Barnett v. State

• Decision Date: 24 September 2020
• Docket Number: No. SC19-87,SC19-87
• Citation: 303 So.3d 508
• Parties: Michael BARNETT, etc., et al., Petitioners, v. State of Florida, DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES, et al., Respondents.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

303 So.3d 508

Michael BARNETT, etc., et al., Petitioners,

v.State of Florida, DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL SERVICES, et al., Respondents.

No. SC19-87

Supreme Court of Florida.

September 24, 2020

H. T. Smith of the Law Offices of H. T. Smith, P.A., Miami, Florida; John W. McLuskey and Lisa A. Riddle of McLuskey, McDonald & Hughes, P.A., Miami, Florida; and Lauri Waldman Ross of Ross & Girten, Miami, Florida, for Petitioner Michael Barnett

Vincent E. Miller of the Law Offices of Vincent E. Miller, P.A., Delray Beach, Florida, for Petitioner Leroy Nelson, Jr.

Daniel R. Russell, William D. Hall, III, Marc W. Dunbar, and Peter M. Dunbar of Dean Mead & Dunbar, Tallahassee, Florida, for Respondent State of Florida Department of Financial Services

Michael P. Spellman and Jeffrey D. Slanker of Sniffen & Spellman, P.A., Tallahassee, Florida, and Kraig Conn, Florida League of Cities, Inc., Tallahassee, Florida, for Amicus Curiae Florida League of Cities

Herbert W.A. Thiele, County Attorney, Tallahassee, Florida, for Amicus Curiae Florida Association of County Attorneys

Frances Guasch De La Guardia and Suzanne M. Aldahan of Holland & Knight LLP, Miami, Florida; and Miriam Soler Ramos, City Attorney, Coral Gables, Florida, for Amicus Curiae City of Coral Gables

PER CURIAM.

This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in State Department of Financial Services v. Barnett , 262 So. 3d 750 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018). In a separate opinion in the same case, State Department of Financial Services v. Barnett , 268 So. 3d 758 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019), the district court certified the following question as one of great public importance:

WHEN MULTIPLE CLAIMS OF INJURY OR DEATH ARISE FROM THE SAME ACT OF NEGLIGENCE COMMITTED BY A STATE AGENCY OR ACTOR, DOES THE LIMITATION ON THE WAIVER OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN SECTION 768.28(5), FLORIDA STATUTES, CAP THE LIABILITY OF STATE AGENCIES AT $200,000 FOR ALL RESULTING INJURIES OR DEATHS, AS CLAIMS AND JUDGMENTS "ARISING OUT OF THE SAME INCIDENT OR OCCURRENCE"?

Id. at 759. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. We rephrase the certified question as follows:

WHEN MULTIPLE CLAIMS OF INJURY AGAINST A STATE AGENCY OR ACTOR ARISE FROM ONE OVERALL INJURY-CAUSING EVENT, DOES THE LIMITATION ON THE WAIVER OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN SECTION 768.28(5), FLORIDA STATUTES, CAP THE LIABILITY OF STATE AGENCIES AT $200,000 FOR ALL RESULTING INJURIES OR DEATHS AS CLAIMS AND JUDGMENTS "ARISING OUT OF THE SAME INCIDENT OR OCCURRENCE"?

Given this Court's long-standing precedent that strictly construes Florida law waiving sovereign immunity, we answer the rephrased certified question in the affirmative and hold that the mass shooting committed by Patrick Dell is a single "incident or occurrence" for purposes of section 768.28(5), Florida Statutes (2010) (subsection (5)), and that the cumulative liability for all claims of injury resulting from the incident may not exceed the aggregate cap of $200,000 set forth in the statute.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In September 2010, Patrick Dell (Dell) entered the Riviera Beach residence of his estranged wife, Natasha Whyte-Dell (Whyte-Dell), where he fatally shot her and four of her children. Dell also severely wounded a fifth child by shooting him in the neck. Dell committed suicide shortly after exiting the residence.

Several months prior to the shootings, on January 26, 2010, the abuse hotline of the Florida Department of Children and Families (DCF) received a phone call about an incident that occurred in December 2009. According to the police report, while Whyte-Dell was visiting a friend, Dell charged at and threatened Whyte-Dell with a knife, verbally threatened to kill her, and flattened all four tires on her vehicle. Later the same morning, Dell was arrested for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and criminal mischief.

