Barnes v. State
| Decision Date | 23 January 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 06-286.,No. 06-285.,06-285.,06-286. |
| Citation | 174 P.3d 732,2008 WY 6 |
| Parties | William L. BARNES, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff). |
| Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
Representing Appellant: Diane M. Lozano, State Public Defender, PDP; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Kirk A. Morgan, Assistant Appellate Counsel. Argument by Mr. Morgan.
Representing Appellee: Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; David Willms, Assistant Attorney General; Kristen Dolan, Assistant Attorney General. Argument by Ms. Dolan.
Before VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.
[¶ 1] William L. Barnes pled no contest to possession of cocaine with intent to deliver, but reserved his right to appeal the district court's denial of his motion to suppress statements he made to police before his arrest. He claims the statements were inadmissible because he made them while in custody but without having been given Miranda warnings. We affirm the district court's order denying the suppression motion.
[¶ 2] In a consolidated appeal, Mr. Barnes claims the district court erred in concluding he was not entitled to credit for time served while he was awaiting disposition of the possession charge and another unrelated charge. The district court declined to give him credit for time served because he had violated the conditions of his parole in yet another matter and was incarcerated partly because he was awaiting a parole revocation hearing. We hold Mr. Barnes was entitled to credit for the time he served between his arrest and sentencing. We reverse the district court's sentence and remand for correction of the judgment and sentence in accordance with this opinion.
[¶ 3] Mr. Barnes states the issues as follows:
I. Did the trial court err in denying appellant's motion to suppress the statements given to police regarding his use and possession of an illegal drug when the statements were solicited by a police detective while appellant was in custody and prior to him receiving a Miranda style warning?
II. Did the trial court err when it directed that appellant not be given any credit for the time served as he was on parole, and then forwarded its decision to the Parole Board?
The State claims the district court properly denied Mr. Barnes' motion to suppress and declined to give him credit for time served while awaiting a parole revocation hearing.
[¶ 4] On January 11, 2006, Detective James Eddy of the Cheyenne Police Department saw a vehicle without registration traveling westbound on Nationway in Cheyenne, Wyoming. Detective Eddy approached the vehicle in his unmarked patrol car. He observed Mr. Barnes, who was driving the vehicle, and a passenger. They looked at Detective Eddy several times and then the passenger slumped down in the seat. The detective activated his lights and siren and, after he had sounded the siren twice, the vehicle pulled over. As Detective Eddy stopped the patrol car to inquire about the vehicle registration, Mr. Barnes got out of the vehicle and ran. Detective Eddy yelled for him to stop but Mr. Barnes did not respond. Detective Eddy returned to his vehicle and pursued Mr. Barnes into an alley. He left the patrol car and went after Mr. Barnes on foot, apprehending him a few blocks away.
[¶ 5] Detective Eddy tackled Mr. Barnes to the ground and told him to put his hands behind his back. Instead, Mr. Barnes put his hands in his pants pockets. He appeared to be trying to remove something. Detective Eddy managed to get Mr. Barnes' hands out of his pockets and placed him in handcuffs. He sat Mr. Barnes up and, as he did so, he noticed several baggies containing white powder on the ground. He asked Mr. Barnes if the powder was methamphetamine. Mr. Barnes stated the baggies were not his property. The detective searched Mr. Barnes and in his pocket found a spoon and a needle of the type commonly used for shooting methamphetamine.
[¶ 6] Mr. Barnes began complaining of shortness of breath and dizziness. Detective Eddy asked him how much of the powder he had ingested. Mr. Barnes responded that methamphetamine was his drug of choice and the powder in the baggies was cocaine. Detective Eddy asked him why he had the substance if he had not been using it. Mr. Barnes stated, The officer asked him what he meant and Mr. Barnes responded that he intended to sell the cocaine. Detective Eddy placed him under arrest and took him to the detention center.
