Barnes v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1

• Decision Date: 28 April 1977
• Docket Number: No. 44081,44081
• Citation: 563 P.2d 199,88 Wn.2d 483
• Parties: Robert L. BARNES et al., Respondents, v. SEATTLE SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1 et al., Appellants.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

Page 483

88 Wn.2d 483

563 P.2d 199

Robert L. BARNES et al., Respondents, v. SEATTLE SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1 et al., Appellants.

No. 44081.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

April 28, 1977.

Foster, Pepper & Riviera, Marco J. Magnano, Jr., Seattle, for appellants.

Skeel, McKelvy, Henke, Evenson & Betts, Jay E. Leipham, leSourd, Patten, Fleming & Hartung, Leon C. Misterek, Seattle, for respondents.

UTTER, Associate Justice.

A number of certificated administrative personnel of the Seattle School District received notices on June 4, 1975, of probable cause to adversely affect their teaching contracts for the 1975--76 school year. These notices informed them their status would be changed for the ensuing school term from their present contract status as administrators to that of teachers at severe reductions in salary, and stated this action was required by declining enrollment and an adverse emergency financial situation created by the failure of the 1976 special levy. The district's action was appealed to the superior court where these cases were consolidated. That court ruled adversely to the district and held, in ruling upon a motion for partial summary judgment, that the district's financial difficulties did not constitute probable cause to adversely affect the contract status of a certificated employee under the applicable statutes. The trial court reasoned that discharge or adverse affect in contract status under the statute in question could only be based upon deficiencies in employee performance and not upon economic difficulties peculiar to the district. It further held that the notices of June 4 were 'in effect' notices of nonrenewal and, having been served after the April 5 statutory deadline for nonrenewal, were invalid. We affirm the trial court.

The legislature has developed a statutory scheme within which the employment, discharge and reduction in rank of certificated teachers and administrators must take place. RCW 28A.58.100 empowers school boards to employ teachers for not more than one year and to discharge certificated personnel for 'sufficient cause.' RCW 28A.58.450 ¹ outlines the procedure to be followed in accomplishing a discharge or other action adversely affecting a certificated employee's contract. Notice of probable cause to take such action may be given at any time. The statutory scheme further provides, in RCW 28A.67.070, ² that the one-year contracts authorized by RCW 28A.58.100 are automatically renewed for the coming year unless notice of probable cause for nonrenewal is served upon the employee prior to April 15th of the current contract year ³ and it is thereafter established, pursuant to specified procedures, that 'sufficient cause for nonrenewal' exists.

RCW 28A.58.450 is generally referred to as the discharge statute, while RCW 28A.67.070 has been termed the nonrenewal statute. In commenting on the difference in these two statutes, our court in Pierce v. Lake Stevens School Dist. 4, 84 Wash.2d 772, 781, 529 P.2d 810 (1974), noted the discharge statute 'provides for the discharge of an employee during the term of his contract, whereas the nonrenewal statute provides for notice, on or before April 15 of the contract year, that the contract will not be renewed for the year beginning the following September.'

Respondents were not notified of nonrenewal of their contracts by April 15, and pursuant to the express terms of RCW 28A.67.070 they were conclusively presumed to have been rehired by the district on terms substantially identical to those contained in their 1974--75 contracts. The district contends, however, that this 'conclusive presumption' does not preclude the district from taking action to alter these employees' contracts, on the basis of the adverse affect in contract status language contained in RCW 28A.58.450, without regard for the April 15 deadline. They argue the language of the discharge statute, allowing an employee to be discharged or otherwise adversely affected in his contract status on the basis of 'sufficient cause' authorizes the timing of the action it took here and that 'sufficient cause' for discharge may be based upon the district's severe financial problems.

We have held that the term 'sufficient cause' in the context of the nonrenewal statute, RCW 28A.67.070, includes adverse financial condition of the district and that such condition may provide grounds for nonrenewal of an employee's contract under that statute. Hill v. Dayton School Dist. 2, 85 Wash.2d 204, 532 P.2d 1154 (1975); Pierce v. Lake Stevens School Dist. 4, supra. Our decisions indicate, however, that the phrase has a different meaning in the context of the discharge statute.

' Sufficient cause' has been defined with regard to statutory procedures for revocation of a teaching certificate as conduct which would affect the teacher's efficiency. Browne v. Gear, 21 Wash.2d 147, 57 P. 359 (1899). See Gaylord v. Tacoma School Dist. 10, 85 Wash.2d 348, 535 P.2d 804 (1975). More recently we have held 'sufficient cause' under the discharge statute relates to conduct of a teacher adversely affecting performance. Gaylord v. Tacoma School Dist. 10, 88 Wash.2d 286, 559 P.2d 1340 (1977). See Denton v. South Kitsap School Dist. 402, 10 Wash.App. 69, 516 P.2d 1080 (1973). The thrust of the inquiry of a school board proceeding under RCW 28A.58.450, although that statute speaks of 'probable cause' and 'sufficient cause' for "adverse change in contract status", is 'whether the teacher has so materially breached his promise to teach as to excuse the school district in its promise to employ.'

Francisco v. Board of Directors, 85 Wash.2d 575, 580, 537 P.2d 789, 792 (1975).

There is no indication either in the language of the respective statutes or legislative history that the phrase 'sufficient cause' means the same thing in the different contexts in which it is used in these different statutes. RCW 28A.58.450 has been employed in the past in litigation in this state only where a district has removed or otherwise taken action against a teacher whose professional conduct is in some respects substandard. Noe v. Edmonds School Dist. 15, 83 Wash.2d 97, 515 P.2d 977 (1973); State ex rel. Mary M. Knight School Dist. 311 v. Wanamaker, 46 Wash.2d 341, 281 P.2d 846 (1955); Hunter v. Board of Directors, 14 Wash.App. 177, 536 P.2d 1209 (1975); McAnulty v. Snohomish School Dist. 201, 9 Wash.App. 834, 515 P.2d 523 (1973); Roberge v. Hoquiam School Dist. 28, 5 Wash.App. 564, 490 P.2d 121 (1971). We find no reason to extend the scope of the meaning of that term in this case beyond its previous use. ⁴

The district's remedy was to proceed under the nonrenewal statute (RCW 28A.67.070) in a timely fashion, which it did not do. Respondents' contracts as administrators were, in fact, not renewed and respondents were not offered a new contract containing substantially identical contractual terms and conditions. The language of the nonrenewal statute clearly contemplates that an immediate statutory right vests in certificated personnel to demand contracts containing substantially identical terms and conditions upon failure of the district to give timely notice of nonrenewal. The statute clearly does not contemplate the offer of new and different contracts such as were here presented to the respondents. Our interpretation of the statute requires that language to the contrary contained in the opinion of the Court of Appeals in McCollough v. Cashmere School Dist. 222, 15 Wash.App. 730, 551 P.2d 1046 (1976), be overruled. The procedure used here did not involve discharge but was instead a procedurally improper effort to nonrenew contracts of the respondents, coupled with an offer to rehire them under different contracts with diminished responsibility and pay. This was at best an offer on the part of the district to modify the terms of the contract rights already conclusively presumed to have vested under statute which offer was not, and need not have been, accepted by respondents.

Finally, the district argues on appeal that it was financially impossible for them to respect respondents' contracts. This theory was not presented to the trial court and will not be considered on appeal. Fuqua v. Fuqua, 88 Wash.2d 100, 558 P.2d 801 (1977). There was,...