Over the course of the following month, DCF conducted an investigation but subsequently closed the case file on February 25, 2010, after concluding that the children were not at significant risk of harm. The investigator's report stated:

[A]lthough there have been prior domestic disturbances between the parents, this is the first time that there has been a significant domestic violence matter between the two, and they have both agreed to a safety plan which involves calling 911 should any future incidents occur. The older children have been made aware of this as well. Despite the serious nature of the matter for which the father was arrested, investigation did not reveal any reliable evidence which would lead this [investigator] to believe that the children are in any significant risk at this time.

....

The family requested daycare/aftercare services for the four younger children, and such referral was made.

Michael Barnett (Barnett), individually, as the natural father and guardian of the injured child, and in his capacity as the personal representative of the estates of three of the deceased children, filed an action against DCF alleging claims of wrongful death and negligence. Leroy Nelson, Jr., (Nelson) filed a separate wrongful death action against DCF in his capacity as the personal representative of the estate of the fourth deceased child.

Barnett's and Nelson's complaints alleged that DCF breached multiple nondelegable duties and failed to protect the children from an unreasonable risk of harm. Among the actions that DCF allegedly failed to take were failing to adequately follow up on the December 2009 incident, failing to inquire into domestic disturbance calls placed from Whyte-Dell's residence between July 2009 and November 2009, and failing to inquire into a domestic violence injunction obtained by Whyte-Dell against Dell that expired in July 2009.

DCF raised various affirmative defenses, including that Florida's limited waiver of sovereign immunity, codified at section 768.28, limited the aggregate recovery available to Barnett and Nelson to $200,000.

Barnett and Nelson filed separate motions for partial summary judgment on the sovereign immunity issue and adopted each other's motions. The Florida Department of Financial Services (DFS) filed a petition for declaratory relief, seeking a determination as to whether the $200,000 aggregate cap applied to all claims arising out of the mass shooting committed at Whyte-Dell's residence. DFS also filed a motion to intervene in the Barnett action and a motion to consolidate the Barnett and Nelson cases for purposes of ruling on the petition for declaratory relief and the motions for partial summary judgment. The trial court granted the motions to intervene in the declaratory action and to consolidate the two cases for the limited purposes sought.

Following a hearing, the trial court granted both motions for partial summary judgment, concluding that the shooting of each individual child was a separate incident or occurrence for purposes of the sovereign immunity damage caps set forth in subsection (5). The court also determined that as to the DFS petition for declaratory relief, "each wrongful death or personal injury claim is eligible for the $100,000 per person and $200,000 per claim limitation found in [subsection (5) ]."

On appeal, the Fourth District reversed the decisions of the trial court. See Barnett , 262 So. 3d at 751. The district court concluded that the present case "involves a single claim of negligence against [DCF] in the failure to properly investigate the family and the stepfather before closing its file. Thus, each estate's claim and the claim of the injured child arise from the same incident of negligence of [DCF]. Therefore, the $200,000 cap per incident or occurrence applies to limit recovery for all claims." Id. at 753.

In a separate opinion in the same case, on the motion to certify a question of great public importance, the Fourth District stated:

Unfortunately, our state has experienced a number of highprofile mass shootings in the past several years, some of which have led to negligence complaints against state agencies. In our opinion in the instant case, we narrowly construed [subsection (5) ] to limit the sovereign immunity waiver to $200,000 when there are multiple claims arising out of the same negligent act(s) committed by the state agency. However, we acknowledge that a broader reading of the statute could allow a per injury limitation.

Barnett , 268 So. 3d at 759 (footnote omitted). The district court then certified the question set forth above as one of great public importance.

ANALYSIS

I. Sovereign Immunity

The common law doctrine of sovereign immunity, pursuant to which a government is immune from suit unless it consents to being sued, dates back to thirteenth-century England, Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida , 517 U.S. 44, 102-03, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996), and became Florida law when "[t]he common law of England in effect on July 4, 1776, was adopted [by the Legislative Council of the Territory of Florida] as the law of Florida and declared to be of full force and effect [in 1829]." State v. Egan , 287 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1973) (quoting Coleman v. State , 118 Fla. 201, 159 So. 504, 507 (1935) ). Florida's constitution expressly vests the Legislature with the power to waive sovereign immunity. See art. X, § 13, Fla. Const. ("Provision may be made by general law for bringing suit against the state as to all liabilities now existing or hereafter originating.").

In 1973, the Legislature enacted section 768.28 waiving sovereign immunity with respect to tort claims, "but only to the extent specified in this act." § 768.28(1), Fla. Stat. In pertinent part, subsection (5) provides that in the absence of a "further act of the Legislature," known as a claims bill, the damages that may be paid by the State, its agencies, or subdivisions are limited to $100,000 for a claim or judgment by any one person and that all claims or judgments "arising out of the same incident or occurrence" may not exceed $200,000. At the time of...