[¶ 7] At the detention center, Mr. Barnes complained of chest pains. Detective Eddy transported him to the hospital where he was treated and released. Back at the detention center, Mr. Barnes was charged with possession with intent to deliver cocaine. Detective Eddy subsequently weighed and tested the substance in the baggie, which proved to be cocaine, and Mr. Barnes was also charged with misdemeanor possession of cocaine.
[¶ 8] Prior to trial, Mr. Barnes filed a motion to suppress the statements he made to Detective Eddy prior to his arrest. He claimed that he was in custody (i.e. Detective Eddy chased him down, tackled him to the ground and placed him in handcuffs) when he made the statements; therefore, Detective Eddy was required to give him Miranda warnings prior to questioning him. The State argued Mr. Barnes' statements were not made during a custodial interrogation which is a condition precedent to the Miranda warning requirement. Under the circumstances that existed at the time, the State asserted, the seizure was best characterized as a Terry stop, in which an officer may question a detainee sufficiently to determine his identity and information confirming or dispelling the officer's suspicions without first giving Miranda warnings.
[¶ 9] After a hearing, the district court denied the motion. The court agreed with the State that Detective Eddy's questions were more analogous to a Terry stop than a custodial interrogation and did not, therefore, violate the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Additionally, the court concluded the detective's questions were in response to Mr. Barnes' medical complaints and were necessary for his health and safety.
[¶ 10] Prior to the court's ruling on the motion to suppress, the State moved for and the district court granted a dismissal of count II, misdemeanor possession of cocaine. Mr. Barnes pleaded no contest to the remaining charge of possession with intent to deliver and the district court sentenced him to four to five years imprisonment. The district court refused to give Mr. Barnes credit for time served, reasoning that at the time of his arrest for possession with intent to deliver, he was on parole and his subsequent incarceration was due in part to the parole violation. The district court ordered the sentence to be served concurrently with the sentences imposed for the parole violation and another crime with which Mr. Barnes was charged after his arrest for possession with intent to deliver. Subsequently, Mr. Barnes filed a motion to correct illegal sentence in which he argued that he was entitled to credit for 285 days served from his arrest on January 11, 2006, through his sentencing on October 23, 2006, because his detention during that time was a result solely of his inability to post bond. It is not apparent from the record whether the district court ruled on the motion.
[¶ 11] The standards for reviewing a district court order denying a motion to suppress have been often repeated:
Rulings on the admissibility of evidence are within the sound discretion of the trial court. We will not disturb such rulings absent a clear abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion occurs when it is shown the trial court reasonably could not have concluded as it did. Factual findings made by a trial court considering a motion to suppress will not be disturbed unless the findings are clearly erroneous. Because the trial court has the opportunity to hear the evidence, assess witness credibility, and draw the necessary inferences, deductions, and conclusions, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's determination.
Negrette v. State, 2007 WY 88, ¶ 11, 158 P.3d 679, 682 (Wyo.2007). A sentence that does not include proper credit for pre-sentence incarceration is illegal. Doolittle v. State, 2007 WY 52, ¶ 18, 154 P.3d 350, 356 (Wyo. 2007). The determination of whether a sentence is illegal is a question of law, which we review de novo. Id., ¶ 9, 154 P.3d at 354.
[¶ 12] Mr. Barnes contends that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion to suppress the statements he made to Detective Eddy because he made them during custodial interrogation without having been advised of his Miranda rights. He further asserts that the circumstances existing at the time he made the statements did not fall under any of the exceptions, including the public safety exception, which would relieve Detective Eddy of his obligation to give the Miranda warnings. The State argues that the district court properly denied the suppression motion because, first, Mr. Barnes made the statements during a valid investigatory stop, not a custodial interrogation, and second, Detective Eddy's questions were prompted by Mr. Barnes' medical complaints and fell within the public safety exception to the Miranda requirement. We begin by considering whether Mr. Barnes made the statements during an investigatory stop or in the course of a custodial interrogation.
[¶ 13] In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the Court established the rule that to be admissible in evidence any statement given by a suspect during custodial interrogation...
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