Barnes v. Hall

• Decision Date: 14 February 1941
• Citation: 285 Ky. 160
• Parties: Barnes et al. v. Hall.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky

285 Ky. 160

Barnes et al. v. Hall.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

December 20, 1940.

Rehearing Denied February 14, 1941.

1. Statutes. — In absence of definition of the term "labor dispute" as included in Unemployment Compensation Act pursuant to Federal Social Security Act, court presumed that Legislature intended to use the term in the same sense as it was used in the previously-enacted National Labor Relations Act and Norris-LaGuardia Act (Ky. Stats. Supp. 1939, sec. 4748g-9(b) (3); National Labor Relations Act, sec. 2(9), 29 U.S.C.A., sec. 152(9); Norris-LaGuardia Act, sec. 13(c), 29 U.S.C.A., sec. 113(c); Social Security Act, sec. 903, 42 U.S.C.A., sec. 1103).

2. Master and Servant. — Where coal miners refused to accept renewal of existing contract, not because renewal contract imposed substantial disadvantages, but merely because they sought elimination of "penalty" clause or insertion of "closed shop" clause,

there was a "labor dispute" and not a "lock-out," and hence miners were not entitled to unemployment compensation by virtue of resulting unemployment (Ky. Stats. Supp. 1939, sec. 4748g-9(b) (3); National Labor Relations Act, sec. 2(9), 29 U.S.C.A., sec. 152(9); Norris-LaGuardia Act, sec. 13(c), 29 U.S.C.A., sec. 113(c); Social Security Act, sec. 903, 42 U.S.C.A., sec. 1103).

3. Master and Servant. — Workmen to whom continued employment is offered may not reject it and thus create a status entitling them to unemployment compensation, where the employment offered in no respect differs from that in which they have been previously engaged (Ky. Stats. Supp. 1939, sec. 4748g-9(b)).

4. Master and Servant. — The purpose of Unemployment Compensation Act was to provide employment for unfortunate victims of a maladjusted economy who are unable to obtain suitable work at a living wage, not to enable those who are offered continuation of existing employment to refrain from work until they have secured additional advantages (Ky. Stats. Supp. 1939, sec. 4748g-9(b)).

Appeal from Letcher Circuit Court.

Hubert Meredith, Attorney General, Robert Hensley and Elwood Rosenbaum for Unemployment Compensation Commission.

Edw. C. O'Rear, Allen Prewitt and C.F. Pace for Consolidation Coal Co.

Howard & Mayo for Elkhorn Coal Corporation.

Caldwell & Gray for other appellants.

John Y. Brown and Jos. J. Bradley for appellees.

Before R. Monroe Fields, Judge.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUDGE TILFORD.

Reversing.

Section 4748g-9(b) of the Unemployment Compensation Act of 1938, since amended, among other provisions disqualifying an unemployed worker from receiving employment benefits, contains the following:

"If he has left (or partially or totally lost) his employment with an employer because of a strike or other bona fide labor dispute, for any week in which such strike or other bona fide labor dispute is in active progress in the establishment in which he is or was employed, provided that for the purposes of this subsection a lock-out shall not be deemed a strike or a bona fide labor dispute and no worker shall be denied benefits by reason of a lock-out."

The appellant, Carl Hall, an employee of a mining company in Letcher County, and a member of the United Mine Workers of America, District No. 30, was refused compensation because of the quoted provision. This ruling was made following an opinion delivered by a special agent appointed pursuant to Section 4748g-11 of the 1938 act after there had been filed with the Commission a petition by District No. 30, United Mine Workers of America, for and on behalf of the unemployed coal miners of Kentucky, in which was set forth that the miners had lost their employment through no fault of their own "but because the mines in Kentucky have been closed pending negotiations between the coal operators and the representatives of the coal miners." The petitioner further alleged that the miners were not on a strike but had been locked out by their employers, basing this allegation upon the rejection by the representatives of the coal operators of the following resolution introduced on March 15, 1939, by the representatives of the miners at a joint conference held in New York for the purpose of negotiating a new wage and hour agreement to take the place of a similar contract which had expired at midnight March 31st:

"In order to allay any public apprehension concerning the possibility of a suspension of mining operations in the bituminous coal industry due to the expiration of the existing wage agreement, this Joint Conference

"`Resolves, That in the event no agreement is reached by March 31, 1939, that work in the industry shall be continued under the existing wages, conditions and contracts pending continuance of negotiations and ultimate success or failure to agree on a new contract.'"

