Baron v. United States Steel Corp.

• Decision Date: 26 November 1986
• Docket Number: Civ. No. H-86-449.
• Citation: 649 F. Supp. 537
• Parties: John R. BARON, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION and United States Steel and Carnegie Pension Fund, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana

649 F. Supp. 537

John R. BARON, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION and United States Steel and Carnegie Pension Fund, Defendants.

Civ. No. H-86-449.

United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, Hammond Division.

November 26, 1986.

Fred Towe, Fred W. Dennerline, III, Fillenworth, Dennerline, Groth & Baird, Indianapolis, Ind., for plaintiff.

James T. Carney, S.G. Clark, U.S. Steel Corp., Pittsburgh, Pa., Charles Myers, McHie, Myers & McHie, Hammond, Ind., for defendants.

ORDER

MOODY, District Judge.

This matter is before the court on a Motion to Dismiss Count II, or in the alternative, for Summary Judgment on Count II filed by defendant United States Steel Corporation ("USX") on August 21, 1986. In addition, codefendant United States Steel and Carnegie Pension Fund ("Carnegie") filed its own Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment on August 21, 1986. Plaintiff John R. Baron filed a memorandum in opposition to both defendants on September 24, 1986 and the defendants filed a joint reply on October 30, 1986.

I. Background

The issues presented in this case involve the reemployment rights of plaintiff under the Veterans' Reemployment Act ("Act") 38 U.S.C. § 2021 et seq., and plaintiff's entitlement to certain pension funds under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001, et. seq. The undisputed facts reveal that plaintiff was employed by defendant USX from June 15, 1942 until he was drafted into military service on February 8, 1943. After receiving an honorable discharge from the U.S. Army Air Corps on June 16, 1946, plaintiff was granted a 28-day terminal leave which extended to July 14, 1946. Sometime between June 16 and July 14, 1986, plaintiff visited the USX employment office at its Homestead Works plant in Homestead, Pennsylvania.

Plaintiff alleges that he applied for reemployment with USX at that time. Plaintiff was also considering additional education at the University of Pittsburgh. Of critical importance here is whether or not plaintiff actually applied for reemployment with USX within 90 days of his military discharge. Plaintiff was accepted at the University of Pittsburgh and enrolled in classes that fall. Plaintiff attended the University of Pittsburgh on a continuous basis and prior to graduation in the fall of 1949, he interviewed with USX at its main office in Pittsburgh. USX informed plaintiff that there were no positions immediately available so plaintiff continued his education in a masters degree program. Finally, in February, 1950, plaintiff was called by USX to interview for a trainee position at Gary Sheet & Tin. Plaintiff left school and started working at Gary Sheet & Tin on March 13, 1950.

On or about July 1, 1984, plaintiff filed an application for his pension benefits pursuant to the rules of the U.S. Steel 1980 Non-Contributory Pension Rules. Plaintiff was advised by defendant Carnegie that he would not be credited for service prior to March 13, 1950 for the purposes of calculating his pension benefits. Plaintiff brought this two-count complaint against his former employer, USX, and the pension fund administrator, Carnegie. Count I, which is not the subject of the court's order today, alleges a violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et. seq., against USX. Count II invokes jurisdiction under ERISA and the Veterans' Reemployment Act. Factual allegations in Count II make out violations against both USX and Carnegie, however, the prayer for relief in Count II is directed toward Carnegie alone. In their motions, both USX and Carnegie present arguments as if USX was a proper party defendant under Count II despite the limited scope of its prayer for relief. In the spirit of liberal pleading and in order to do substantial justice, Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(f), the court construes Count II of plaintiff's complaint to state a cause of action, pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 2021, against defendant USX.

II. Defendant USX

USX moves the court to dismiss plaintiff's second count on the ground that it fails to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted, Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), or in the alternative, for summary judgment on the ground that there is no genuine dispute as to any factual issue and that USX is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, Fed.R.Civ.P. 56.

