Baros v. Texas Mexican Ry. Co., 03-41646.

• Decision Date: 09 February 2005
• Docket Number: No. 03-41646.,03-41646.
• Citation: 400 F.3d 228
• Parties: Charles BAROS; et al., Plaintiffs, Charles Baros; Les Furman; and Roger Miller, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. TEXAS MEXICAN RAILWAY COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee. Robert Martin; Ira Sklar; Daniel P. Kubecka; T.J. Babb Heir's Partnership; and Richard Anderson, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Texas Mexican Railway Company, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 228

400 F.3d 228

Charles BAROS; et al., Plaintiffs, Charles Baros; Les Furman; and Roger Miller, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. TEXAS MEXICAN RAILWAY COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.

Robert Martin; Ira Sklar; Daniel P. Kubecka; T.J. Babb Heir's Partnership; and Richard Anderson, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Texas Mexican Railway Company, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 03-41646.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

February 9, 2005.

John Wallace Griffin, Jr. (argued), Rebecca D. Rozmus, Houston, Marek & Griffin, Victoria, TX, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Robert Kenneth Wise (argued), Hunton & Williams, Dallas, TX, Randy M. Clapp, Duckett, Bouligny & Collins, El Campo, TX, for Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.

Before JONES, SMITH and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:

In this property dispute, each of the plaintiffs (collectively, the "landowners") owns a parcel of land in Jackson or Victoria County, Texas, subject to a railroad right-of-way referred to as the "Victoria Segment" of the "Rosenberg Line."¹ The landowners sought a judgment declaring that the portion of the Victoria Segment's right-of-way that abuts their land reverted to them as a matter of law after Southern Pacific Transportation Company ("Southern Pacific"), the former owner of the line, allegedly abandoned it. The district court dismissed for want of subject matter jurisdiction. We affirm.

I.

A.

Southern Pacific sought permission to abandon the Victoria Segment in 1993 by filing a "Notice of Exemption" with the Interstate Commerce Commission ("ICC"),² asserting that no local traffic had moved over the line during the previous two years.³ The Notice of Exemption became effective on December 1, 1993, subject to a "public use condition," imposed by the ICC, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 10906,⁴ prohibiting Southern Pacific from disposing of the property for 180 days to permit interested parties to acquire it for public purposes.

In 1994, Southern Pacific entered into unsuccessful negotiations with another rail carrier regarding a possible sale of the entire Rosenberg Line. Later that year, the Gulf Coast Rural Rail Transportation District ("Gulf Coast"), a consortium of governmental entities and businesses, attempted to purchase or lease the Victoria Segment from Southern Pacific to preserve rail service, but the parties could not come to an agreement on price.

Having failed to reach an agreement, but determined to prevent Southern Pacific from removing the tracks, Gulf Coast filed a petition in state court seeking to condemn the Victoria Segment and requesting a temporary restraining order and temporary injunction. After the state court granted the temporary restraining order, Southern Pacific removed the matter to federal court and sought to quash the state court's temporary restraining order. Gulf Coast opposed the relief sought by Southern Pacific and requested the federal court to issue a temporary injunction.

On August 31, 1994, the district court granted a preliminary injunction in favor of Gulf Coast enjoining Southern Pacific from removing tracks along the Victoria Segment. In granting the preliminary injunction, the district court found that Southern Pacific "clearly expressed its intent to permanently abandon the rail line from El Campo to Victoria" and that Southern Pacific "consummated its abandonment of the rail line." As a result, the district court concluded that the "ICC no longer exercises jurisdiction over the rail line."⁵

In April 1995, while the Gulf Coast suit was pending, Southern Pacific filed a letter with the ICC reporting that the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department had expressed an interest in acquiring the Victoria Segment for rail-banking and interim trail use purposes, pursuant to the National Trails Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d).⁶ In a decision and order issued on May 4, 1995, the ICC reopened the abandonment proceeding and issued a Notice of Interim Trail Use ("NITU").⁷ The NITU extended the effective date of the notice of exemption for 180 days, to November 8, 1995, thereby deferring Southern Pacific's authority to abandon the line and permitting negotiations for possible rail-banking and interim trail use to continue through that date.

In an effort to permit continued negotiations between the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department and Southern Pacific, the negotiation period was extended on two more occasions, first on November 17, 1995, by a decision of the ICC, and second on May 21, 1996, by a decision of the STB. The final negotiation period expired on November 30, 1996, without an agreement.

