Barnes v. Hall
Decision Date | 14 February 1941 |
Citation | 285 Ky. 160 |
Parties | Barnes et al. v. Hall. |
Court | Supreme Court of Kentucky |
3. Master and Servant. — Workmen to whom continued employment is offered may not reject it and thus create a status entitling them to unemployment compensation, where the employment offered in no respect differs from that in which they have been previously engaged (Ky. Stats. Supp. 1939, sec. 4748g-9(b)).
4. Master and Servant. — The purpose of Unemployment Compensation Act was to provide employment for unfortunate victims of a maladjusted economy who are unable to obtain suitable work at a living wage, not to enable those who are offered continuation of existing employment to refrain from work until they have secured additional advantages (Ky. Stats. Supp. 1939, sec. 4748g-9(b)).
Appeal from Letcher Circuit Court.
Hubert Meredith, Attorney General, Robert Hensley and Elwood Rosenbaum for Unemployment Compensation Commission.
Edw. C. O'Rear, Allen Prewitt and C.F. Pace for Consolidation Coal Co.
Howard & Mayo for Elkhorn Coal Corporation.
Caldwell & Gray for other appellants.
John Y. Brown and Jos. J. Bradley for appellees.
Before R. Monroe Fields, Judge.
Reversing.
Section 4748g-9(b) of the Unemployment Compensation Act of 1938, since amended, among other provisions disqualifying an unemployed worker from receiving employment benefits, contains the following:
"If he has left (or partially or totally lost) his employment with an employer because of a strike or other bona fide labor dispute, for any week in which such strike or other bona fide labor dispute is in active progress in the establishment in which he is or was employed, provided that for the purposes of this subsection a lock-out shall not be deemed a strike or a bona fide labor dispute and no worker shall be denied benefits by reason of a lock-out."
The appellant, Carl Hall, an employee of a mining company in Letcher County, and a member of the United Mine Workers of America, District No. 30, was refused compensation because of the quoted provision. This ruling was made following an opinion delivered by a special agent appointed pursuant to Section 4748g-11 of the 1938 act after there had been filed with the Commission a petition by District No. 30, United Mine Workers of America, for and on behalf of the unemployed coal miners of Kentucky, in which was set forth that the miners had lost their employment through no fault of their own "but because the mines in Kentucky have been closed pending negotiations between the coal operators and the representatives of the coal miners." The petitioner further alleged that the miners were not on a strike but had been locked out by their employers, basing this allegation upon the rejection by the representatives of the coal operators of the following resolution introduced on March 15, 1939, by the representatives of the miners at a joint conference held in New York for the purpose of negotiating a new wage and hour agreement to take the place of a similar contract which had expired at midnight March 31st:
The ensuing paragraph of the petition is as follows:
"Your petitioner further states that at a later date, or on March 31, 1939, a verbal motion was made before the joint sub-committee of the operators and miners to the same effect as the above resolution, and that the operators refused on both occasions to agree to the above proposals to continue work under the terms and conditions of the present existing contract pending negotiations for a new contract, and, therefore, the present situation is not a strike on the part of the employees, but a lock-out on the part of the employers."
The only persons who appealed from the decision of the Special Examiner, so far as the record discloses, were the United Mine Workers of America "for and on behalf of the unemployed coal miners of Kentucky," and Carl Hall individually.
The Commission, as permitted by the act, designated, as referee to hear and determine the appeal, the Hon. A.M. Hall, who, in a comprehensive opinion delivered on June 5, 1939, affirmed the decision of the Special Agent, finding, among other things:
The referee also held that the but that Section 25, Civil Code of Practice, was broad enough to permit the appellee, Hall, to appeal on behalf of all other unemployed coal miners similarly situated; that this was Hall's intention, notwithstanding the fact that his petition did not so state; and that the appellees had waived the question of jurisdiction by their failure to file a special demurrer or plea. The referee's decision was affirmed by the Commission on June 7, 1939.
Section 4748g-11(j) of the act referred to provides in part:
Within the time limits prescribed by the act a petition was filed in the Letcher Circuit Court captioned:
And the specified grounds...
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