Barnett v. Milan Seating Systems

• Decision Date: 02 February 2007
• Parties: Frances BARNETT v. MILAN SEATING SYSTEMS.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

215 S.W.3d 828

Frances BARNETT v. MILAN SEATING SYSTEMS.

Supreme Court of Tennessee, at Jackson.

November 15, 2006 Session.

February 2, 2007.

Jeffrey P. Boyd, Jackson, Tennessee, for the appellant, Frances Barnett.

P. Allen Phillips, Jackson, Tennessee, for the appellee, Milan Seating Systems.

OPINION

D. MICHAEL SWINEY, Sp.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which WILLIAM M. BARKER, C.J., and JANICE M. HOLDER, CORNELIA A. CLARK, and GARY R. WADE, JJ., joined.

We accepted this appeal prior to its review by a Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel primarily to determine whether the chancery court correctly ruled that an employee is working for her "pre-injury employer" for purposes of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d)(1)(A) when the company she was working for at the time of the injury is sold to a new entity and the employee's place of work, job duties, and rate of pay with the new entity remain unchanged. We conclude that an employee is not working for her "pre-injury employer" when she returns to work and the company she was working for at the time of the injury then is purchased by a different company, and this is so even if the employee's place of work, job duties, and rate of pay remain unchanged. The judgment of the chancery court on this particular issue is, therefore, reversed.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Frances Barnett ("Plaintiff") is currently fifty-four years old and a high school graduate with an associates degree in business. In May of 2003, after performing forceful and repetitive work at defendant Milan Seating Systems ("Milan Seating") for approximately fourteen years, Plaintiff sought medical treatment from Dr. Claiborne Christian. Plaintiff complained of pain, numbness, and tingling in both hands, with the pain in her left hand being greater than the pain in her right hand. A nerve conduction study showed moderately severe carpal tunnel syndrome on the left side, with normal results on the right. Phalen's and Tinel's tests were positive bilaterally. Dr. Christian diagnosed Plaintiff with bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, moderately severe on the left side. Dr. Christian eventually performed a carpal tunnel release on the left side. Plaintiff tolerated the surgical procedure well and experienced positive results. Plaintiff was returned to work with no restrictions. Dr Christian assigned Plaintiff a 3% permanent partial impairment to the left upper extremity.

Plaintiff filed her first complaint for workers' compensation benefits on June 6, 2003, claiming she suffered a work-related injury to both of her arms while employed by Milan Seating. On November 24, 2003, an agreed settlement was approved by the chancery court. Pursuant to that settlement, Plaintiff received lump-sum benefits for a vocational disability of 19.75% to the left upper extremity and 9.87% to the right upper extremity. Medical benefits remained open.

Almost one year after the first lawsuit was settled, Plaintiff returned to Dr. Christian on November 3, 2004, again complaining of bilateral hand pain, numbness, and tingling. Tinel's and Phalen's tests were mildly positive on the right and equivocal on the left. Plaintiff was diagnosed with moderately severe carpal tunnel syndrome and mild cubital tunnel syndrome on the right. In February of 2005, Dr. Christian performed both a carpal tunnel release and a cubital tunnel release on Plaintiff's right upper extremity. Thereafter, Dr. Christian assigned Plaintiff an 8% permanent partial impairment to the right upper extremity. Of the total 8% impairment, Dr. Christian attributed one-half of that total, or 4%, to the carpal tunnel syndrome. The remaining 4% permanent partial impairment was attributed to the cubital tunnel syndrome. Dr. Christian released Plaintiff to return to work without any restrictions.

An independent medical examination was performed by Dr. Joseph Boals. Dr. Boals concluded that Plaintiff had a 10% permanent partial impairment to the right upper extremity as a result of the carpal tunnel syndrome, and an additional 5% permanent partial impairment to that extremity as a result of the cubital tunnel syndrome.

On December 21, 2004, Plaintiff filed a second workers' compensation lawsuit against Milan Seating. Plaintiff sought compensation for the carpal tunnel and cubital tunnel injuries to her right upper extremity. Milan Seating filed an answer asserting res judicata as an affirmative defense to part of Plaintiff's claim. More specifically, Milan Seating claimed that Plaintiff already had received vocational disability benefits for the carpal tunnel injury to her right upper extremity and she was, therefore, barred from receiving any further vocational disability benefits for that same injury. On appeal, Milan Seating acknowledges that the cubital tunnel syndrome was a new and compensable injury.

