Barnes v. Boatmen's Nat. Bank of St. Louis

• Decision Date: 10 February 1947
• Docket Number: 40000
• Citation: 199 S.W.2d 917,355 Mo. 1136
• Parties: Francis M. Barnes v. The Boatmen's National Bank of St. Louis, a Corporation, Executor of the Estate of Hugh W. Thomasson, Deceased, Appellant
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

199 S.W.2d 917

355 Mo. 1136

Francis M. Barnes v. The Boatmen's National Bank of St. Louis, a Corporation, Executor of the Estate of Hugh W. Thomasson, Deceased, Appellant

No. 40000

Supreme Court of Missouri

February 10, 1947

Motion for Rehearing or to Transfer to Banc Overruled March 10 1947.

Appeal from Circuit Court of City of St. Louis; Hon. Wm. H Killoren, Judge.

Affirmed.

Franklin E. Reagan and Lehmann & Allen for appellants.

(1) The probate court has exclusive original jurisdiction of probate business. Constitution of Missouri 1875, Art. VI, Sec. 34; Sec. 2437, R.S. 1939; Scott v. Royston, 223 Mo. 568 123 S.W. 454; Smith v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 340 Mo. 979, 104 S.W.2d 341; In re Mills' Estate, 349 Mo. 611, 162 S.W.2d 807; State ex rel. v. Woolfolk, 303 Mo. 589, 262 S.W. 346; Metzger v. Metzger, 153 S.W.2d 118; Campbell v. Campbell, 350 Mo. 169, 165 S.W.2d 851; Seibert v. Hardin, 319 Mo. 1105, 8 S.W.2d 905; St. Louis Natl. Bank v. Field, 156 Mo. 306; Kerwin v. Kerwin, 204 S.W. 925; Green v. Tittman, 124 Mo. 372. (2) The allowance of expenses of administration is probate business and the circuit court is without jurisdiction to allow such claims. Secs. 220, 224, R.S. 1939; Young and Cullen v. Boatmen's Natl. Bank, Executor, 350 Mo. 1157, 171 S.W.2d 553; Garnett v. Carson, 11 Mo.App. 290; Stephens v. Cassity, 104 Mo.App. 210; Crow v. Lutz, 175 Mo.App. 427; Hewitt v. Ducan's Estate, 226 Mo.App. 254, 43 S.W.2d 87; In re Carlin's Estate, 226 Mo.App. 622, 47 S.W.2d 213; Hax v. O'Donnell, 234 Mo.App. 375, 167 S.W.2d 87; Kopp v. Moffett, 237 Mo.App. 375, 167 S.W.2d 87; Application of Kosch, Lewis and Reuben, 20 F.Supp. 359. (3) A judgment of the circuit court void on its face for want of jurisdiction over the subject matter is a nullity and may be attacked directly or collaterally. 1 Freeman on Judgments (5th Ed.), sec. 322; United Cemeteries Co. v. Strother, 342 Mo. 1155, 119 S.W.2d 762; State ex rel. v. Hartmann, 330 Mo. 386, 51 S.W.2d 22; In re Buckles, 331 Mo. 405, 53 S.W.2d 1055; 31 Am. Jur., Judgments, sec. 604, p. 200. (4) The probate court has inherent power to purge its own files and records of this void judgment. State ex rel. Behrens v. Wilson, 176 Mo.App. 268; Ralph v. Annuity Realty Co., 325 Mo. 410, 28 S.W.2d 662; Prasse v. Prasse, 342 Mo. 388, 115 S.W.2d 807.

Fordyce, White, Mayne, Williams & Hartman, James T. Blair, Jr., Geo. O. Durham and Clifford Greve for respondent.

