, Hilton's salary for the 1999-2000 school year did not comply with the negotiated agreement.

[¶ 4] In October 1999, the C.E.A. filed a mandamus action against the School District, seeking to require it to issue Hilton a contract within the parameters of the negotiated agreement. Hilton was not named as a party in the mandamus action. The C.E.A. and the School District settled the mandamus action, agreeing the School District would nonrenew Hilton's contract for the 2000-2001 school year and offer him a contract within the parameters of the negotiated agreement for that year. The settlement agreement between the C.E.A. and the School District did not affect Hilton's salary for the 1999-2000 school year.

[¶ 5] In the spring of 2000, the School District sent Hilton a notice of nonrenewal. Hilton did not request a hearing or formally object to the nonrenewal. Instead, he found another job and sued the N.D.E.A., the C.E.A., and the twenty individual members of the C.E.A. for (1) breach of a duty of fair representation, (2) intentional interference with contract, (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress, and (4) negligent infliction of emotional distress. Hilton moved to amend his complaint to seek punitive damages. The N.D.E.A., the C.E.A., and the twenty individual defendants moved for summary judgment.

[¶ 6] The trial court denied their motion for summary judgment on Hilton's claim for breach of a duty of fair representation, concluding Hilton was part of the C.E.A. negotiating unit and there were disputed issues of fact about whether the C.E.A. breached its duty of fair representation to him. The court also concluded there were disputed issues of fact regarding Hilton's claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. However, the court granted summary judgment dismissal of Hilton's claim for intentional interference with contract, concluding the C.E.A. was the appropriate negotiating unit for all the School District's certificated teachers under N.D.C.C. ch. 15-38.1, and Hilton was subject to the negotiated agreement and had no authority to separately negotiate with the School District. The court also granted summary judgment dismissal of Hilton's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, concluding there was no evidence the N.D.E.A. or the C.E.A. intentionally meant to harm Hilton. The court dismissed Hilton's claims against the twenty individual defendants, concluding the C.E.A. was the appropriate negotiating unit for the School District's certificated teaching personnel and the individuals were not authorized to separately bargain once the School District recognized the C.E.A. as the appropriate negotiating unit. The court also denied Hilton's motion to amend his complaint to seek punitive damages.

[¶ 7] After a bench trial, the court dismissed Hilton's claims for breach of a duty of fair representation and for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The court found the C.E.A.'s mandamus action sought to align Hilton's contract with the negotiated agreement, Hilton knew he was governed by the negotiated agreement, and the C.E.A. and the N.D.E.A. did not breach their duty of fair representation to him. The court also dismissed Hilton's claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Hilton appealed.

II

A

[¶ 8] Hilton argues the trial court erred in deciding, as a matter of law, he was a member of the C.E.A. negotiating unit. Hilton argues his counselor job did not involve classroom teaching, and he was not a "teacher" as defined by N.D.C.C. § 15-38.1-02(6). He therefore argues he was not part of the "appropriate negotiating unit" for teachers, as defined by N.D.C.C. § 15-38.1-02(3), and he was not bound by the negotiated agreement between the C.E.A. and the School District.

[¶ 9] During the relevant time, contract negotiations between teachers and school districts were governed by N.D.C.C. ch. 15-38.1.¹ Under N.D.C.C. § 15-38.1-08, "representative organizations" were authorized to represent an "appropriate negotiating unit" in matters of employee relations with a school board. Section 15-38.1-02(4), N.D.C.C., defined a "representative organization" as any organization authorized by an "appropriate negotiating unit" to represent the members of the unit in negotiations with a school board, and N.D.C.C. § 15-38.1-02(3) defined an "appropriate negotiating unit" as a group of teachers having common interests, common problems, a common employer, or a history of common representation, which warranted representation by a single representative organization in negotiations with a school board. Section 15-38.1-02(6), N.D.C.C., said "`teachers' means and includes all public school employees certificated under chapter 15-36 and employed primarily as classroom teachers." Chapter 15-38.1, N.D.C.C. also authorized an appropriate negotiating unit for "administrators," which were defined as all public school employees employed primarily for administration of the school or schools of a school district and devoting at least fifty percent of their time in any one year to the duties of administration of the school or schools of a school district. N.D.C.C. § 15-38.1-02(1) and (2).

[¶ 10] Here, the primary issue is whether Hilton, a counselor who was certified under N.D.C.C. ch. 15-36, was a "teacher" within the meaning of N.D.C.C. ch. 15-38.1. The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, fully reviewable on appeal. McDowell v. Gillie, 2001 ND 91, ¶ 11, 626 N.W.2d 666. In construing N.D.C.C. ch. 15-38.1, our duty is to ascertain the Legislature's intent, which initially must be sought from the statutory language. Barnes County Educ. Ass'n v. Barnes County Special Educ. Bd., 276 N.W.2d 247, 249 (N.D.1979). If statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the letter of the statute cannot be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit, because the Legislature's intent is presumed clear from the face of the statute. Id. However, if statutory language is ambiguous, a court may resort to extrinsic aids, including legislative history, to interpret the statute. County of Stutsman v. State Historical Soc'y, 371 N.W.2d 321, 325 (N.D.1985). A statute is ambiguous when it is subject to different, but rational meanings. Kroh v. American Family Ins., 487 N.W.2d 306, 307 (N.D.1992). [¶ 11] In other contexts, we have said N.D.C.C. ch. 15 38.1 was ambiguous and subject to judicial interpretation. Loney v. Grass Lake Pub. Sch. Dist., 322 N.W.2d 470, 472-73 (N.D.1982) (s...