The ensuing paragraph of the petition is as follows:

"Your petitioner further states that at a later date, or on March 31, 1939, a verbal motion was made before the joint sub-committee of the operators and miners to the same effect as the above resolution, and that the operators refused on both occasions to agree to the above proposals to continue work under the terms and conditions of the present existing contract pending negotiations for a new contract, and, therefore, the present situation is not a strike on the part of the employees, but a lock-out on the part of the employers."

The only persons who appealed from the decision of the Special Examiner, so far as the record discloses, were the United Mine Workers of America "for and on behalf of the unemployed coal miners of Kentucky," and Carl Hall individually.

The Commission, as permitted by the act, designated, as referee to hear and determine the appeal, the Hon. A.M. Hall, who, in a comprehensive opinion delivered on June 5, 1939, affirmed the decision of the Special Agent, finding, among other things:

"The unemployment of appellants was not due to a lock-out. The Employers were demanding no change in conditions or more desirable terms, but were willing to continue the employment for another two years upon the same conditions that had prevailed for the previous two years.

"The actions of the miners in ceasing to work in obedience to the fifty years' traditional policy of the union requiring them to quit at the expiration of a contract was tantamount to an `undeclared strike' on their part.

"Each and all of the claimants, `covered employees', left or lost their employment with their respective `subject Employers' because of a strike or bona fide labor dispute in the respective establishments wherein they were employed within the meaning of Section 9(b) (4) of the Unemployment Compensation Law."

The referee also held that the "Compensation Act deals with `covered employees' as individuals, be they union or nonunion employees and with `subject employers' as separate units and companies be they members or non-members of an association of employers. Neither the United Mine Workers of America, on the one hand, nor the Coal Operators' Association, on the other hand, has any right to appeal in a proceeding involving the right to or denial of compensation benefits in their own name as such union or association for and in behalf of any of their members, either employee or employer;" but that Section 25, Civil Code of Practice, was broad enough to permit the appellee, Hall, to appeal on behalf of all other unemployed coal miners similarly situated; that this was Hall's intention, notwithstanding the fact that his petition did not so state; and that the appellees had waived the question of jurisdiction by their failure to file a special demurrer or plea. The referee's decision was affirmed by the Commission on June 7, 1939.

Section 4748g-11(j) of the act referred to provides in part:

"Within twenty days after the decision of the Commission has become final, any party aggrieved thereby may secure judicial review thereof by filing against the Commission for the review of its decision, a petition in the Circuit Court of the County in which the claimant was last employed by a subject employer whose reserve account is affected by such claims, in which action any other party to the proceeding before the Commission shall be made a defendant. Such petition shall state fully the grounds upon which review is sought, assign all errors relied on, and shall be verified by the petitioner, who shall furnish copies thereof for each defendant to the Commission, who shall deliver one such copy to each of such defendants. * * *

"Such actions, and the questions so certified, shall be heard by the Court in a summary manner upon the record certified by the Commission. The Court shall enter judgment affirming, modifying, or setting aside the order and decisions appealed from, or determining the question of law certified to it by the Commission, and may in advance of judgment, in its discretion, remand the case to the Commission for further proceedings in accordance with the direction of the Court. An appeal may be taken from the decision of the Circuit Court to the Court of Appeals, in the same manner but not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, as is provided in equity cases."

Within the time limits prescribed by the act a petition was filed in the Letcher Circuit Court captioned:

"Letcher Circuit Court

"District No. 30 United Mine Workers of America, for and on behalf of the unemployed coal miners of Kentucky, and Carl Hall, individually and in his own behalf, and for and on behalf of all other unemployed coal miners and claimants similarly situated,

                                                   Plaintiffs
                VS             Petition in Equity
                                   No. 5408
                V.E. Barnes
                Omer C. Stubbs and
                John C.C. Mayo, Jr
                Members of the Unemployment
                Compensation Commission of
                Kentucky, and (here follow the names of 107 coal
                mining corporations, including the appellants in
                this appeal)
                                                   Defendants"
                

And the specified grounds...