Barnes v. Reagen

• Decision Date: 06 November 1980
• Docket Number: No. C 79-2063.,C 79-2063.
• Parties: Rochelle BARNES, through her next friend, Lillie Barnes, individually and on behalf of Day Twan Barnes and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Michael V. REAGEN, Commissioner of the Iowa Department of Social Services, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa

501 F. Supp. 215

Rochelle BARNES, through her next friend, Lillie Barnes, individually and on behalf of Day Twan Barnes and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Michael V. REAGEN, Commissioner of the Iowa Department of Social Services, Defendant.

No. C 79-2063.

United States District Court, N. D. Iowa, E. D.

November 6, 1980.

Susan B. Keith, Waterloo, Iowa, for plaintiffs.

Stephen C. Robinson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Social Services Div., Des Moines, Iowa, for defendant.

ORDER

McMANUS, Chief Judge.

This matter is before the court on the parties' cross motions for summary judgment and on plaintiff's¹ resisted application for class certification. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment granted.

Plaintiff brings this action for declaratory and injunctive relief² under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976), alleging that defendant has, under color of Iowa law, deprived her of rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. Jurisdiction is founded on 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) and (4) (1976).

The court notes at the outset that defendant's³ attack on subject matter jurisdiction is without merit. Defendant's challenge of jurisdiction is based on Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization, 441 U.S. 600, 99 S.Ct. 1905, 60 L.Ed.2d 508 (1979), which supports the conclusion that the federal court has no jurisdiction in cases such as this to consider claims based exclusively on an alleged statutory violation. Plaintiff does not rely exclusively on such a theory in this case, however, but also complains of the violation of her constitutional rights. These constitutional claims are not "obviously frivolous or obviously lacking in merit," Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974); see Johnson v. Harder, 383 F.Supp. 174 (D.Conn. 1974), aff'd, 512 F.2d 1118 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 876, 96 S.Ct. 149, 46 L.Ed.2d 109 (1975). Accordingly, the court is empowered to exercise jurisdiction over the constitutional claims, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3); Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization, 441 U.S. 600, 99 S.Ct. 1905, 60 L.Ed.2d 508 (1979); Davis v. Reagen, 630 F.2d 1299, (8th Cir. 1980), and pendant jurisdiction over the statutory claim. Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization, 441 U.S. 600, 99 S.Ct. 1905, 60 L.Ed.2d 508 (1979); Davis v. Reagen, 630 F.2d 1299, (8th Cir. 1980); Roe v. Ray, 407 F.Supp. 351 (N.D.Ia.1976), aff'd, 551 F.2d 241 (8th Cir. 1977).

Both parties have moved for summary judgment. Summary judgment should not be entered unless the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. FRCP 56(c); see Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 467, 82 S.Ct. 486, 488, 7 L.Ed.2d 458 (1962). It is an extreme remedy, not to be entered unless the moving party has established its right to a judgment with such clarity as to leave no room for controversy and unless the other party is not entitled to recover under any discernible circumstances. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm. v. Liberty Loan Corp., 584 F.2d 853, 857 (8th Cir. 1978). In passing upon a motion for summary judgment, the court is required to view the facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1608-09, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). The material facts in this case, which are undisputed, follow.

The plaintiff in this action, Rochelle Barnes,⁴ is a minor and an unwed mother of one child, Day Twan Barnes. Rochelle and Day Twan live with Lillie Barnes, one of Rochelle's sisters.

Rochelle's parents are both deceased. By virtue of this fact, Rochelle is entitled to monthly benefits under the Old Age Survivors and Disability Insurance (OASDI) program.⁵ Pursuant to federal regulation,⁶ these benefits are paid to a "representative payee," who in this case is Delores Barnes, another sister of Rochelle's, for Rochelle's use and benefit. Delores is charged by federal regulation to expend these funds only for purposes determined by her to be in Rochelle's best interests,⁷ subject to criminal sanctions for failure to do so.⁸.

Day Twan was born on October 6, 1978. At some time between this date and January 1, 1979, Rochelle applied for and received from defendant an Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) grant for Day Twan. On January 1, 1979, Rochelle was added to this AFDC grant. At this time, however, defendant treated Rochelle's OASDI benefits as income available to meet the needs of both Rochelle and Day Twan.

