Davis v. Reagen

Decision Date01 October 1980
Docket NumberNo. 80-1246,80-1246
Citation630 F.2d 1299
PartiesRobert DAVIS, Individually and on behalf of his wife, Victoria Davis, his two children, Robert and Janel Davis, and Jane Jensen, Appellees, v. Michael V. REAGEN, Individually and as Commissioner of the Iowa Department ofSocial Services, Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Thomas J. Miller, Atty. Gen., of Iowa, Des Moines, Iowa, John G. Black, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Stephen C. Robinson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Des Moines, Iowa, for appellant.

Mark S. Schaffner, HELP Legal Assistance, Davenport, Iowa, Sherry J. Leiwant, Adele M. Blong, Center on Social Welfare Policy and Law, New York City, Michael B. Trister, Sobol & Trister, Washington, D. C., for appellees.

Before HEANEY and BRIGHT, Circuit Judges, and HUNGATE, District Judge. *

BRIGHT, Circuit Judge.

Michael Reagen, Commissioner of the Iowa Department of Social Services (IDSS), appeals from a judgment of the district court 1 enjoining him from denying assistance under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program (AFDC) to families whose unemployed parents refuse without good cause to accept bona fide offers of employment. This appeal poses the difficult problem of determining the appropriate sanction for such refusals under the AFDC statute, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-644 (1976). Having carefully reviewed that statute and pertinent regulations, we affirm.

I. Background.

IDSS administers the AFDC program in Iowa. This program is designed to provide financial assistance to families with dependent children in financial need because one parent is dead, absent from the home, incapacitated, or unemployed. In conjunction with AFDC, Congress created a work incentive (WIN) program to provide employment training and services for AFDC families. The WIN program in Iowa is administered through the Iowa Department of Job Services, pursuant to an agreement between it and the Secretary of Labor. In some Iowa counties the WIN program is mandatory; nonexempt AFDC recipients must register in WIN to receive benefits. In other counties registration in WIN is voluntary; AFDC recipients also may qualify for benefits by registering with Job Services of Iowa in its capacity as a state public employment agency.

Plaintiff Robert Davis registered in the WIN program in December 1976. In September 1977, Davis was accused of failing to cooperate with the WIN program after he failed to obtain a job to which he had been referred. 2 Following an unsuccessful administrative appeal, IDSS cut off all assistance to the Davis family. 3

Davis alleged in his complaint that the actions of IDSS contravened the due process and equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment 4 and conflicted with the AFDC statute. Davis sought and the district court granted certification of a class consisting of all those innocent family members qualifying for AFDC assistance in Iowa because a parent was unemployed, whose assistance had been or might be terminated because of the parents' refusal to cooperate in finding a job. 5

The district court determined that Davis' constitutional claims conferred jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1976). The court then concluded that it could exercise pendent jurisdiction over Davis' supremacy clause claim that IDSS policy violated federal standards. Finding the supremacy clause claim dispositive, the court held that the only appropriate sanction under the federal statute for an unemployed parent's failure to accept offers of employment or otherwise cooperate in the WIN program is elimination of that parent's needs in calculating assistance to the family. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (19)(F)(i)(1976).

On appeal IDSS argues that the district court lacked jurisdiction to decide this case and, in any event, decided it wrongly. In substantial part, IDSS contends that the court accorded insufficient deference to the view of the Departments of Labor and of Health and Human Services (formerly Health, Education and Welfare), which supports appellant's position.

II. Analysis.
A. Jurisdiction.

In Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization, 441 U.S. 600, 99 S.Ct. 1905, 60 L.Ed.2d 508 (1979), the Supreme Court held that jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) and (4) does not encompass a claim that a state welfare regulation is invalid because it conflicts with the Social Security Act. Appellant argues that under this holding the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider Davis' supremacy clause claim.

Appellant recognizes, as he must, that if Davis' complaint stated a colorable constitutional claim which would confer federal jurisdiction on the district court, then the court also had jurisdiction to hear Davis' supremacy clause claims on a pendent basis. See id. at 618 n.36, 99 S.Ct. at 1916; Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974). Appellant argues, however, that the constitutional claims presented by Davis were not sufficiently substantial to confer jurisdiction.

Having carefully considered appellant's argument, we agree with the district court that Davis' constitutional claims satisfy the minimal standards set forth in Hagans v. Lavine, supra. 6 Cf. Herweg v. Ray, 619 F.2d 1265, 1269 (8th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (due process and equal protection claims presented substantial constitutional questions); Peske v. Tangedahl, 619 F.2d 729 (8th Cir. 1980) (cause remanded for consideration of the substantiality of plaintiff's constitutional claims). It follows that the district court had federal jurisdiction to hear this case.