(1) The order of the probate court entering the judgment of the circuit court and classifying the claim amounted to a judgment of the probate court itself which judgment became final and beyond the jurisdiction of the probate court to alter or vacate on motion filed after the expiration of the term. Wilks v. Murphy, 19 Mo.App. 221; State ex rel. Maple v. Mulloy, 322 Mo. 281, 15 S.W.2d 809; State ex rel. Copelow v. Kirkwood, 117 S.W.2d 652; City of St. Louis v. Bank, 351 Mo. 688, 173 S.W.2d 837; Peoples Bank, etc., v. Yager, 329 Mo. 767, 46 S.W.2d 585; State ex rel. Holtcamp v. Hartmann, 330 Mo. 386, 51 S.W.2d 22; In re Boland's Estate, 14 S.W.2d 521; State ex rel. Cantley v. Akin, 224 Mo.App. 114, 22 S.W.2d 836. (2) The original judgment was res judicata and constituted an estoppel, as between the parties thereto, when questioned in any other court, both on the merits and on the jurisdiction of the court rendering it and the probate court was without authority to do anything except recognize and obey the order of the superior court. The circuit court itself lost its jurisdiction over the cause and power to vacate or modify its judgment after the lapse of the term at which it was entered. State ex rel. Holtcamp v. Hartmann, 330 Mo. 386, 51 S.W.2d 22; Peoples Bank v. Yager, 329 Mo. 767, 46 S.W.2d 585. (3) The Supreme Court's power also terminated with the term. Prasse v. Prasse, 342 Mo. 388, 115 S.W.2d 807; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Hyde, 327 Mo. 115, 34 S.W.2d 85. (4) The mandate of the Supreme Court was peremptory and binding on all lower courts. Zeitinger v. Hargadine-McKittrick D. G. Co., 309 Mo. 433, 274 S.W. 789; Gary Realty Co. v. Swinney, 317 Mo. 687, 297 S.W. 43; Wise Coal Co. v. Columbia Zinc & Lead Co., 143 Mo.App. 587, 128 S.W. 232; Meyer v. Bobb, 184 S.W. 105; Aetna Ins. Co. v. Mo. Pac., 132 Mo.App. 608, 112 S.W. 31; Ward v. Haren, 183 Mo.App. 569, 167 S.W. 1064; Bagnell Timber Co. v. Railway Co., 242 Mo. 11, 145 S.W. 469; State ex rel. Roberts v. Kelly, 293 Mo. 297, 239 S.W. 867; Powell v. Bowen, 240 S.W. 1085; Meyer v. Campbell, 12 Mo. 603; State ex rel. Fowler v. Chaney, 49 Mo.App. 511. (5) The principles of res judicata apply to questions of jurisdiction as well as to other questions. Courts speak by their judgments and not by an incidental statement of reasons assigned therefor and such reasons or the absence of such reasons do not constitute part of the judgment. Durant v. Essex Co., 74 U.S. 107, 19 L.Ed. 154; Mead v. Spalding, 94 Mo. 43, 6 S.W. 384; Griffith v. Griffith, 180 S.W. 411; 34 C.J. 503-504. (6) A judgment by a court of general jurisdiction necessarily implies it decided it had jurisdiction of the subject matter. Such decision is implicit in the judgment regardless of whether the ruling is express or merely implied. Shay v. New York Life Ins. Co., 192 S.W.2d 421; Bealmer v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 281 Mo. 495, 220 S.W. 954; Ussery v. Haynes, 344 Mo. 530, 127 S.W.2d 410; Bushnell v. Drainage District, 340 Mo. 811, 102 S.W.2d 879; Crabtree v. Life Ins. Co., 341 Mo. 1173, 111 S.W.2d 103; Ross v. Pitcairn, 179 S.W.2d 35, 153 A.L.R. 215; Harbstreet v. Shipman, 233 Mo.App. 526, 122 S.W.2d 395; Theener v. Kurn, 235 Mo.App. 823, 132 S.W.2d 707; Steinbaum v. Wallace, 238 Mo.App. 841, 176 S.W.2d 683. (7) The same rule is followed by the Federal courts. Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 83 L.Ed. 104; Badger Dome Oil Co. v. Haslam, 99 F.2d 293; Russell v. United States, 86 F.2d 389; Lambert v. Central Bank, 85 F.2d 954; Moore v. Pape, 39 F.2d 616; Rippberger v. A.C. Allyn Co., 113 F.2d 332; Nye v. United States, 137 F.2d 73; American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156, 77 L.Ed. 231 (followed by Division No. 1 in Shay v. New York Life Ins. Co., 192 S.W.2d 421). (8) As between the parties it is not essential to the application of the rule of res judicata or estoppel by judgment that the court be vested with jurisdiction dejure of the subject matter. Even though it be subsequently determined by a proper court that jurisdiction of the subject matter in similar cases is lacking, such judgment is not retroactive and does not affect a judgment in another case which has become final and unassailable under the principles of res judicata, as between the parties thereto. Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 84 L.Ed. 329. (9) If the question of the original jurisdiction of the circuit court and of the Supreme Court on appeal be considered as an original proposition, not affected by the principles of res judicata or of the jurisdiction of an inferior court to go behind the mandate of a superior court, it will be discovered that in the instant case the circuit court and the Supreme Court on appeal had jurisdiction of the subject matter of the respondent's demand. The jurisdiction of the circuit court as originally exercised has never been taken away by legislation. Laws 1849, p. 436, sec. 4; Laws 1866, p. 85, sec. 6; Mo. Constitution of 1875; R.S. Mo. 1939, Sec. 2437, R.S. 1939; R.S. 1879, Sec. 192, now Sec. 189, R.S. 1939; Pryor v. Kopp, 342 Mo. 887, 119 S.W.2d 228; Linn County Bank v. Clifton, 263 Mo. 200, 172 S.W. 388; 14 Am. Jur. 437; Matson v. Pearson, 121 Mo.App. 120, 97 S.W. 983; State ex rel. v. Walsh, 67 Mo.App. 348; State ex rel. Tempel v. Garesche, 198 Mo.App. 457, 207 S.W. 735. (10) To deprive respondent of his judgment by force of a ruling made in a case to which he was not a party would operate to deprive him of a vested property right, without due process of law. U.S. Constitution, 14th Amendment; Mo. Constitution, Sec. 30, Art. II (1875); Mo. Constitution, Sec. 1, Art. I (1945). (11) Request for penalty. Scullins v. Railroad, 192 Mo. 1, 90 S.W. 1026; Meyer v. Bobb, 184 S.W. 105.