On June 5, 2005, Milan Seating was sold to Kongsberg Automotive ("Kongsberg"). The sale resulted in no changes to Plaintiff's employment, and she continued to perform the same job at the same location at the same rate of pay. The only effect of the sale from Plaintiff's standpoint was that she was now being paid by Kongsberg. Plaintiff still was working for Kongsberg on the date of trial.

There were essentially three issues at trial. The first issue was whether Plaintiff had suffered a new carpal tunnel injury to her right upper extremity. The next issue was whether Plaintiff should be considered as having returned to work for her "pre-injury employer" such that any benefits would be capped at 1.5 times the medical impairment rating as set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d)(1)(A) (2005). The final issue was the extent of Plaintiff's vocational disability to her right upper extremity.

The chancery court found that Plaintiff's carpal tunnel injury to her right upper extremity was not a new injury. Therefore since Plaintiff already had been compensated for that carpal tunnel injury, she was not entitled to any additional vocational disability benefits. However, the chancery court also determined that the cubital tunnel syndrome was a new injury and Plaintiff was entitled to compensation for that particular injury. The chancery court then concluded that Plaintiff was subject to the 1.5 multiplier found in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d)(1)(A) and limited her recovery for the cubital tunnel syndrome to a vocational disability of 7.5% to the right upper extremity.

Plaintiff appeals, raising two issues. First, Plaintiff claims the chancery court erred when it determined that her recovery was limited by the 1.5 multiplier set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d)(1)(A). Second, Plaintiff claims the chancery court erred when it found Plaintiff had not suffered a new carpal tunnel injury, thereby preventing her from receiving any additional vocational disability benefits for that injury.

II. Analysis

Our standard of review for questions of law in a workers' compensation case is de novo without a presumption of correctness as to the trial court's conclusions. Perrin v. Gaylord Entm't Co., 120 S.W.3d 823, 826 (Tenn.2003). Our review of factual issues is de novo upon the record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness as to the trial court's factual findings, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(2) (2005); Houser v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 36 S.W.3d 68, 70-71 (Tenn.2001).

A. Applicability of the 1.5 Multiplier Found at Tennessee Code Annotated Section 50-6-241(d)(1)(A)

Relying on our opinion in Perrin v. Gaylord Entm't Co., 120 S.W.3d 823 (Tenn.2003), Plaintiff argues the chancery court erred when it concluded the 1.5 multiplier limited her recovery in this case. Milan Seating argues that the chancery court correctly determined that Perrin does not apply or, alternatively, if Perrin does apply, then we should overrule our holding in that case.

In Perrin, the plaintiff injured his lower back while working for The Nashville Network ("TNN"), which was owned by Gaylord Entertainment Company. 120 S.W.3d at 824. Following surgery, the plaintiff returned to work at TNN. Id. at 825. The plaintiff was assigned a permanent partial impairment rating of 18% to the body as a whole. Id. The plaintiff settled his workers' compensation claim based on a 45% vocational disability to the body as a whole, which was 2.5 times the medical impairment rating.¹ Id. Prior to the settlement, TNN was purchased by CBS Corporation in October of 1997. Id. The sale initially resulted in no changes to the plaintiff's job duties or pay. Id. The only initial change from the plaintiff's standpoint was that he was being paid by CBS. Id. Plaintiff's job was terminated in December of 1998. Id. In September of 1999, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(a)(2) (1999), the plaintiff filed an action for reconsideration of his original award against Gaylord Entertainment.² Id. The trial court dismissed the request for reconsideration after finding that it had not been filed within one year of the plaintiff's loss of employment as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(a)(2). Id.

On appeal in Perrin, we affirmed the decision of the trial court and concluded that the plaintiff's request for reconsideration had not been filed timely. We stated:

We begin our analysis by reviewing the statutory provisions that govern the circumstances in which an employee may seek reconsideration of a prior workers' compensation award:

[T]he court may reconsider, upon the filing of a new cause of action, the issue of industrial disability. . . . Such reconsideration may be made in appropriate cases where the employee is no longer employed by the pre-injury employer and makes application to the appropriate court within one (1) year of the employee's loss of employment, if such loss of employment is within four hundred (400) weeks of the day the employee...