B. The Statutory Scheme: Overview and Historical Development.

AFDC is a joint federal-state welfare program established by Title IV-A of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-644 (1976). Under the program, states receive federal matching funds for the cost of AFDC payments to "dependent children" and their caretaker relatives if the state implements a plan that meets statutory requirements. The statute defines the term "dependent child" as a needy child who has been deprived of parental support or care "by reason of the death, continued absence from the home, or physical or mental incapacity of a parent," 42 U.S.C. § 606(a)(1) (1976), or "by reason of the unemployment * * * of his father." 42 U.S.C. § 607(a) (1976). 7

Congress first added an unemployed parents provision to the AFDC program in 1961. Pub.L.No. 87-31, § 1, 75 Stat. 75 (1961) (codified in 42 U.S.C. § 607 (1964)). This statute required that a state's AFDC plan provide for cooperative arrangements with state public employment agencies, including registration and periodic reregistration by unemployed parents, so that these parents might find employment. 42 U.S.C. § 607(2)(A) (1964). The statute also required that state plans include

(B) provisions to assure that aid to families with dependent children is not provided to any such child or relative if, and for as long as, the unemployed parent refuses without good cause to accept employment, in which he is able to engage, which (i) is offered through such public employment offices, or (ii) is otherwise offered by an employer if the offer is determined by the State or local agency administering the State plan, after notification by such employer, to be a bona fide offer of such employment(.) (42 U.S.C. § 607(2)(B) (1964) (emphasis added).)

In short, benefits to the entire family would be terminated if the unemployed parent refused an offer of employment.

Congress restructured this part of the AFDC program in 1967. Pub.L.No. 90-248, § 203(a), 81 Stat. 821 (1967). The amended statute provided for uniform national standards in defining unemployment and established three prerequisites for receipt of aid. 8 Of greater significance to this case, the amendment repealed the previous statutory provisions governing cooperation with state employment agencies and sanctions for refusing work. In their place, the amended statute provided for referral (later, certification) of unemployed parents to the Secretary of Labor under a newly created comprehensive work incentive (WIN) program. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(19) and §§ 630-644 (1976).

Under the WIN program, the sanction for nonparticipation or refusal of a job offer is termination of benefits only to the family member who refused to participate or accept the offer. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(19)(F) (1976). 9 The limited nature of this sanction reflects a legislative compromise between the Senate and the House; the House version of the bill provided for termination of benefits to the entire family if and for so long as the unemployed parent refused to accept employment. See Conf.Rep.No. 1030, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in (1967) U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2834, 3179, 3204-05.

That Congress intended the WIN sanction to apply to unemployed parents is clear. The original version of the WIN sanction provision specifically included (in a parenthetical reference) relatives or individuals referred to the Secretary of Labor pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 607(b)(2), the unemployed parents provision. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(19)(F) (1970). 10 Likewise, the regulations promulgated by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare in 1969 to implement the new WIN program included unemployed parents in the category of persons subject to sanctions under WIN for refusal to participate or to accept job offers. 34 Fed.Reg. 1354, 1357 (1969) (to be codified in 45 C.F.R. § 220.35(a)(1)(i), (a)(1)(iv), and (a)(6)(i)). 11

Congress, however, retained independent requirements for state AFDC plans under the unemployed parents provision. These requirements specified that there should be cooperation with state vocational education agencies to encourage retraining where possible; they also specified that state plans must provide

(C) for the denial of aid to families with dependent children to any child or relative specified in subsection (a) of this section

(i) if, and for so long as, such...

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  • Barnes v. Reagen
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa
    • November 6, 1980
    ... ... 501 F. Supp. 217 denied, 423 U.S. 876, 96 S.Ct. 149, 46 L.Ed.2d 109 (1975). Accordingly, the court is empowered to exercise jurisdiction over the constitutional claims, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3); Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization, 441 U.S. 600, 99 S.Ct. 1905, 60 L.Ed.2d 508 (1979); Davis v. Reagen, 630 F.2d 1299, (8th Cir. 1980), and pendant jurisdiction over the statutory claim. Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization, 441 U.S. 600, 99 S.Ct. 1905, 60 L.Ed.2d 508 (1979); Davis v. Reagen, 630 F.2d 1299, (8th Cir. 1980); Roe v. Ray, 407 F.Supp. 351 (N.D.Ia.1976), aff'd, 551 ... ...
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