Denton v. South Kitsap School Dist. No. 402, 825--II

• Decision Date: 04 December 1973
• Docket Number: No. 825--II,825--II
• Parties: Gary L. DENTON, Appellant, v. SOUTH KITSAP SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 402, Respondent.
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals

Page 69

10 Wn.App. 69

516 P.2d 1080

Gary L. DENTON, Appellant, v. SOUTH KITSAP SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 402, Respondent.

No. 825--II.

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 2.

Dec. 4, 1973.

James I. Maddock of Schultheis, Maddock & Fox, Port Orchard, for appellant.

Elvin J. Vandeberg and Leslie O. Stomsvik of Kane, Vandeberg & Hartinger, Tacoma, for respondent.

PEARSON, Chief Judge.

A teacher appeals from the judgment of the superior court sustaining his discharge. The principal question presented is whether the teacher's sexual relations with a minor female student in the school district constitute 'sufficient cause' for his discharge. We hold that this conduct justifies discharge.

On November 15, 1971, the board of directors of South Kitsap School District 402 directed a notice of probable cause for discharge to Mr. Denton. The stated cause was 'that you violated RCW 9.79.020 in that as a male person you carnally knew and abused a female child under the age of eighteen (18) years, who was not your wife, namely, . . . a student of South Kitsap School District No. 402, . . .'

Pursuant to RCW 28A.58.450, Mr. Denton served a request for a hearing upon the board, and a hearing was held on December 8, 1971. Thereafter the board discharged him. On appeal the superior court sustained the action of the school board.

The records of the hearing and trial disclose the following course of events. Mr. Denton, a teacher at Marcus Whitman Junior High School, became acquainted with a girl who was a student at South Kitsap High School, as a result of his friendship with her parents. Although she had been a student at the junior high school during Mr. Denton's tenure there, she had never been his student. Mr. Denton obtained permission from her parents to date her, and they dated during the summer and fall of 1971.

In early November, 1971, the school administrators received information from a counselor that the student in question was pregnant, and that 'a teacher was involved.' On the evening of November 8, 1971, Mr. Denton met in conference with Dennis Ray, his principal, and the vice principal, at Mr. Ray's request. Mr. Ray testified at the hearing before the school board that he asked appellant if the student in question was pregnant, and if so, whether he was the expectant father, and that Mr. Denton answered 'yes' to both questions.

Thereafter appellant met with Mr. Ray and Lee Tucker, the assistant superintendent. Mr. Tucker testified at the hearing and at trial that he put essentially the same questions to appellant, and likewise received affirmative answers.

Both at the hearing and at trial, Mr. Denton asserted the privilege against self-incrimination to all questions directed to the subject of his sexual involvement with this student. Testimony as to the above described questioning and his responses thereto was admitted over his objections at both proceedings.

Mr. Denton and the student in question were married on November 12, 1971.

The governing statute in this case is RCW 28A.58.100, which provides in part:

Every board of directors, unless otherwise specially provided by law, shall:

(1) Employ for not more than one year, and for Sufficient cause discharge all certificated and noncertificated employees, . . .

(Italics ours.) This section is implemented procedurally by RCW 28A.58.450, which contains notice provisions and rules for hearings before the school board.

We have recently noted that the term 'sufficient cause' under this statute has seldom been elucidated in the Washington cases. Wojt v. Chimacum School Dist. 49, 9 Wash.App. 857, 516 P.2d 1099 (1973).

Nonetheless, we believe that the behavior of the appellant in this case is well within its purview. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of circumstances which would more clearly justify the action of the school board than the sexual misconduct of a teacher with a minor student in the district.

There is ample authority to support this conclusion. In Browne v. Gear, 21 Wash. 147, 57 P. 359 (1899), the Supreme Court, in discussing 'sufficient cause' as it related to the former statute on revocation of a teaching certificate, stated that such moral turpitude outside the profession as would recoil upon a teacher's efficiency and injure the school was within the meaning of the term. We would hold that, at least where such 'moral turpitude' consists of unlawful sexual relations with a minor student in the district, it is within the contemplation of RCW 28A.58.100(1). Noteworthy also in this connection is the present statute pertaining to the revocation of teaching certificates. RCW 28A.70.160. One ground for revocation specified therein is 'immorality.' We are of the opinion that the less drastic measure of discharge is likewise available upon such a ground.

Mr. Denton relies heavily on the case of Morrison v. State Board of Education, 1 Cal.3d 214, 82 Cal.Rptr. 175, 461 P.2d 375 (1969) for the proposition that discharge of a teacher cannot be predicated upon sexual immorality absent a showing that the conduct redounds adversely upon the teacher's 'fitness to teach.'

While the argument that 'immorality' per se is not a ground for discharge without a showing of adverse effect upon 'fitness to teach' or upon the school has merit (indeed this is a fair inference from Browne v. Gear, Supra), we decline to set such a requirement where the sexual misconduct complained of directly involves a teacher and a minor student. In our view, the school board may properly conclude in such a situation that the conduct is inherently harmful to the teacher-student relation, and thus to the school district. We are accordingly of the opinion that Mr. Denton's conduct constituted sufficient cause for discharge.

Several essentially evidentiary questions are additionally raised. Mr. Denton initially contends that any admissions obtained from him were the results of implied coercion, and hence inadmissible against him at the hearing or at trial, on a theory analogous to the well-known Miranda rule. Aside from the fact...