Between 1995 and 1996, Southern Pacific and Union Pacific had been engaged in negotiations to merge. The STB approved the merger on August 12, 1996, and Union Pacific succeeded to Southern Pacific's ownership interest in the Rosenberg Line.

In 1998, Texas Mexican and Union Pacific entered into negotiations regarding the sale of the Rosenberg Line. In November 1999, Union Pacific and Texas Mexican executed a contract whereby Texas Mexican agreed to purchase the line from Union Pacific on the express condition that the STB issue a decision determining that the Victoria Segment remained subject to the STB's jurisdiction and authorizing the sale.

Texas Mexican thus petitioned the STB in August 2000 to determine whether the Victoria Segment was subject to the STB's jurisdiction and to authorize the sale. On December 8, 2000, the STB issued a decision granting Texas Mexican's petition, stating its conclusion that it still retained jurisdiction over the line, and approving the sale. In March 2001, Texas Mexican purchased the line from Union Pacific for $9,200,000.

B.

In May 2002, the landowners filed separate declaratory judgment actions against Texas Mexican in state court in Jackson County and Victoria County. The landowners sought judgments declaring that the railroad right-of-way at issue (the Victoria Segment) was abandoned as a matter of law by Southern Pacific and that the STB no longer exercises jurisdiction over the line. Texas Mexican removed the actions to federal court on the basis of a federal question, i.e., whether there had been an abandonment and a resulting termination of federal agency jurisdiction; the actions were consolidated.

Both sides moved for summary judgment. The landowners moved for partial summary judgment, contending that Southern Pacific had abandoned the Victoria Segment as a matter of law as early as 1994, and, consequently, the STB had been improperly exercising jurisdiction over the Victoria Segment. To that end, the landowners maintained that the district court's findings of fact and conclusions of law in the Gulf Coast suit — namely, its finding that Southern Pacific had consummated the abandonment of the Victoria Segment, and its conclusion that the ICC no longer had jurisdiction over the line — were entitled to preclusive effect in their declaratory judgment action.

Texas Mexican moved for summary judgment, claiming that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because (1) the STB retained exclusive and plenary jurisdiction to determine whether the Victoria Segment had been abandoned; and (2) the landowners' declaratory judgment action was an improper collateral attack on the STB's December 15, 2000, decision approving the sale of the Rosenberg Line from Union Pacific to Texas Mexican.

In October 2003, the district court denied the landowners' partial summary judgment motion and granted Texas Mexican's summary judgment motion, thereby dismissing the landowners' suit for want of subject matter jurisdiction. In so doing, the court refused to give preclusive effect to its prior decision in the Gulf Coast suit, finding that it "was limited to the issues surrounding the application for a temporary injunction" and was thus not reached after "a final hearing on the merits."

In a thorough opinion, the court determined that the conditional nature of the abandonment exemption granted Southern Pacific by the ICC was dispositive: It held that when an abandonment exemption is conditional, the STB retains jurisdiction over a railroad right-of-way until it has been abandoned pursuant to the conditions established by the agency; and, in such cases, the agency retains exclusive and plenary jurisdiction to determine whether there has been an abandonment sufficient to terminate its jurisdiction.

Because the original exemption granted to Southern Pacific was conditional, the district concluded that the STB retained exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether Southern Pacific or its successors in interest ever consummated the abandonment of the Victoria Segment. Moreover, the court characterized the landowners' suit as an improper collateral attack on ICC and STB decisions precluded by the Hobbs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2342(5), which vests federal courts of appeals with exclusive jurisdiction to review all final STB orders.

II.

The landowners contend that because the "precise issue" — whether Southern Pacific consummated the abandonment of the railway, thereby terminating STB jurisdiction over the line — was decided in the Gulf Coast temporary injunction proceeding, that finding is entitled to preclusive effect. This plea for collateral estoppel is unavailing.

A.

"Collateral estoppel vel non is a question of law reviewed de novo." Baby Dolls Topless Saloons, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 295 F.3d 471, 478 (5th Cir.2002). Where a party seeks to employ collateral estoppel offensively, however, a court has broad discretion to determine whether relitigation of an issue should be precluded. See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331, 99 S.Ct. 645, 58 L.Ed.2d 552 (1979). "We thus review the district court's refusal to offensively apply collateral estoppel only for abuse of the broad discretion afforded it." Winters v. Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co., 149 F.3d 387, 392 (5th Cir.1998) (citing Copeland v....