Barnes v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co., Inc., HARLEY-DAVIDSON
| Decision Date | 20 April 1987 |
| Docket Number | HARLEY-DAVIDSON,No. 74209,74209 |
| Citation | 182 Ga.App. 778,357 S.E.2d 127 |
| Parties | , Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 11,467 BARNES v.MOTOR COMPANY, INC. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Kenneth Kalivoda, David R. Montgomery, Athens, for appellant.
William T. Gerard, Howard T. Scott, Athens, for appellee.
Breach of Manufacturer's Warranty--Strict Liability--Summary Judgment. Barnes was injured in an accident in August 1984, while driving his motorcycle. Barnes deposed that he had grown up riding motorcycles. Apparently he had owned and operated three of his own and had been using motorcycles for approximately 17-18 years. He had owned and operated a 1976 Harley-Davidson 1200 cc Super Glide model motorcycle for several years before the accident in August 1984. His father purchased the motorcycle for him in 1979. It was conceded that at the time of its purchase the motorcycle was in good operating condition and Barnes did not consider that the vehicle was without any equipment essential to its efficient operation. At the time of the acquisition, the motorcycle was not designed to have as standard equipment, and did not have, "crash bars" (to protect the motorcycle in the event of falling over during operation). Although Barnes had thought about installing crash bars as a safety feature, he had never done so. Also, the motorcycle was equipped with a standard motorcycle sealed beam unit (Par. 46 5 1/4"') with a maximum candlepower of 22,000 on high beam and 10,500 on low beam, designed pursuant to Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 108. That headlamp had been standard equipment on Harley-Davidson motorcycles since 1976 and there had been no change in design throughout the period of installation and use. Barnes stated that he had come to the belief that the candlepower was inadequate at higher speeds but although he had personally replaced the sealed beam unit several times he had never sought to increase the candlepower nor placed a second or auxiliary lamp on the motorcycle. Barnes also conceded that he had no complaints about the operation of the vehicle or equipment upon the motorcycle prior to the accident in August 1984.
On August 7, 1984, one Bobby Howard was operating his automobile on Highway 78 just west of Lexington, Georgia. Howard experienced electrical failure in the ignition and his car stalled. Howard parked the stalled auto on the right shoulder of the road with the left front and back wheels just to the right of the white line constituting the edge of the westbound lane of the highway, thus just off the highway. After working unsuccessfully on the car for more than an hour to get it restarted, Howard and a friend apparently started to push the stalled vehicle toward Lexington. The friend apparently was pushing from the rear of the vehicle and Howard was pushing at the driver's door and presumably guiding the vehicle in its forward progress. Howard and his friend heard a loud noise which Howard stated he though to be a truck. The appellant Barnes was approaching the stalled auto on his motorcycle at about 50-55 mph. Howard stated he never saw the approaching motorcycle and Barnes stated he never saw the stalled car. Barnes struck the driver's door of the stalled vehicle which was projecting several inches to a foot beyond the white line and thus slightly into the eastbound lane. Barnes' motorcycle struck the edge of the auto door with the right lower part of the motorcycle, causing him to lose control and ultimately to cause injuries to his right leg resulting in the amputation of the leg at a point just below the knee.
As a result of this accident, Barnes filed a complaint against his own insurer (Leader) and Howard. Because Barnes had deliberately refused coverage on uninsured motorist and paid no premium therefor, his insurer (Leader) was granted summary judgment and removed from the litigation. Barnes then brought Harley-Davidson in as a party defendant as the manufacturer of the motorcycle, upon the basis of strict liability contending that Harley-Davidson misdesigned the particular model motorcycle by not providing crash bars as standard equipment and using an inadequate headlight, both defects together making the motorcycle, as designed, not reasonably suited for the use intended, i.e., a safe two-wheeled vehicle. He further argues that Harley-Davidson was negligent in not warning Barnes as a consumer of the inherent dangers involved in using a product with no crash bars and inadequate lighting, a fact which he contends Harley-Davidson clearly would have greater knowledge about than a consumer. After extensive discovery, Harley-Davidson moved for summary judgment contending there was no breach of any express or implied warranty and that Barnes had assumed any risk involved in the use of the motorcycle without crash bars or with what he considered inadequate lighting. The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment filed by Harley-Davidson and this grant forms the basis for the appeal by Barnes. Held:
Although Barnes enumerates 7 separate asserted errors, each is simply a different facet of the same argument. We are at once confronted with the obvious facts that Barnes was a very knowledgeable and experienced operator of motorcycles. He had operated the motorcycle upon which the accident occurred for approximately 4-5 years. He had been taught rules of safe driving and was familiar with motorcycles generally, including the different equipment that was furnished as standard safety features and equipment on different models of motorcycles. He conceded that there was no apparent defect in the model 1200 cc Super Glide when it was purchased and that he had used it successfully throughout his ownership. He conceded further...
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