Section 2021 of 38 U.S.C. provides in pertinent part:

(a) In the case of any person who is inducted into the Armed Forces of the United States under the Military Selective Service Act (or under any prior or subsequent corresponding law) for training and service and who leaves a position (other than a temporary position) in the employ of any employer in order to perform such training and service, and (1) receives a certificate described in section 9(a) of the Military Selective Service Act (relating to the satisfactory completion of military service), and (2) makes application for reemployment within ninety days after such person is relieved from such training and service or from hospitalization continuing after discharge for a period of not more than one year —

* * * * * *

(B) if such position was in the employ of a State, or political subdivision thereof, or a private employer, such person shall —

(i) if still qualified to perform the duties of such position, be restored by such employer or the employer's successor in interest, to such position or to a position of like seniority, status, and pay; or

(ii) if not qualified to perform the duties of such position, by reason of disability sustained during such service, but qualified to perform the duties of any other position in the employ of the employer, or the employer's successor in interest, be offered employment and, if such person so requests, be employed in such other position the duties of which such person is qualified to perform as will provide such person like seniority, status, and pay, or the nearest approximation thereof consistent with the circumstances in such person's case.

This provision guarantees reemployment for veterans following completion of their military service. The statutory rights to reemployment are contingent on the veteran meeting several criteria set forth in the statute. Although the statute is to be liberally construed for the benefit of those who have served their country, Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Co., 328 U.S. 275, 285, 66 S.Ct. 1105, 1111, 90 L.Ed. 1230 (1946); Barrett v. Grand Truck Western R.R. Co., 581 F.2d 132, 135 (7th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 946, 99 S.Ct. 1423, 59 L.Ed.2d 634 (1979), plaintiff bears the burden of proving that he has satisfied the statutory requirements and is entitled to receive reemployment rights. Trulson v. Trane Co., 738 F.2d 770, 772-773 (7th Cir.1984).

A critical criterion for entitlement to reemployment rights under the Act is that a veteran "must make application for reemployment within ninety days after ... service." 38 U.S.C. § 2021(a)(2). In his complaint, plaintiff alleges that he made application for reemployment sometime between June 16 and July 14, 1946, well within the 90-day time limit. USX does not contest the fact that plaintiff visited its Homestead Employment Office within 90 days of his discharge; instead, USX argues that plaintiff did not apply for reemployment for purposes of the Act at that visit. USX claims that plaintiff "merely advised the office that he was going to try to go to college and that if he did not succeed in getting admitted to college, he would come back to USX and request work."

A. Motion to Dismiss

The court first addresses USX's motion to dismiss for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed.R. Civ.P. 12(b)(6). "A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief." Ed Miniat, Inc., et al. v. Globe Life Insurance Group, Inc., et al., 805 F.2d 732, 735 (7th Cir.1986) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-02, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). Taking all of the allegations in plaintiff's complaint as true, Wilson v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 777 F.2d 1246, 1247 (7th Cir.1985), and viewing all of plaintiff's allegations in the light most favorable to plaintiff, Haroco, Inc. v. American National Bank and Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 385 (7th Cir.1984), aff'd 473 U.S. 606, 105 S.Ct. 3291, 87 L.Ed.2d 437 (1985), the court finds that plaintiff may well be able to prove that he did in fact apply for reemployment for purposes of the Act. Hence plaintiff's claim against USX for the alleged violation of 38 U.S.C. § 2021 should not be dismissed at this early stage of the proceedings on the ground that the complaint does not state a claim.

B. Motion for Summary Judgment

In the alternative, USX seeks summary judgment by challenging all of plaintiff's factual allegations as legally insufficient. Because the evidentiary scope is broader under a summary judgment motion, the court's review is not limited to the four corners of plaintiff's complaint. Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions and affidavits "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see Box v. A & P Tea Co., 772 F.2d 1372, 1375 (7th Cir.1985). The court must view the record and any reasonable inferences drawn from it in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. P.H. Glatfelter C. v. Voith, Inc., 784 F.2d 770, 774 (7th Cir.1986). However, the plain language of Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of...