Baron v. City of Los Angeles

• Decision Date: 05 May 1970
• Citation: 86 Cal.Rptr. 673,2 Cal.3d 535,469 P.2d 353
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 469 P.2d 353, 42 A.L.R.3d 1036 Hal F. BARON, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES et al., Defendants and Respondents. L.A. 29717.

Page 673

86 Cal.Rptr. 673

2 Cal.3d 535, 469 P.2d 353, 42 A.L.R.3d 1036

Hal F. BARON, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES et al., Defendants and Respondents.

L.A. 29717.

Supreme Court of California,

In Bank.

May 5, 1970.

Martin & Flandrick and Robert Flandrick, San Marino, for plaintiff and appellant.

Tuttle & Taylor and Julian Burke, Los Angeles, as amici curiae on behalf of plaintiff and appellant.

Burke, Williams & Sorensen and Royal M. Sorensen, Los Angeles, for defendants and respondents.

MOSK, Acting Chief Justice.

In 1967 the City of Los Angeles adopted Ordinance No. 134571, entitled 'Registration of Lobbyists' and incorporated in Los Angeles Municipal Code at chapter 4, article 8, sections 48.01 to 48.09.

The ordinance provides that 'any person who shall engage himself for pay or for any consideration * * * for the purpose of attempting to influence the action on municipal legislation by the City Council, any of its committees, any board or commission, or any committee thereof, or any officer or employee of the City charged by law with the duty of conducting a hearing and making a decision thereon, including the approval or veto or other action by the Mayor upon municipal legislation, shall, before doing anything in furtherance of such object, register with the City Clerk as a municipal legislative advocate.' (§ 48.02, subd. (a). ¹ 'Municipal legislation' is defined by the ordinance to include 'resolutions, motions, appeals, applications, petitions, nominations, ordinances, amendments, and other matters pending or proposed before the City Council or any of its committees, or before any board or commission, whether created by Charter or by ordinance, or any committee of a board or commission, or any officer or employee of the City charged by law with the duty of conducting a hearing and making a decision as to the matter pending or proposed.' (§ 48.01, subd. (c).)

An individual required to register under the ordinance must file with the city clerk at the time of registration a form stating his name and address, the name and address of the person or organization represented by him, the duration of his employment, the amount he receives for expenses and what expenses are included. He must also submit written authorization from each person he represents. Each calendar quarter registrants must file additional reports of (1) all money received as compensation for regular employment as a municipal legislative advocate, (2) each expenditure of $25 or more made in the course of such employment, (3) the proposed legislation he was employed to support or oppose, and (4) the names of any publications to which he contributed written material to influence municipal legislation. (§ 48.02, subds. (a) and (b).) ²

The plaintiff in this action is an attorney in the Los Angeles area. A substantial portion of his practice involves appearances before the City Council, officers, boards, committees, and commissions of the City of Los Angeles on behalf of persons interested in matters falling within the definition of 'municipal legislation' in the ordinance. To continue his activities, he will be required to register. Acting for himself and others similarly situated, plaintiff filed this action seeking a declaration that the ordinance is void as applied to attorneys because, so applied, it regulates the practice of law, a field preempted by state legislation. The plaintiff contends that the State Bar Act (Bus. & Prof.Code, §§ 6000--6172) precludes local regulation of licensed attorneys engaged in the practice of law.

The trial court held that the ordinance is a valid exercise of the police power of the City of Los Angeles and that it may be applied to plaintiff and others similarly situated, except when they are 'acting on behalf of others in the performance of a duty or service, which duty or service lawfully can be performed for such other only by an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of California.' We affirm the judgment.

Los Angeles is a chartered city with the power 'to make and enforce all laws and regulations in respect to municipal affairs, subject only to the restrictions and limitations provided in (its charter).' (Cal.Const. art. XI, § 6.) ³ Therefore, ordinances relating to matters which are purely 'municipal affairs' are not invalid because they are in conflict with general state laws or because state laws have been enacted to cover the same subject. (Bishop v. City of San Jose (1969) 1 Cal.3d 56, 61, 81 Cal.Rptr. 465, 460 P.2d 137.) 'As to matters which are of statewide concern, however, home rule charter cities remain subject to and controlled by applicable general state laws regardless of the provisions of their charters, if it is the intent and purpose of such general laws to occupy the field to the exclusion of municipal regulation (the preemption doctrine).' (Id. at pp. 61--62, 81 Cal.Rptr. at p. 468, 460 P.2d at p. 140.) ⁴

Accordingly, our first inquiry must be to determine whether Ordinance No. 134571 regulates purely municipal affairs. If it does, plaintiff's attack on its validity, based on the State Bar Act, must fail. However, we find that the ordinance does not regulate purely municipal affairs and therefore the ordinance is invalid to the extent that the field it regulates is preempted by state laws.

