Griffith v. Griffith

• Decision Date: 22 November 1915
• Docket Number: No. 11775.,11775.
• Citation: 180 S.W. 411
• Parties: GRIFFITH v. GRIFFITH.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

180 S.W. 411

GRIFFITH v. GRIFFITH.

No. 11775.

Kansas City Court of Appeals, Missouri.

November 22, 1915.

Error to Circuit Court, Bates County; C. A. Calvird, Judge.

"Not to be officially published."

Action by Hannah Griffith against Lawrence M. Griffith, who filed a cross-petition. There was a judgment granting plaintiff a divorce but denying alimony, and she brings error. Reversed and remanded.

Smith & Chastain, of Butler, for plaintiff in error. Silvers & Dawson, of Butler, and H. H. Heck, of Rich Hill, for defendant in error.

JOHNSON, J.

Plaintiff sued defendant, her husband, for divorce on the ground of alleged indignities, and also prayed for the custody of their infant child, and for the allowance of suit money and alimony. Defendant filed an answer and cross-petition, in which he alleged indignities inflicted upon him by plaintiff, and prayed that he be granted a divorce and the custody of the child. The judgment rendered by the court awarded a divorce and the custody of the child to plaintiff and allowed her suit money in the sum of $100, but refused the application for alimony, and the court "declined at this time to make any allowance to the plaintiff or against the defendant for the support and maintenance of said child."

Plaintiff brought the case here by writ of error to procure a review and reversal of that part of the judgment relating to alimony. Defendant filed no motion for a new trial and is not attacking, nor in position to attack, the judgment.

The learned trial judge prepared and put on record a written statement of his reasons for granting a divorce to plaintiff, from which it appears he was moved to that conclusion by the fact that defendant "drinks to such an excess as to render him unfit to attend to business and properly care for his family," although he found that "an irascible temper and disposition on the part of the plaintiff" was one of the prime causes of the separation. This statement, which, if a part of the record of the case for review, might cast a grave doubt upon the propriety of the decree in favor of plaintiff, is not properly before us, and cannot be considered for the reason that the scope and vitality of a formal judgment cannot be restricted, qualified, or impaired in such manner. Mead v. Spalding, 94 Mo. loc. cit. 47, 6 S. W. 384; Kennard v. Peck, 19 Mo. App. loc. cit. 348; Paint, etc., Co. v. Shooting the Chutes Co., 74 Mo. App. loc. cit. 663; Little v. Hooker, 122 Mo. App. 623, 100 S. W. 561. It is the judgment which speaks, not the analysis of the evidence which led to the rendition of the judgment.

Another ground for disregarding the stated reasons is that the judgment for divorce was accepted by defendant, the losing party, as a finality, and is not before us in any other guise than as a formal, unimpeachable adjudication that plaintiff is the injured and innocent party, entitled to the relief granted.

With the case in such posture we cannot give our sanction to the conclusion that plaintiff is entitled to no alimony for the support of herself and...