OPINION

Ellison, J.

The Boatmen's National Bank of the City of St. Louis, executor of the estate of Hugh W. Thomasson, deceased, appeals from a judgment of the circuit court of that city entered on appeal from the probate court. The cause concerns the validity of a prior judgment of the circuit court -- for $ 15,000 -- rendered against the appellant executor and in favor of Dr. Francis M. Barnes in 1940, in a suit brought by the latter directly in the circuit court for services rendered by him as a psychiatric expert to the former administratrices of the estate of said decedent in certain litigation before his will was found and the appellant executor appointed. This first Barnes judgment, as we shall call it, was affirmed by this court in 1941, in Barnes v. Boatmen's National Bank, 348 Mo. 1032, 156 S.W.2d 597. But the contentions now made were not presented in that case.

This first Barnes judgment not only fixed the amount of recovery at $ 15,000, but further directed that it be certified to the probate court to be there classified and paid as a cost of administration. It was so certified, and was classified by the probate court accordingly. Thereafter, in 1944 the appellant executor filed in the probate court a motion to strike that Barnes judgment, embodying Dr Barnes' claim, from the probate files on the ground that the circuit court had no jurisdiction to render it. The motion was sustained by the probate court and Dr. Barnes appealed to the circuit court. The circuit court adjudged that the order of the probate court be set aside, and that the first Barnes judgment be reinstated in the probate court records...