Barnett v. Bailey

• Decision Date: 27 March 1992
• Docket Number: No. 91-8054,91-8054
• Citation: 956 F.2d 1036
• Parties: John BARNETT, Sarah Mayfield and Milton Cook, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Geraldine G. BAILEY, John O. McCurley, Thomas Herndon, Ray H. Lewis, Bruce Teasley, James D. Oliver, Leonard M. Seymour, Terrell Fleming, Donnie Greenway, Frank Szabo, W. Grover Dudley and Joel L. Shirley, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 1036

956 F.2d 1036

John BARNETT, Sarah Mayfield and Milton Cook, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Geraldine G. BAILEY, John O. McCurley, Thomas Herndon, Ray H. Lewis, Bruce Teasley, James D. Oliver, Leonard M Seymour, Terrell Fleming, Donnie Greenway, Frank Szabo, W Grover Dudley and Joel L. Shirley, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 91-8054.

United States Court of Appeals Eleventh Circuit.

March 27, 1992.

John Jay McArthur, Athens, Ga., for plaintiffs-appellants.

E. Freeman Leverett, Heard, Leverett & Phelps, Elberton, Ga., Walter James Gordon, Hartwell, Ga., for defendants-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia.

Before KRAVITCH and BIRCH, Circuit Judges, and KAUFMAN ^*, Senior District Judge.

KRAVITCH, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiffs-appellants John Barnett, Sarah Mayfield and Milton Cook ("plaintiffs" or "appellants") appeal the district court's dismissal of their motion for attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction. We hold that the district court's dismissal as to defendants-appellees Geraldine Bailey and John McCurley constituted a ruling on the merits of an otherwise moot case, and therefore was error. Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the district court for a hearing on the issue of appellants' entitlement to attorney's fees from those defendants in their respective official capacities. We affirm the district court's dismissal of appellants' motion with respect to the other defendants in this case ¹ because the district court had no subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs' Voting Rights Act action as it pertained to those individuals.

I. Background

Under the system of government in effect in Hart County, Georgia, between 1959 and 1987 ("1959 system"), the county was governed by a Commissioner of Roads and a three-member Board of Finance, all four of whom were elected county-wide. In 1988, Hart County and the Georgia General Assembly formulated a plan whereby the County electorate would choose by referendum a new system of government from three options provided on the ballot. On April 12, 1988, the citizens of Hart County voted to adopt a new system of county government ("1988 system") whereby the county would be governed by a Road Commissioner, elected county-wide; a Chairman, also elected county-wide; and a three-member Board of Commissioners, the members of which were to be elected from districts. The county did not seek preclearance of the referendum by the United States Department of Justice ("Justice Department") under the procedure provided in section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c.

After the referendum, Hart County submitted its new system of government to the Justice Department for preclearance pursuant to section 5. Within the 60-day period prescribed in the Act, the Justice Department requested additional information regarding the county's submission, thereby extending the Department's period of determination by an additional 60 days. Because of this delay, the review period extended beyond August 9, 1988, the date of the general primary election whereby candidates under the new system of county government were to be nominated.

During the months preceding the August 9 primary, the process for qualification of candidates for that election took place. In the course of this process, the Hart County Democratic Executive Committee, headed by its Chairman, appellee John McCurley, permitted several individuals ² to qualify for the August 9 primary under both the 1988 system and the 1959 system. Conversely, Chairman McCurley allegedly told appellant John Barnett, who sought qualification for a position under the 1959 system, that the County Democratic Executive Committee intended to qualify candidates for positions under the 1988 system only; Mr. Barnett declined to qualify under the 1988 system. Eventually, the County Democratic Executive Committee reopened the qualification process to permit qualification of candidates for positions under the 1959 system as well as under the 1988 system; however, only those candidates who had already registered under the 1988 system were allowed to qualify for candidacy under the 1959 system. This requirement precluded Mr. Barnett from qualifying under the 1959 system.