Defendant subsequently cancelled Rochelle's AFDC grant for one month, effective April 1, 1979. On April 10, 1979, Rochelle applied for reinstatement of her grant. Defendant, in processing this application, again included Rochelle's OASDI benefits as income to both Rochelle and Day Twan, thereby reducing their AFDC grant from the one-person grant of $145.00 per month to a two-person grant of $2.30 per month. Defendant's computation was made pursuant to its written procedures.⁹

On May 3, 1979, Rochelle filed an appeal with defendant requesting that Day Twan receive her own AFDC grant. Defendant held a hearing on this appeal on June 5, 1979. At some point prior to July 1, 1979, defendant recomputed Rochelle's AFDC grant. Based on increased monthly OASDI benefits, which were determined to be in excess of the basic need standard for a two-person grant under the AFDC program, defendant cancelled Rochelle and Day Twan's AFDC grant, effective July 1, 1979.

Defendant issued, on August 2, 1979, a proposed decision affirming its earlier action and upholding the method utilized to compute the AFDC grant for Rochelle and Day Twan. On September 11, 1979, after receiving additional written objections from Rochelle, defendant adopted its proposed decision as its final decision.

This action was filed on October 17, 1979, and is framed in four counts. In count one, plaintiff alleges that the procedures upon which defendant relied in treating Rochelle's OASDI benefits as income to both Rochelle and Day Twan conflict with the Social Security Act and regulations promulgated thereunder and are thereby invalid under the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution. Counts two and three both allege that the conduct of defendant in considering the OASDI benefits as income to Rochelle and Day Twan for AFDC purposes violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution, and count four alleges that defendant's conduct also violates the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.

It appears to the court that plaintiff's supremacy clause theory has merit. Accordingly, the court does not reach plaintiff's constitutional claims. See, e. g., Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974) (court required to decide statutory issues first in order to avoid, if possible, constitutional adjudication). Since there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, this case is ripe for disposition on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment.

Participation by a given state in the AFDC program is voluntary. But if a state does participate, it must conform its program to the "several requirements of the Social Security Act and ... the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder." King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 317, 88 S.Ct. 2128, 2133, 20 L.Ed.2d 1118 (1968). Plaintiff argues that the procedures relied upon by defendant in determining plaintiff's eligibility for and grant level under the Iowa AFDC program conflict with federal requirements. Specifically, plaintiff claims that defendant, by treating as income for AFDC purposes the OASDI benefits paid to Delores Barnes as representative payee for plaintiff, is in violation of 20 CFR § 404.1603,¹⁰ which governs the obligations and duties of Delores in her capacity as plaintiff's representative payee. Because of 20 CFR § 404.1603, plaintiff asserts that her OASDI benefits are not "income" to her insofar as AFDC is concerned.

Defendant, however, argues that the OASDI benefits are income to Rochelle and, by virtue of Rochelle's legal obligation to support her child, to Day Twan, and that it is not a violation of federal statutes or regulations for defendant to include these benefits as income in the AFDC grant equation for Rochelle and Day Twan.¹¹ Defendant relies on the federal statutory and regulatory provisions that prescribe the requirements of state AFDC programs with regard to the computation of benefit levels. Generally, these provisions provide that the state program must, with certain enumerated exceptions not relevant in this case, include all income of the AFDC eligibility group in determining the group's needs and the AFDC grant amount,¹² and that income of a parent is attributable to the parent's minor dependents living in the parent's home.¹³ In accordance with this understanding, defendant promulgated the various provisions under attack here.¹⁴

It appears to the court that defendant is incorrect in his interpretation of the federal AFDC requirements. It is conceded that Rochelle is legally responsible for Day Twan's support and that, therefore, all income to Rochelle is attributable to Day Twan for AFDC purposes. The court also agrees that OASDI benefits paid directly to an AFDC applicant or recipient are income to that person under the AFDC program. See Carr v. Commonwealth Department of Public Welfare, 41 Pa.Cmwlth. 254, 398 A.2d 1088, 1090-91 (1979). But the court cannot agree that OASDI benefits paid to a representative payee on behalf of an AFDC applicant or recipient are "income" to that person unless or until the payee actually applies the benefits to the person's current maintenance needs.¹⁵ See Johnson v. Harder, 383 F.Supp. 174 (D.Conn.1974), aff'd, 512 F.2d 1118 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 876, 96 S.Ct. 149, 46 L.Ed.2d 109 (1975); Howard v. Madigan, 363 F.Supp. 351 (D.S. D.1973); Collins v. White, 319 F.Supp. 954 (N.D....