Barr v. First Taxing Dist. of City of Norwalk

• Decision Date: 01 March 1960
• Citation: 147 Conn. 221,158 A.2d 740
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Evelyn BARR et al. v. FIRST TAXING DISTRICT OF the CITY OF NORWALK. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut

Page 740

158 A.2d 740

147 Conn. 221

Evelyn BARR et al. v. FIRST TAXING DISTRICT OF the CITY OF NORWALK.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

March 1, 1960.

Robert B. Seidman, Norwalk, with whom was Sidney Vogel, Norwalk, for plaintiffs.

Harry H. Hefferan, Jr., Norwalk, with whom was Fred L. Griffin, Norwalk, for defendant.

Before BALDWIN, C. J., and KING, MURPHY, MELLITZ and SHEA, JJ.

BALDWIN, Chief Justice.

Three plaintiffs brought this action against the defendant, alleging that they are residents of Norwalk residing outside of the territorial limits of the defendant and are residential customers of the waterworks which the defendant owns and operates in the part of the city where the defendant has the exclusive franchise for supplying water. The plaintiff alleged further that the rates charged them by the defendant are substantially higher than the residential rates charged customers living within the boundaries of the defendant and are unreasonably discriminatory; that the plaintiffs have paid the rates under duress and through mistake; and that the rates were fixed by the defendant without proper public notice and hearing as required by statute. The plaintiff sought temporary and permanent injunctions restraining the defendant from discriminating against them and those similarly situationed, and repayment of the amounts overcharged. Before any further pleadings were filed, the parties entered into a stipulation for a reservation to this court for advice upon certain stated questions. ¹ Unlike the usual reservation containing questions which, when answered, are, practically speaking, dispositive of the litigation, this reservation propounds questions which the parties think are likely to arise in the trial of the case after the pleadings are closed. Apparently the case is to be tried in any event. The reservation is merely ancillary to the case rather than dispositive of it. Whether all or any of the precise questions propounded will arise in the trial is admittedly speculative and uncertain. Nevertheless, the reservation was approved by the court.

General Statutes § 52-235 provides that questions of law may be reserved for the advice of this court in all cases in which an appeal could lawfully be taken were judgment rendered. Section 469 of the Practice Book provides that no reservation will be entertained in an action which is not ready for final judgment unless the questions presented are such as are, in the opinion of the court, reasonably certain to enter into the decision of the case and 'it appears that their present determination would be in the interest of simplicity, directness and economy of judicial action.' See Burton v. City of Hartford, 144 Conn. 80, 86, 127 A.2d 251; New Haven Metal & Heating Supply Co. v. Danaher, 128 Conn. 213, 218, 21 A.2d 383; Maltbie, Conn.App.Proc., p. 288. This court is not bound to entertain a reservation, and whether it will do so rests in its discretion. Greenwich Trust Co. v. Brixey, 117 Conn. 663, 664, 166 A. 918; City of New Haven v. New Haven Water Co., 132 Conn. 496, 516, 45 A.2d 831; Maltbie, loc. cit. Parties cannot, by making a reservation, compel action by this court. Potter v. Appleby, 136 Conn. 641, 643, 73 A.2d 819; Husted v. Mead, 58 Conn. 55, 66, 19 A. 233. While a reservation of questions of law can, in an appropriate case, promote 'simplicity, directness and economy of judicial action,' it does not necessarily follow that a case which appears to present an unusual factual situation or involve a number of legal issues should be reserved.

'[I]t is certain that the statute [now § 52-235] did not contemplate, and ought not to be construed to permit, that every question which a trial court may encounter in the progress of a cause, much less every one which it may anticipate that it may encounter, might be brought here at once upon its being either met or scented from afar and its determination had for the guidance of the trial court. Such a practice would inevitably result in this court being called upon to formulate principles of law which would never enter...