On July 29, 1988, Mr. Barnett and appellants Sarah Mayfield and Milton Cook ³ filed suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia against appellee Geraldine Bailey in her official capacity as Hart County Superintendent of Elections; against Chairman McCurley in his official capacity; and against the aforementioned Democratic primary candidates. Plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that both (1) the qualification of candidates under the 1988 system, and the limited reopening of candidate qualifications under the 1959 system and (2) the institution in general of the 1988 system of government constituted alterations of voting procedures which were subject to preclearance by the Justice Department pursuant to section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. Plaintiffs made no allegation that either the Democratic Executive Committee's manipulation of the candidate qualification process or the County's conduct of the August 9, 1988 primary election under the 1959 or 1988 systems of government discriminated against black voters or candidates, or that these actions carried with them a potential for such discrimination.

The plaintiffs sought, inter alia, the following relief: (1) a temporary restraining order enjoining Election Superintendent Bailey from conducting the August 9, 1988 general primary election pending Justice Department preclearance of the 1988 system; (2) a hearing on the granting of a preliminary injunction on the issue of the general primary; and (3) a declaratory judgment that the candidate qualification process undertaken by the Democratic Executive Committee violated section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.

On the day plaintiffs filed their complaint, the district court entered a temporary restraining order enjoining the August 9 general primary election and retaining the 1959 system. The court held that the institution of the 1988 system of government, and the candidate qualification processes related thereto, were subject to the preclearance requirements of section 5, and that the plaintiffs had met their burden of proving immediate and irreparable injury in the absence of issuance of the TRO. Barnett v. Bailey, No. CA-88-53-ATH (M.D.Ga. July 29, 1988). The court also ordered the candidate qualification process to be reopened to permit any individual to qualify as a candidate for the Board of Finance under the 1959 system of government. Id. On August 8, 1988, the district court extended the TRO until the case could be considered by a three-judge district court on application for a preliminary injunction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284(b)(3). Thereafter, in late August, defendants filed their responsive pleadings; certain defendants moved to dismiss the case on substantive and/or jurisdictional grounds.

After a three-judge court was empaneled on September 1, 1988, this case was consolidated with another case challenging the constitutionality of Hart County's old system of government. ⁴ The three-judge court, by Order dated October 26, 1988, declared the instant case moot by passage of time. The court reserved the issue of plaintiffs' entitlement to attorney's fees for consideration at a later date, reassigning this and any other outstanding issues to the Honorable Duross Fitzpatrick (U.S.D.C. M.D.Ga.), who had entered the original TRO.

Plaintiffs subsequently moved for attorney's fees, costs and expenses pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. By order dated December 14, 1990, the district court dismissed plaintiffs' motion, holding that because the plaintiffs' complaint under section 5 had not alleged racial animus or discrimination on the part of the defendants, the court lacked federal subject matter jurisdiction to have issued its previous temporary restraining order and to hear plaintiffs' motion for attorney's fees. Barnett v. Bailey, 753 F.Supp. 949 (M.D.Ga.1990). Plaintiffs appeal the district court's dismissal.

II. Analysis

The appeal presents a single issue: whether the district court's decision to dismiss plaintiffs' motion for attorney's fees for failure to allege racial animus or discrimination in plaintiffs' complaint under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act amounted to a jurisdictional ruling or constituted a decision on the merits. If plaintiffs' failure to allege racial animus or discrimination did indeed deprive the district court of federal subject matter jurisdiction, then the district court's dismissal was appropriate, given that a court sua sponte can raise a jurisdictional defect at any time, leading to dismissal of the relevant action. Fitzgerald v. Seaboard System R.R., Inc., 760 F.2d 1249, 1251 (11th Cir.1985), citing Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 95 S.Ct. 1893, 44 L.Ed.2d 525 (1975). If, however, the district court's dismissal constituted a ruling on the merits in a case that already had been dismissed as moot, then the district court erred, and we should remand to the district court for a determination of the merits of plaintiffs' motion for attorney's fees. Doe v. Marshall, 622 F.2d 118, 119 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 993, 101 S.Ct. 2336, 68 L.Ed.2d 855 (1981). ⁵ We review the district court's jurisdictional decision de novo. Local Union 72 v. John Payne Co., Inc., 850 F.2d 1535, 1537 (11th Cir.1988). ⁶

A. Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act

The Voting Rights Act "implemented Congress' firm intention to rid the country of racial discrimination in voting." Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 550, 89 S.Ct. 817, 822, 22 L.Ed.2d 1 (1969). Under section 5 of the Act, a state covered by the Act, or a political subdivision thereof, cannot enact or enforce "any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or...