Superficially, the ordinance would appear to be a regulation of a mere municipal subject: the registration and control of local lobbyists. ⁵ One is hard pressed to divine any statewide concern in a local procedure by means of which a local legislative body and the people within its jurisdiction may learn the identity, affluence and power of the interests seeking to influence action of municipal legislation. ⁶ Indeed the state's interest in lobbying would seem to be limited to efforts of lobbyists to affect measures pending before the state Legislature. (See Gov.Code, § 9900 et seq.)

However, closer scrutiny reveals a substantial area of statewide interest involved in Ordinance No. 134571. The definition of 'municipal legislation' adopted by the city is so broad as to apply to virtually all of the activities of attorneys representing clients before any local administrative agencies, including those activities which are unrelated to lobbying as it is traditionally defined. In effect, the ordinance invokes a substantial regulation of attorneys in the practice of their profession in that it requires many of those practicing before city agencies to register as 'municipal legislative advocates.'

Regulation of attorneys and control over the practice of law have always been considered matters of statewide concern. '(T)he profession and practice of the law, while in a limited sense a matter of private choice and concern in so far as it relates to its emoluments, is essentially and more largely a matter of public interest and concern, not only from the viewpoint of its relation to the administration of civil and criminal law, but also from that of the contacts of its membership with the constituent membership of society at large, whose interest it is to be safeguarded against the ignorances or evil dispositions of those who may be masquerading beneath the cloak of the legal and supposedly learned and upright profession. * * * It is for * * * these reasons that the membership, character and conduct of those entering and engaging in the legal profession have long been regarded as the proper subject of legislative regulation and control; * * * From almost the inception of our state government statutory provision has been made for the admission, disbarment, suspension or disciplining of members of the legal profession.' (State Bar of California v. Superior Court (1929) 207 Cal. 323, 331, 278 P. 432, 435; In re McKenna (1940) 16 Cal.2d 610, 611, 107 P.2d 258.)

Furthermore, the scope of the State Bar Act (Bus. & Prof.Code, §§ 6000--6172) as it is written today manifests legislative belief that there is substantial state interest in the regulation of the legal profession. Among other elements, the act delineates rules governing admission to the practice of law, rules of professional conduct for members of the State Bar, procedures for the disciplining of members of the bar, and rules of procedure to be followed in matters pending before bar committees.

Therefore, although the Los Angeles ordinance, by its title and purpose, would appear to be limited to municipal affairs, the ordinance as it is written has substantial direct effect upon the practice of law within the state, a matter of statewide concern. We conclude that Ordinance No. 134571 deals with subjects that are not purely municipal affairs and that the ordinance is invalid to the extent that it conflicts with state law.

"As defined by the cases the constitutional phrase 'conflict with general laws' (art. XI, § 11) may arise in several different weays. It may grow out of the exact language of the state and municipal laws (citations) or from a local attempt 'to impose additional requirements in a field that is preempted by the general law' (citations) or from the state's adoption of 'a general scheme for the regulation of a particular subject' (citations). But if the state's preemption of the field or subject is not complete, local supplemental legislation is not deemed conflicting to the extent that it covers phases of the subject which have not been covered by state law. (Citations.)" (Robins v. County of Los Angeles (1966) 248 Cal.App.2d 1, 8--9, 56 Cal.Rptr. 853, 858, quoting from In re Martin (1963) 221 Cal.App.2d 14, 16--17, 34 Cal.Rptr. 299.)

Plaintiff does not contend that there is any direct conflict between the provisions of the State Bar Act and those of the Los Angeles ordinance, and we have found none. The conflict arises, it is asserted, because the State Bar Act preempts the field of regulation of the practice of law, and that field is invaded by the Los Angeles ordinance to the extent...